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Abstract  
 
Though much research has focused on sociopolitical integration of immigrants in 
the United States, less exists on integration of young immigrants in Europe, at least for an 
international audience of English or French speakers.  Given the ongoing process of 
globalization and increasing flows of immigration into and throughout Europe, it is 
essential that scholars come to understand better how immigrant youth are socialized into 
the cultural and political views that support democracy, especially those that emphasize 
liberty and human autonomy.  In particular it is important for political and educational 
leaders to understand how instruction and national-level decisions about curriculum are 
related to immigrants’ outcomes, as these are prime targets of policy reform. 
This study makes use of data from thirteen European countries included in 
CIVED 1999, an international data set collected by the International Association for the 
Evaluation of Educational Achievement, to study adolescents’ civic knowledge, civic 
participation, patriotism and three so-called ‘self-expression values’ (the social attitudes 
that best predict democracy): attitudes toward women’s, immigrants’, and ethnic 
minorities’ rights.  At the school level, the relationships of relatively more discussion-
based versus traditional lecture-style teaching methods are explored in two-level 
hierarchical linear models.  At the national level, countries’ systems of designing and 
disseminating curriculum—most centralized to most decentralized—are explored in 
 xiii 
relation to these outcomes using three-level hierarchical linear models. 
Analyses suggest that immigrant youth do not necessarily fit the stereotypes that 
native Europeans sometimes assign to immigrant groups (e.g., they tend to be equally 
supportive of women’s rights and just as likely to participate in civic-related activities).  
Additionally, at the school level, a classroom climate open to discussion is not the silver 
bullet for increasing adolescents’ tolerance of out-groups that other studies have found it 
to be, though this is likely because there is little information on the content of discussions 
and the skill with which teachers guide them.  Finally, confirming findings of recent 
comparative studies, a centrally controlled system for designing and disseminating 
curriculum appears to be strongly positively related to higher overall levels of all six civic 
outcomes, and to smaller disparities between immigrant and native students on nearly all 
outcomes.   
More concerted efforts are needed to study and improve civic education teachers’ 
skills in leading discussions (as well as their content knowledge), and to understand the 
value of a centralized system for curriculum control.  Findings suggest that a more open 
classroom, combined with a strong lecture component might have the greatest success in 
encouraging democratic student attitudes.  In addition, while difficult, shifting the locus 
of power over curriculum design to the central government appears to be important.  
Finally, we need more purposeful sampling of minority groups in large-scale 
international surveys so that scholars could make stronger claims about how those groups 
fare in various educational systems. 
 
 1 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
As forces of globalization have changed the nature of politics and trade, they have 
also led to increased immigration around the world.  In the decades after the fall of 
communism, levels of immigration have risen and the demographics of immigrant groups 
have diversified.  These population changes have dramatically affected both new and 
established democracies of Europe.  Bringing their cultural norms and values, skills, 
language, religious beliefs, and political attitudes, many of which set them apart from the 
European societies that ‘receive’ them, immigrants often face difficulties when trying to 
integrate into society.  Yet despite the continued economic need for immigrants “to keep 
the ratio of workers to pensioners steady” in welfare states, cultural changes and 
continuing immigration flows into Europe have given rise to nativist, anti-immigration, 
xenophobic movements that deepen the divide between the socially advantaged and 
disadvantaged (Collins, 2011; "Europe's need for immigrants: A continent on the move," 
2000).  This is a compelling problem for policymakers who hope to better integrate 
immigrants into the nation’s social fabric and political value system, and reduce 
disparities in social advantage. 
Particularly interesting sites for studying immigrant integration are schools, into 
which immigrants’ children have flooded in alongside native students.  The knowledge 
 2 
sharing and socialization elements of schools have great potential to aid immigrant youth 
in the processes of integrating into their new country’s government and civil society, as 
well as the new society’s cultural and political values.  Educational and political leaders 
hope that these children will grow up to be contributing members of society, so it is of 
great interest to educational researchers and political scientists whether and how 
immigrant children are integrated into democratic societies; i.e., whether and how they 
take up or reject receiving countries’ values and attitudes.  This dissertation investigates 
immigrants’ sociopolitical integration and the role that progressive educational methods 
and national curriculum policies play in that process: in part it is about the skills required 
for life in a political democracy, and in part it is about the attitudes, or cultural values, 
that engender a more tolerant social democracy.   
As a means of measuring the degree of immigrants’ sociopolitical integration at 
the still-impressionable age of 14, the democratic-oriented qualities I study are students’ 
civic knowledge, extracurricular participation, and four ‘attitudes’: three of tolerance (of 
women’s, immigrants’, and ethnic minorities’ rights), one of identity (affinity for the 
nation, or patriotism).  This dissertation is a bridge between educational and political 
science research: while individuals’ characteristics are important considerations in 
studying these qualities, I argue that educational contexts—particularly the use of 
discussion-based teaching methods—and features of the national context—especially the 
national system for regulating curriculum—are related to these outcomes.  I contend that 
policy makers interested in improving immigrants’ sociopolitical integration could take 
action at high levels based on this study’s findings.  
I am interested in democracy primarily because, despite its flaws, it is the most 
 3 
inclusive, humane system of governance yet devised.  Because it offers the greatest 
freedom of self-determination of any political system, and until there exists an even better 
system, I am wholeheartedly invested in its establishment and consolidation.  I focus on 
European democracies for three reasons.  First, literature on immigrant students’ civic 
integration in that region is modest (at least for an international audience, i.e., who read 
English or French).  Second, the push and pull factors producing such high numbers of 
migrants to the region are not expected to diminish in the near future.  Third, the 
European Union—of which most European countries are members—has changed 
politically, demographically, and territorially in the last decade.  As its internal borders 
become blurrier, findings about countries whose experiences with immigrant integration 
are more successful than others might be able to serve as role models for fellow member-
states.   
 
1.1 Democracy and Immigration 
Democracy, the political system of nearly every country in the European region, 
is founded on the ideal of citizens’ regular and informed participation in political and 
civic conversations and events.  Functionally, it is meant to give a country’s citizens the 
opportunity—through meaningful elections, and a free press, and so forth—to express 
their opinions about how the country should be run.  Though the structures of 
government differ across contemporary European democracies, each strives to bring 
citizens into political conversations and ensure that they are capable of thinking and 
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acting in the simultaneous interests of themselves, their communities, their countries, and 
the democratic way of life.1  
This is an ideal, though.  Globalization is a process by which traditional 
understandings of national borders and sovereignty are broken down by supranational 
economic systems and increased linkages between societies.  In the face of it, nation-
states tend to focus on national material gain while, as Martin Carnoy writes, “much less 
attention is given to the promotion of ‘equal treatment’ among various ethnic groups 
living within national boundaries or among regions” (1999; McGinn, 1997).  Indeed, 
though the white, historically Christan European population is demographically on the 
decline, immigrants who could keep the population steady tend to face serious obstacles 
to integration in their adopted countries (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010; "Europe's 
need for immigrants: A continent on the move," 2000).  Often because of culture clashes, 
religion, skin color, or foreign origin, immigrants encounter xenophobia and racism.  
Warranted or not, natives also tend to express concern that immigrants are threatening 
their job security (Bjørklund & Andersen, 1999; European Commission, 1997).   
Intolerant attitudes negatively impact immigrants’ rates of employment and 
intermarriage, educational attainment, quality of education, living conditions, and degree 
of civic participation, all indicators of how well they are integrated into society (Spencer, 
2003).  Immigration is a great challenge to countries whose status as nation-states with a 
                                                
1 I do not dwell on the various existing structures of European democracies in this study.  Suffice it to say 
that most European democracies are parliamentary in structure, with separate people acting as head of 
government and head of state.  Where a prime minister is the head of government in such systems, either a 
president or a monarch may be the head of state, with limited political power and a more ceremonial 
presence.  The prime minister and his or her cabinet of ministers are the executive branch, accountable to 
and representative of the legislative branch of government.  This is in contrast to the presidential system of 
government exemplified by the United States, where the president—as the executive branch—may not 
represent the political makeup of Congress—the legislative branch—and thus need not reflect Congress’s 
political views (Stepan & Skach, 1993). 
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dominant ethnic and/or cultural identity is, ostensibly, threatened by the presence of 
oppositional values among new groups (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007).  Where 
intolerant attitudes toward other ethnic groups brew, they can (or can be perceived to) 
threaten the values of political democracy or society’s view and expectations of their 
political leaders. 
 
1.2 Pro-Democratic Cultural Views and Preparedness for Citizenship 
1.2.1 Cultural Views that Support Democracy 
Half of this study is devoted to adolescents’ cultural views on women’s, 
immigrants’, and ethnic minorities’ rights.  Among adults of voting age, these views at 
the societal level are strongly predictive of democratic governance (Inglehart & Welzel, 
2005).  Largely because European societies are generally materially comfortable, 
unconcerned with food shortages, they have developed very strong, liberal cultural views 
of women’s social and economic roles, as well as on the place of minority groups in 
society.  Immigrants from countries not as materially secure tend to have less liberal, 
more traditional views of rights and roles of women and other traditionally marginalized 
groups.  Those countries tend to be less or not at all democratic, which means that 
immigrants arrive with different cultural values and different understandings of the 
political process.  This is precisely the clash of cultures that causes European 
policymakers so much distress.  Immigrants are clearly a non-negligible and increasing 
portion of society in modern Europe.  Their cultural values add diversity to society’s 
overall values, which has ramifications for how democratic countries actually work 
(Klausen, 2009).  
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1.2.2 Patriotism, Civic Knowledge, and Civic Participation 
In addition to the three democratic attitudes toward women’s, immigrants’, and 
ethnic minorites’ rights, I am concerned with three other characteristics that indicate 
students’ preparedness for and commitment to citizenship, which are often studied in 
relation to schools.  First is an individual’s feeling of pride in or loyalty to the nation, or 
patriotism.  Feelings like these are not necessarily desirable in a democracy if they take 
on an air of “chauvinistic nationalism” that is prejudiced against outsiders (Schulz & 
Sibberns, 2004a, p. 168).  However, patriotism in the sense of loyalty to the principles of 
democracy or, as phrased by educational theorist Lawrence Blum, the “best traditions of 
[the] nation” can be advantageous to democracy by engendering a commitment to service 
and actions that support democratic goals, also known as civic participation (2007, p. 63).  
To understand what the “best traditions” of one’s nation are requires a certain breadth and 
depth of knowledge of the nation in light of democracy’s objectives and structures.  
Scholars of civic education Joseph Kahne and Ellen Middaugh relate patriotism 
implicitly to this civic knowledge: “[If] one’s love of country is based in part of 
recognition of the desirability of life in a democratic society, such patriotic commitments 
can help citizens identify with the nation’s democratic ideals” (2006, p. 602).   
As such, adolescents’ patriotism is linked to two other qualities important to 
democracy’s maintenance: knowledge about the political and civic realms and 
participation in civic-oriented extracurricular activities.  Each of these is valuable to 
democratic society at large, but also to an individual’s experience in a democracy.  In an 
ideal participatory democracy, citizens have access to various kinds of political and civic 
information that they can evaluate, and then act on in their own and their communities’ 
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interests.  First, the effective evaluation of information depends in many cases on civic 
and political knowledge: what laws govern behavior, who runs what institution, how 
citizens can air grievances, what the rights and responsibilities of citizens are.  Second, 
civic participation—acting in one’s own and others’ interests—of some kind is a 
fundamental expectation in democracies.  Without citizen participation in public life, 
democracies risk losing the sense of ‘rule by, of, and for the people’ to a sense of rule by, 
of, and for some people.  Therefore, while much emphasis is on voting, it also includes 
volunteerism, campaigning, and advocacy, whether the latter is through petitions or 
protests.  When it comes to adolescents’ preparation for this part of citizenship, 
researchers have repeatedly found that greater civic knowledge and volunteer efforts or 
membership in civic-oriented groups are associated with a greater likelihood of voting as 
adults (McFarland & Thomas, 2006; Yates & Youniss, 1998).   
 
1.3 The Role of Schools in Adolescents’ Civic Development 
While media consumption and interaction with knowledgeable, civically active 
people may increase people’s civic knowledge, likelihood of participation, and even 
tolerance for out-groups, young people’s most structured source of civic knowledge and 
experience tends to be the school: the classes they take, the instructors they interact with, 
and the peers they socialize with.  Schools are uniquely positioned, furthermore, to reach 
entire generations of people, and thus have the potential to teach democratic philosophies, 
actions, and structures in such a way that all future voters have them in common.  To 
many early proponents of public education, the main purpose of public schools is to 
prepare students for citizenship (Jefferson, 1786/1939; Mann, 1845/1957).  In particular, 
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schools ideally provide immigrant youth with invaluable opportunities to learn about and 
acclimate to the ‘host’ society.  Researchers have found strong relationships between 
coursework in civics or history and civic knowledge.  In turn, greater civic knowledge—
for that matter, greater academic achievement and educational attainment overall—is 
associated with more tolerant attitudes toward people of other ethnicities and greater civic 
participation (Flanagan, Cumsille, Gill, & Gallay, 2007; Hjerm, 2005; Nie & Hillygus, 
2001; Sotelo, 1997).  
However, though each country provides schooling for its native and foreign-born 
youth, scholars and politicians in Europe and the US have noted a serious problem: 
educational outcomes for native and immigrant youth tend to be quite different (Faist, 
1995; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006, 2007; Suárez-
Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, & Todorova, 2008; Willms, 2006, p. 57).  Beyond that, 
immigrants’ experiences with schooling overall tend to be negative.  Immigrant students 
may have difficulty with the language of the school, be placed in classes that are less 
academically rigorous (a process known as ‘tracking’), be taught by teachers with low 
expectations and rigid teacher-centered methods, and they tend to leave school earlier 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010; Rumbaut, 2004; 
Torney-Purta & Wilkenfeld, 2009).  Most studies address immigrants’ achievement in 
academic subjects like math and science and find them to be less knowledgeable than 
their non-immigrant peers.  If immigrants’ civic outcomes—knowledge in particular—
follow those patterns, then they are not as knowledgeable of the political system they 
now live under and thus are less well integrated into their peer group and less prepared 
for citizenship as adults.   
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It is well known that certain individual characteristics are strongly related to civic-
oriented qualities, though because of a dearth of research, less is known about whether 
those characteristics operate differently for immigrant students than for natives, as they 
do for overall academic achievement.  In addition, while much research exists on the 
relationship of academic achievement to structures of schooling and instructional 
methods, little research has been done on the relationships of these characteristics with 
immigrants’ civic outcomes in Europe.  In some research, scholars have found student 
attitudes, inclination to participate in civic activities, and knowledge to be highly 
sensitive to teaching methods and the kind and quality of discourse in the classroom 
(Flanagan et al., 2007).  Particularly effective is an experiential approach, according to 
American civic education scholar Carole Hahn: discussions of controversial topics like 
immigration policy, welfare policy, and abortion; student-driven projects on the 
environment or local issues; and role-playing or attending actual panel discussions or 
debates on political issues (1998).   
In addition to the content of civic education classrooms, their general tone is 
important, as well.  However, it is unclear whether this is so for all students.  Multiple 
studies have shown that an atmosphere of respectful curiosity, where comments are not 
offered as—or received with—judgments of what is good or bad, tends to result in 
students learning more, having richer conversations about political or social topics, being 
more tolerant of traditional out-groups (such as ethnic minorities), and increasingly 
believing in their own political self-efficacy (Avery, Bird, Johnstone, Sullivan, & 
Thalhammer, 1992; Hahn, 1991, 1998; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schulz, 
2001; Torney-Purta & Wilkenfeld, 2009).   
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At a higher level, one concerning national policies on school curriculum, Jan 
Janmaat and Nathalie Mons found that a country’s system for designing and 
disseminating curriculum is related both to students’ tolerance of immigrants and their 
feelings of patriotism.  More interestingly, these researchers show that the site of 
curriculum control—e.g., central government, regional government, local schools—also 
is related to how similar ethnic minority students’ attitudes are to majority attitudes.  
Attitudes of native students toward immigrants are more positive and inclusive in 
countries with more centralized control of curriculum than in countries with highly 
disparate curricula.  Furthermore, ethnic minority students’ patriotism is much closer to 
majority students’ patriotism in more centrally controlled countries (2011). 
In this study I consider the relationships of students’ civic outcomes with several 
features of schools, but am primarily interested in various kinds of instruction: a) more 
discussion-based, with much student-directed, student-oriented classwork; and b) more 
lecture- or textbook-based, with traditional note-taking and memorization of facts.  At the 
national level, this study explores the relationship of ‘territorial differentiation’ (systems 
of curriculum control) with patriotism, civic knowledge and behavior, and three pro-
democratic attitudes as an extension of Janmaat and Mons’ work. 
 
1.4 Theoretical Model and Research Questions 
The model shown in Figure 1-1 was created by the International Association for 
the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA; the creators of the CIVED data that I 
use—see section 1.5) and represents the various contextual factors that influence how 
students develop civic knowledge, citizenship, and social or civic values both in and out 
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of school.  Accordingly, this model situates students at the center of these contexts.  
Surrounding the student are the five types of “social actors” with whom students 
are most closely in contact: family members, school personnel, community leaders, youth 
organizations, and peers.  The larger of the two circles represents the environment of 
societal discourse around goals and values, which informs how those social actors act and 
present information to students.  Finally, at the octagonal perimeter, there are national 
institutions, values, symbols, and societal structures informing the public discourse 
(Lehmann, 2004).   
  
Figure 1-1. Theoretical model created by IEA to guide the development of CIVED 1999, the survey 
whose data I use.   
Note. From “IEA Civic Education Study technical report,” by W. Schulz & H. Sibberns (Eds.), 2004, 
Amsterdam, p. 11.  Copyright 2004 by IEA.  Reprinted with permission. 
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In my study, the qualities of students I explore—my six dependent variables—are 
civic knowledge, participation in civic-oriented extracurricular activities, patriotism, and 
attitudes toward the rights of women, immigrants, and ethnic minorities.  I investigate 
hypotheses about immigrant adolescents’ sociopolitical integration into their European 
societies as a function of a) individual characteristics, b) features of schools, and c) 
features of the national context.  In particular, I ask the following questions about 
immigrants and their native-born peers in Europe:  
Research question 1: What are European adolescents’ overall levels of civic 
knowledge, civic participation, patriotism, and self-expression values (attitudes toward 
rights for traditionally marginalized groups—women, immigrants, and ethnic minorities)?  
To what extent do immigrants and native-born adolescents differ on these civic 
outcomes? 
• To what extent are overall levels and immigrant/native differences associated with 
the amount of time students have lived in the country and their home language? 
• To what extent are overall civic outcomes associated with adolescents’ civic 
knowledge, extracurricular participation, and perceptions of an open classroom 
climate?   
Research question 2: To what extent are European adolescents’ overall civic 
outcomes related to their educational environments, and to differences between 
immigrants and native students on these outcomes?   
Specifically, how are the following characteristics of schools related to these civic 
outcomes? 
• instructional methods (discussion-based vs. traditional lecture/note-taking) 
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• ethnic heterogeneity (the relative size of the immigrant population) 
• average family educational resources 
Research question 3: To what extent are characteristics of the countries in which 
adolescents reside related to overall civic outcomes, as well as differences in civic 
knowledge, participation, and self-expression values between immigrant and native 
students?  Specifically, how are the following characteristics related to students’ attitudes 
and behaviors? 
• system of curricular control (centralized to decentralized) 
• relative affluence 
• relative degree of income inequality 
I have broken up these questions according to the ‘level’ at which the independent 
variables (predictors) of interest are measured: first students, then schools, then countries.  
The structure of the questions also mirrors the structure of the data and analytical 
techniques that I use to answer them.   
For example, the student at the center of Figure 1-1, with unique demographic 
characteristics and an identity as a student and civic actor, provides the information for 
addressing research question 1, with special emphasis on the differences between 
immigrants and native-born students.  Moving outward from there to the inner circle of 
‘social actors,’ I address research question 2 with information about peers’ perspectives 
on the educational environment and socioeconomic situation.  Finally, for research 
question 3, I study several characteristics along the octagonal perimeter, where high-level 
contextual features influence everything inside the model.  The analysis at this level 
allows me to examine primarily educational values (as represented by the national system 
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for designing and disseminating curriculum), but also socioeconomic stratification (for 
this study’s purposes, income inequality) and economic process/values (as proxied for 
with Gross National Income). 
The research questions and techniques I use to answer them can provide 
researchers with information about whether European countries generally have similar 
civic-related immigrant integration and tolerance issues in schools, or whether certain 
countries are better positioned than others for successful integration.  As civic education 
scholars Hoskins, Barber, Van Nijlen, and Villalba put it recently, international data 
collection “enhance[s] monitoring capacities for policy making” (2011, p. 82).  Unequal 
or impoverished economic circumstances are difficult, but not intractable problems.  
Decisions about responsibility for school curriculum are politically charged in many 
countries, where people hold strong beliefs about the rights of localities or regions over 
the rights of a central government.  But these decisions are similarly are not so 
entrenched that changing them is unthinkable (as Americans are seeing in current 
discussions about Common Core Standards).  Likewise, where characteristics of schools 
are related to students’ preparedness for citizenship, it may be that schools’ demographic 
compositions or teacher education for more effective civic instruction can be valuable 
policy levers. 
 
1.5 Data: CIVED 1999 
To address these research questions, I use data from over 33,000 students in the 
Civics Study (CIVED) of 1999, sponsored by the International Association for the 
Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), which surveyed student achievement in 
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and attitudes about civics in 28 countries around the world.  This dataset has great 
advantages, including much larger sample sizes and ‘representativeness’—both of Europe 
and of students in individual countries—than would be feasible in any study a researcher 
could conduct on his or her own.  Today, the data from CIVED are twelve years old and 
represent the “world” prior to September 11, 2001.  From one perspective, this is 
problematic because the world has changed dramatically since the millennium: 
immigration flows and the politics of immigration and integration are quite different, as 
are modes of communication and information-sharing.  However, IEA followed up on the 
CIVED study in 2008-2009 with the International Civics and Citizenship Study (ICCS), 
which surveyed contemporary adolescents on the same topics and will intentionally serve 
as a source of comparison to CIVED for national policymakers interested in the 
development of democratic citizens.  (The ICCS data have not yet been released to the 
public, making CIVED the best international data on civics available to date.)   
There are a few limitations to these data, most important of which is that they are 
not longitudinal.  Without information from multiple time points researchers can make no 
comments about change or learning over time, nor can they make any inferences that a 
certain characteristic x actually caused a certain outcome y to happen.  Cognizant of this 
limitation, I must ask readers—and take pains myself—to take my findings as suggestive, 
not conclusive, and certainly not causal.   
Another limitation is a matter of theoretical interest vs. practical capacity.  I am 
theoretically interested in immigrants’ civic preparedness and pro-democratic attitudes in 
immigration countries across Europe.  Practically, however, I am limited to exploring just 
thirteen European countries, and these do not necessarily include all countries that readily 
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spring to mind when one thinks of Europe’s immigration problems.  Neither France nor 
the Netherlands chose to participate in CIVED, so despite their prominent domestic 
debates about integration and immigration policy, I am unable to comment on the status 
of immigrant adolescents’ civic knowledge and attitudes in those nations.  Also, though 
twenty-two European countries did participate in CIVED, I had to exclude nine of them 
from this study.  Some had insufficient numbers of immigrant students in their samples.  
Others, like Cyprus or Estonia in the recent past, due to problematic definitions of what 
territory or name constituted their country, the question ‘were you born in this country?’ 
could be difficult to interpret for some students in those countries.  Despite those 
challenges, the use of just thirteen countries in this study does allow me to investigate 
portions of several salient regions of the European continent, though it is not a 
statistically representative, complete picture of that continent and its adolescent students’ 
experiences.  These two drawbacks aside, the data and this study lay an important 
foundation for understanding the relationship of educational features to civic 
preparedness. 
In order to address my research questions based on multilevel data (students 
‘nested’ in schools nested in countries), I select hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) 
methods to analyze the relationships between students, school, and country characteristics 
and students’ civic outcomes.   
 
1.6 Summary 
This international, comparative study contributes to our understanding of the 
expanding features of schools, particularly in the area of instructional methods as related 
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to adolescents’ pro-democratic attitudes and preparedness for democratic citizenship.  It 
is especially useful for shedding light on how immigrant students differ from their native-
born peers in preparedness and offers some suggestive findings on how the educational 
environment is associated with that difference.  In political science, this dissertation 
extends understandings of societies’ pro-democratic cultural values to encompass parallel 
understandings among young, school-age people whose values are still highly influenced 
by peers.  The study is especially important in light of ongoing conversations about 
immigrant integration on both sides of the Atlantic.  Furthermore, as data will soon be 
available on adolescents’ civic attitudes in the late 2000s, interesting studies can soon be 
done of the changes in immigrants’ attitudes of tolerance and civic preparedness since the 
millennium.   
Since CIVED was administered in mid-1999, several elements of the world’s 
immigration “story” have changed.  The data represent a pre-2001 world, when terrorism 
was mainly a local problem and ex-Communist countries—still reeling from the collapse 
of the Soviet empire—had not yet joined NATO or the European Union.  At that time, the 
integration approach known as ‘multiculturalism,’ which granted immigrants all the 
benefits of citizenship without the expectation that they would come to share the host 
country’s values, meant that Arabs and Muslims generally did not face widespread 
suspicion.  However, the attack on the Pentagon and the destruction of the Twin Towers 
of New York City’s World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, brought to light a 
radicalization of at least a small—but increasingly important—minority of Muslims 
concerned with getting revenge on western societies, whose people and governments they 
perceive to be violent, godless, imperialist oppressors.  These dramatic attacks caused 
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visible backlash in western countries against Muslims, immigrants, and immigration.  
Simultaneously, Muslims and immigrants in these western countries became more vocal 
and defensive about western societies’ assumptions about immigrant assimilation.  As 
some political parties in these countries have pronounced the failure of assimilation 
efforts, and immigrants have felt rejected and disrespected, some have clung to their 
cultural traditions harder, becoming more extreme and, in some cases, violent (consider 
the subway bombers in London, riots in France, and honor killings in Germany, among 
others; Lalwani, 2008; Lim, 2005).  
 These are the drawbacks to official multiculturalism in Europe: what was 
intended as a means of recognizing differences has effectively entrenched these 
differences—particularly religious ones between historically Christian and Islamic people 
—and made them appear irreconcilable.  Indeed some researchers think they are 
irreconcilable.2  Whether these political and greater social problems have altered young 
immigrants’ views of their own possibilities and the democratic system in host countries 
is of great interest, but not well researched. 
My study builds on a few quite recent studies of immigrants and ethnic minorities 
in Europe using CIVED data, and provides pan-European insights into how local and 
national educational contexts are associated with students’ readiness for and integration 
into democratic citizenship and life in increasingly diverse societies.  It contributes to the 
literature in two major ways: 
• Its new, wider focus on self-expression values expands how we think about 
immigration and education specifically for democracy. 
                                                
2 See Paul M. Sniderman and Louk Hagendoorn’s (2007) When Ways of Life Collide, and Christopher 
Caldwell’s (2009) Reflections on the Revolution in Europe. 
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• It provides a great baseline for studying shifts or trends in immigrant and native-
born adolescents’ attitudes and behavior before and after the millennium, if paired 
with findings from IEA’s more recent civic education study. 
The push and pull factors producing such high numbers of migrants are not 
expected to diminish in the near future.  Debates about civic education and the role and 
expectations of immigrants in receiving countries have become much more consequential 
in the last decade.  If countries and schools can learn now what elements of education 
policy—especially instruction or curriculum regulation—are best or least conducive to 
democratic thought or action in ethnically diverse societies, then they may be better 
prepared to meet the needs of all European youth.  
 
1.7 Outline of the Dissertation 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation has introduced the main topic of immigrants in 
European democracies, and raised questions regarding their preparedness for citizenship 
in those democracies.  Chapter 2 follows with much greater depth on democracy’s nature 
and intent, especially as it relates to schools.  Chapter 3 reviews literature on the causes 
and terminology of immigration and its various consequences for societies; the prospects 
for adult immigrants’ political integration; and immigrants’ academic achievement and 
special needs in schools.  I then provide an overview of what is known about immigrant 
students’ experiences of civic education in particular, as well as their degree of pro-
democratic attitudes (self-expression values).  After pointing out some of the holes in this 
literature base, I pose my research questions with some general hypotheses.   
With Chapter 4 I re-introduce IEA’s theoretical model and how it is reflected in 
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my research questions; describe the CIVED data and my analytical sampling methods 
and measures; and walk through descriptive and hierarchical linear modeling analytical 
processes.  Chapters 5, 6, and 7 respectively present results from within-school models 
(research question 1), between-school models (research question 2), and between-country 
models (research question 3).  Chapter 8 offers concluding remarks on the contribution of 
this dissertation to understandings of immigrants’ sociopolitical integration in 
adolescence.  It focuses on instructional methods and national curriculum policy, because 
those findings are the most important contributors to greater understandings of 
educational policy issues in immigrant integration.  Other school and national 
characteristics are discussed in chapters 6 and 7.  
Appendices include a) supplementary information on democracy and immigrants’ 
schooling experiences; b) detailed data tables; and c) technical notes providing detailed 
information on analytic techniques. 
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Chapter 2 
Democracy and Its Connection to Schools 
 
As I discussed in Chapter 1, democracy is the system of governance most 
concerned with individual freedom and choice, and nearly all European nations’ political 
systems are democratic.  To bring their citizens into the national conversation about 
politics, democratic governments encourage or mandate some form of civic education, 
whether in schools or through youth organizations.  How schools and other organizations 
enact civic education is not necessarily uniform across countries, or even within them.  
The democratic values and governmental structures of individual countries determine 
whether central organizations prescribe the outline and content of academic learning for 
the nation’s schools, or whether schools are responsible for adapting that curriculum or 
designing their own.  In other words, the types of opportunities students have to learn 
about and practice citizenship can vary greatly across countries. 
Furthermore, contemporary European democracies have embraced varying 
philosophies of social and economic equality, ranging from high taxation that 
redistributes wealth and income across all strata of society to low taxation and regulation 
that emphasizes individuals’ abilities to change their economic circumstances.  Economic 
policies—which affect democratic societies’ affluence and income distributions—derive 
from an overall interpretation of democratic values and the role of government in the 
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lives of people.  As researchers interested in globalization, sociology, and comparative 
education have found, the effects of economic policies are not limited to monetary 
resources, but often include educational, health, and other social outcomes for students 
(Condron, 2011; Marks, 2005; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009).   
This chapter begins with a more detailed review of democracy’s fundamental 
tenets, as well as the variations that obtain in democracy’s political and economic 
structures.  I offer some commentary and a hypothesis on the ramifications of the latter 
for schools and society, based on the theoretical framework that places students’ civic 
learning in the context of national economic policies and values.  I then move to a 
description of the role of schools in democracies, the role of democracy in schools, and 
the common approaches to prescribing curriculum for and instructing all young people 
about their roles as citizens.  I also offer a hypothesis on how systems of curricular 
control relate to what I anticipate is already a gap in civic knowledge and democratic 
attitudes between immigrants and native-born students.   
  
2.1 Democracy and Related Characteristics 
As this study’s focus is on the knowledge, behaviors, and attitudes that support 
and strengthen democracy, I find it important to illustrate the ‘world view’ that 
democracy promotes and how it is enacted in the contemporary world.  Because there are 
various interpretations of ‘democracy,’ it is instructive to note its etymology.  The word’s 
roots are Greek, in which demos means ‘[common] people’ and kratia means ‘rule, 
strength, authority, or power’ ("Democracy," n.d.).  Today, the ‘common people’ 
suggests the great mass of individuals who constitute a nation’s citizenry, and are the 
 23 
source of local and national decision-making.  It is not solely the social elite who decide, 
and each citizen has something in common with each other citizen—the ability to 
participate in decision-making—which connotes individualism and equality.3   
Political scientists Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl point out that there are many 
types of democracy, “and their diverse practices produce a similarly varied set of effects.  
The specific form democracy takes is contingent upon a country’s socioeconomic 
conditions as well as its entrenched state structures and policy practices,” both of which 
depend on its history (1991, p. 76).  To constitute liberal, ideal democratic governance, 
whether in a direct democracy—like that exemplified by New England town meetings—
or representative democracy—with elected representatives—elections and voting must be 
free and fair, meaning that citizens cannot be forced to pay to vote, nor may they be 
coerced to vote a certain way.  Governing bodies make decisions based on ‘majority rule’ 
in voting results, which means that the largest number of votes one way or another 
decides the question.  As consolation, voters in the minority expect that the majority will 
not unduly infringe on the minority’s rights in enacting its decisions and will allow the 
minority to effect change in the future through elections (Diamond, 1999; Schmitter & 
Karl, 1991).   
Furthermore, electoral democracy is essentially accompanied by rule of law—not 
rule by decree or governmental whim.  The rule of law is upheld by an independent 
judicial body, and individuals’ freedom of association, belief, and expression, either 
through speech or the press are protected (Freedom House, n.d.).  Since elections are 
infrequent, these freedoms are means through which “citizens can seek to influence 
                                                
3 In ancient Athens neither women nor slaves were citizens and therefore they could not participate in 
governance.  The notion of ‘citizen’ today has become vastly more inclusive. 
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public policy through a wide variety of other intermediaries” in the periods between 
elections.  As Schmitter and Karl (1991) explain: “Modern democracy, in other words, 
offers a variety of competitive processes and channels for the expression of interests and 
values—associational as well as partisan, functional as well as territorial, collective as 
well as individual. All are integral to its practice” (p. 78).  To secure these freedoms, 
democratic governments take responsibility for respecting individuals’ liberty and 
humanity, as well as protecting minority rights (Diamond, 1999; Linz & Stepan, 1996; 
Rawls, 1993).4  These are the moral principles that lead to a view of democracy as a way 
of life, not just governance, and they constitute some of the universal aspects of 
democracy that students are expected to know about (Kelly, 1995). 
With this understanding of what democracy entails, it should also be understood 
that while it does not necessarily treat all people equally, all people are expected to have 
equal access to the processes that result in governmental action.  Ideally, democracy is a 
form of either directly elected or representative governance that also protects the civil 
liberties of citizens (Cunningham, 2002; Perry, 1944).  It would be a bold claim that an 
ideal democracy exists in the contemporary world; one can easily argue that even long-
established democracies stand to benefit from regular critical review and improvement.  
However, those of western Europe—with a longer history of democratic rule—most 
closely resemble the ideal of political rights and wide-ranging civil liberties.  Eastern 
Europe has had many fewer years of recent experience with democracy and while a 
number of its constituent countries practice western-like democracy, not all do.5 
                                                
4 See Appendix A, Section 1 (page 230), for a more detailed explanation of various interpretations of 
democracy’s fundamental values. 
5 See Appendix A, Section 2 (page 236) for an explanation of how countries ‘rank’ on a continuum of free 
to unfree. 
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2.1.1 Cultural Values and their Relation to Democracy 
Political leaders in affluent Western democracies have watched as globalization 
and increased immigration have coincided with a continuous decline in trust in 
government (Kamens, 2010).  However, attitudes of trust in government officials, or even 
in democracy, are not necessarily the attitudes or orientations about which democratic 
governments should worry.  In fact, trust in national institutions and leaders is just as 
likely to support democracy as authoritarianism.  There are other attitudes and social 
values that matter more for the maintenance—or consolidation—of democracy both 
individually and at the level of society.  
Over time, with greater material security, European societies have developed a 
relatively strong orientation toward so-called ‘self-expression’ values of choice and 
individuality.  With the World Values Survey, a prominent study of modernization and 
cultural change, political scientists Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel have shown 
these self-expression values to be strongly supportive—even predictive—of a more 
democratic society: 
When survival is uncertain, cultural diversity seems threatening.  When there isn’t 
enough to go around, foreigners are perceived as dangerous outsiders who may 
take away one’s sustenance.  People cling to traditional gender roles and sexual 
norms, emphasizing absolute rules and old familiar norms, in an attempt to 
maximize predictability in an uncertain world.  Conversely, when survival begins 
to be taken for granted, ethnic and cultural diversity become increasingly 
acceptable—indeed, beyond a certain point, diversity is not only tolerated but 
becomes positively valued because it is interesting and stimulating. (italics in 
original; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 54) 
Whereas Europe typifies the latter value system, in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, 
from which many of Europe’s recent immigrants have come, material security—and thus 
survival—is not as sure as in Europe.  Cultural values in those regions tend far more 
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toward what Inglehart and Welzel refer to as ‘survival’ values.  It is telling that countries 
in those regions are less likely to be democratic in name, and even less likely to be 
democratic in practice.  Self-expression values, then—the “most crucial component of a 
democratic civic culture”—are those that “reflect an emancipative and humanistic ethos, 
emphasizing human autonomy and choice.”  Through this emphasis on the rights of 
others to express themselves and have freedom of choice, it becomes acceptable to grant 
equal rights to women, homosexuals, foreigners, and other out-groups including 
immigrants (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, pp. 54, 258).  In my study, I investigate 
adolescents’ attitudes toward women’s, immigrants’, and ethnic minorities’ rights as 
indicators of how closely they identify with self-expression values. 
 
2.1.2 Economic Characteristics of European Democracies 
National affluence.  As findings from the World Values Survey (WVS) showed, 
a nation’s relative level of affluence is positively associated with its citizens’ embrace of 
more inclusive, democratic, self-expression values.  (In part, this seems to be because 
national wealth is generally related to the number of years of uninterrupted democracy a 
country has experienced, though the correlation is not perfect; e.g., Germany is wealthier 
but has experienced fewer years of uninterrupted democracy than Belgium).  WVS 
researchers Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel explain it this way: “Individual 
security increases empathy, making people more aware of long-term risks.  The rise of 
self-expression values fuels humanistic risk perceptions” (2005, p. 33).  This more 
humanistic worldview in wealthier countries, held at the societal level, may in turn 
influence young people’s attitudes towards traditional out-groups like immigrants, ethnic 
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minorities, and women.  (However, when it comes to civic participation, some civic 
education researchers have found that it is in the more recently established democracies, 
with far lower national affluence, where students anticipate higher levels of civic 
participation; Hoskins et al., 2011).   
Income inequality.  Another feature of the national context related to civic 
orientations is the degree of inequality between citizens at the low and high ends of the 
economic spectrum, especially since this difference may represent some degree of 
difference in social classes’ tendency toward self-expression values.  Economic policies 
for growth and development have consequences for public and private sector industries 
and services, including education and health, and for how people from various points on 
the social spectrum get access to those services.  Driven by different philosophies on the 
relationship of the state to the individual, economic policies that result in more or less 
inequality in a country’s income distribution (the difference between the incomes of 
wealthy and poor people) have been shown to have differential influences on native and 
immigrant people, including school-age children (Koopmans, 2010; Schneeweis, 2009). 
Through regulation of industries and relatively high taxation, one form of 
capitalist economic policies seeks to redistribute wealth across the social spectrum, while 
also maintaining high standards of living.  American sociologist Lane Kenworthy refers 
to this as ‘egalitarian capitalism,’ and across Europe variations of it have resulted in 
varying degrees of income inequality.  Kenworthy argues that redistributing wealth to 
reduce income inequality is desirable because it is fair.  Arguably a large part of a 
person’s economic success can be attributed to lucky life circumstances, rather than 
personal choices.  Thus he advocates for conscious actions to help those whose quality of 
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life was not their choice.  Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, British social 
epidemiologists, show that, beyond narrowing the gap between social classes’ 
educational and health outcomes and thus engendering national social cohesion, countries 
with narrower income distributions tend to have lower overall homicide and 
imprisonment rates, lower rates of mental illness and obesity, and greater likelihood of 
social mobility (2009, 2011).   
Educationally, other cross-national studies have shown that greater income 
inequality depresses math, reading, and science achievement overall, and indeed results 
in larger percentages of low-achieving students and smaller percentages of high-
achieving students (Chiu, 2010; Chiu & Khoo, 2005; Chudgar & Luschei, 2009; 
Condron, 2011; Marks, 2005).  Taken together, all of this evidence suggests that a 
commitment to reducing economic disparities between rich and poor has wide-ranging 
societal implications, among which may be levels of civic knowledge (an academic 
subject) and patriotism, an indicator of how strongly one feels one’s country represents 
democratic ideals of equality. 
  
2.2 Preparing Young People for Citizenship 
Recall that this dissertation explores the relationship of the school context to 
young people’s pro-democratic attitudes and preparedness for citizenship.  Since the time 
of Thomas Jefferson, the creation and consolidation of a democratic society has been 
seen as heavily dependent on civic and citizenship education, particularly in schools (e.g., 
Jefferson, 1786/1939).  As the American public school advocate Horace Mann argued in 
1845, the primary responsibility of schooling was to prepare schoolchildren—immigrant 
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and American-born—for democratic citizenship:  
The great moral attribute of self-government cannot be born and matured in a day; 
and if school children are not trained to it, we only prepare ourselves for 
disappointment, if we expect it from grown men.  Every body acknowledges the 
justness of the declaration, that a foreign people, born and bred and dwarfed under 
the despotisms of the Old World, cannot be transformed into the full stature of 
American citizens, merely by a voyage across the Atlantic, or by subscribing the 
oath of naturalization. (1845/1957, p. 58) 
Nearly sixty years later, philosopher and educator John Dewey agreed: 
It is said that one ward in the city of Chicago has forty different languages 
represented in it.  It is a well-known fact that some of the largest Irish, German, 
and Bohemian cities in the world are located in America, not in their own 
countries.  The power of the public schools to assimilate different races to our 
own institutions, thru the education given to the younger generation, is doubtless 
one of the most remarkable exhibitions of vitality that the world has ever seen. 
(1902, pp. 375, 377) 
Each of these men believed educating these students—many of them immigrants—in 
schools would greatly benefit the country’s government, and the individuals would know 
and understand their civic rights and responsibilities.   
What follows is a review of literature on political socialization, that lifelong 
process through which all people develop a political identity, active or not.  With this 
overarching understanding of the various sources of political learning available to a 
citizen of a democracy, I describe my operating theory about the difference between 
civics and citizenship in political socialization, then discuss the various methods schools 
and community organizations have developed for educating students in, and giving them 
experience with, civics and citizenship. 
 
2.2.1 Political Socialization 
In 1963, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba remarked in their seminal work on 
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civic culture that the features of “universal suffrage, the political party, the elective 
legislature…are also part of the totalitarian participation pattern, in a formal if not 
functional sense” (1963, p. 5).  The most salient example at the time, the USSR, referred 
to itself as democratic because it held elections in which all could vote, but because 
political opponents of state Communism were silenced, those elections were 
fundamentally farcical and undemocratic.  To allow only one party access to power is to 
create a political culture of submission and passivity.   
What makes the difference, then, between totalitarians’ democratic farce and real 
democracy?  In part, the answer is democratic political socialization, a term that refers to 
the lifelong process of developing people into citizens.  At different points in life, family 
and friends, school experiences like civic education, and media sources influence this 
process, which is essential in the creation of a political and civic culture.  Without 
political socialization, the structures of democracy cannot be sustained: a committed 
democratic citizenry must continually create and reinvigorate a civic culture.  To do this, 
it must demand—through votes, protests, petitions, and political campaigns—that no 
political party has an unbreakable hold on the executive or legislative branches and that 
journalists are free to investigate political situations and politicians, and can report on 
these without concern for retribution.  Citizens must also ensure that elections are free 
and fair, and hold their elected representatives to account at election time.  Without these 
and other elements, contemporary democracies would cease to exist.   
An awareness- and engagement-oriented civic identity is more likely to develop 
in those who have greater access to political and civic experiences and who come to 
place value on those experiences, while a detached, passive civic identity might develop 
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in those who have minimal access or place little value on the experiences they do have 
(Niemi & Junn, 1998).6  Furthermore, researchers have found that knowledge of the 
political and civic system is also associated with social tolerance, or a willingness to 
accept and even protect the rights of minority or out-groups, a finding that is crucial to 
my study’s hypotheses (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Flanagan & Faison, 2001; Verba, 
Schlozman, & Brady, 1995).  Each of these identities and characteristics is a result of 
socialization, though an active identity is the goal—the ideal—of democratic political 
socialization (Almond & Verba, 1963).  Intentional and unintentional experiences—
school-based education about government, politics, and civic responsibilities; television 
viewing and newspaper reading; (overheard) political discussions with family, friends, 
and campaign representatives; voting, campaigning, and other civic events—can provide 
more complete information about the processes and actors in the political system, if 
people pay attention and give credence to these experiences.   
Democratic society’s goal for citizens is that they know enough—and seek more 
and better information if they don’t know enough—about government, politicians, and 
civic issues in order to vote and act in their and their community’s best interests.  This 
reasoning is what drove Jefferson, Mann, Dewey and contemporary scholars to their 
shared belief that democracy is “incompatible with widespread ignorance,” and has 
spurred on efforts to promote formal civic education in schools and youth organizations 
(Niemi & Junn, 1998, p. 9).7   
                                                
6 Of course, as the world has seen in northern Africa since the start of 2011, a combination of economic 
circumstances, feelings of connectedness to others in the same circumstances, and beliefs that government 
has not done what it could to improve those circumstances can give rise to a strong—if temporary—active 
civic identity, leading to extraordinary grassroots movements for democracy.   
7 For a discussion of the challenges of assessing school-based learning of citizenship skills and civic 
orientations, see Appendix A, Section 3 (page 237). 
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2.2.2 Civics vs. Citizenship 
I have used the terms civics and citizenship, but they are conceived of in 
somewhat different ways across classrooms and academic disciplines, so the aim of this 
section is to lay out what I believe the differences are from an educational perspective, 
describe how each can be formulated and enacted in school settings, and to set the 
terminology for this study’s purposes.   
Democratic societies have long charged schools with instructing children in the 
structures and processes of government as well as the skills and responsibilities of 
citizenship.  In this educational process, scholars and curriculum developers agree that 
there are at least four components: (1) citizenship and governmental knowledge, (2) 
cognitive skills and (3) participatory skills for exercising citizenship, and (4) the 
dispositions to exercise citizenship in the first place (Kerr, 1999a; Michigan Department 
of Education, 2007; National Assessment Governing Board, 2006; Patrick, 1999).  
Educators often use ‘civic education’ or ‘citizenship education’ as interchangeable 
references to the context for learning (about) each of these components, though I 
differentiate between the two.  Civic education is based on civic knowledge or civic 
literacy—more simply, civics—which, when interpreted as grounded in facts, tends to be 
characterized by more conventional forms of teacher-centered instruction about 
citizenship.  Citizenship education, however, is aimed at and possibly conducted through 
participation and developing skills and attitudes for citizenship itself, which is briefly 
defined as engagement in the political and civic realms.8   
                                                
8 Of course, in the legal context, the term citizenship takes on another meaning: legal citizenship grants a 
person certain political rights in a country or locality.  Without it, a person usually cannot vote, though he 
or she may be able to engage in other activities associated with good citizenship, including community 
service and protest activities.   
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A definition from the Australian national Department of Education clarifies the 
relationship between civics and citizenship: 
Civics is the more defined of the two. It is the study of … democracy, its history, 
traditions, structures and processes; our democratic culture … the ways … society 
is managed, by whom and to what end. Even these simple definitions indicate 
contested areas which will be encountered in the teaching and learning of Civics. 
On the other hand, Citizenship is the development of the skills, attitudes, 
beliefs and values that will predispose students to participate, to become and 
remain engaged and involved in that society/culture/democracy. A rich and 
complex set of understandings, based on civics knowledge and attitudes or values, 
plus the opportunity to experience, to practise civic competencies, is required for 
effective citizenship education. Without civic knowledge and a disposition to 
engage, a person cannot effectively practise citizenship. (Mellor, n.d.) 
In this definition, citizenship depends on civic knowledge (see Figure 2-1), and is 
not limited to attitudes and skills for successful living in democracy, but also in society.  
Civic engagement may be characterized by different levels of interpersonal involvement 
and risk, according to educational psychologist Helen Haste (2004).  Charitable giving, 
for example, is most often a private transaction, whereas campaigning and signing 
petitions are public, relatively low-effort activities.  Most public and most effortful (i.e., 
requiring much disruption of one’s usual routine) are protest activities, with high costs in 
terms of time and potential risk for punishment (Haste, 2004, p. 426).   
To encourage students toward the ideal of active citizenship—which in Haste’s 
view would also be public—schools can provide opportunities to learn how to identify, 
evaluate, and act on those interests.  Further, schools can—and some would say must—
foster a sense of responsibility and the skills for sustaining democracy through their 
teachers’ and administrators’ habits of inquiry and participation in the creation of civic 
and political conditions.  Citizenship is this latter practice—believing and doing—while 
civics is the information or set of understandings that contributes to effective practice—
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knowing and knowing how to do.  In the sense of engagement and belonging to the 
greater citizenry, citizenship is also best considered as a process, even an “ongoing 
struggle,” not a one-time achievement that is subsequently static (Bénéï, 2005; Osler, 
2005, p. 198).   
 
Figure 2-1. The relationship between civics and citizenship. 
 
These ideas go by different names depending on the scholarly or social context.  
In the schooling context, some scholars refer only to citizenship, and tacitly assume 
civics—or civic knowledge—as one element of it, while others refer only to civic 
education, though they have skill-based objectives for citizenship.  In the political science 
context, these ideas can have entirely different names: “The two conditions necessary for 
democracy are political engagement and democratic enlightenment” (Nie, Junn, & 
Stehlik-Barry, 1996, p. 14).  These terms align with my civics/citizenship differentiation: 
democratic enlightenment is equivalent to civic knowledge, while political engagement 
equates to citizenship.9  Nie et al. write that democratic enlightenment “signifies the 
                                                
9 Political science values civic engagement—not just running for political office or voting—as well, 
including participation in voluntary associations and community networks, as these contribute to the 
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understanding of democratic rule through knowledge and acceptance of the norms and 
procedures of democracy.”  Political engagement, they write, entails action: it “signifies 
the capability of citizens to engage in self-rule and encompasses behaviors and cognitions 
necessary for identifying political preferences, understanding politics, and pursuing 
interests” (1996, p. 11).  
For the purposes of this study, I refer to the school-based context for learning 
civics and citizenship as civic education.  This term is an economical way to refer to all 
the possible civics-, politics-, and citizenship-related elements of a formal education for 
civic engagement, and happens to be the term most often used by educators and scholars 
of education. 
 
2.2.3 Political Socialization of Young Children and Adolescents 
To some, students at the end of secondary school are more obvious targets for 
research on political socialization and civic attitudes because those students are about to 
become members of the voting public.  However, many political scientists, 
developmental psychologists, and I find it similarly worthwhile to study early 
adolescents’ (around age 14) attitudes and knowledge, despite their greater distance from 
traditional political options.  Firstly, education scholars and political scientists find that 
even young children identify with certain national or political values.  Serene Koh (2010) 
finds that elementary-age children hold political identities that are related to who they are 
as young people, not necessarily in relation to who they anticipate they will be as adults.  
These “basic orientations acquired during childhood” may affect adult beliefs about 
                                                                                                                                            
resolution of social problems and increased political participation through trust and cooperation (Diamond, 
1999, p. 19).  
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political and civic issues, however (Flanagan et al., 2007; Searing, Schwartz, & Lind, 
1973, p. 415).   
Older children—adolescents—continue to develop their political and civic beliefs.  
Erik Erikson, a developmental psychologist, suggested in the late 1960s that adolescents’ 
development of a political identity is made possible through their natural tendencies: 
[Adolescents] insistently test each other’s capacity for sustaining loyalties in the 
midst of inevitable conflicts of values. 
The readiness for such testing helps to explain…the appeal of simple and 
cruel totalitarian doctrines among the youth of such countries and classes as have 
lost or are losing their group identities—feudal, agrarian, tribal, or national.  The 
democracies are faced with the job of willing these grim youths by convincingly 
demonstrating to them—by living it—that a democratic identity can be strong and 
yet tolerant, judicious and still determined.  (1968, p. 133) 
Adolescent political identities are likely to be predictive of their adult attitudes, 
with some room for change based on salient events in their lives after adolescence 
(Galston, 2001; Hahn, 1998; Hjerm, 2005; Morduchowicz, Catterberg, Niemi, & Bell, 
1996; Palonsky, 1987; Sapiro, 2004).  As civic education scholar Britt Wilkenfeld writes, 
because “development is cumulative and experiences build on each other, group 
differences in civic engagement at 14 … would be indicative of early inequities in civic 
engagement.  These differences would likely be exacerbated over time” (Wilkenfeld, 
2009, p. 12).  Supporting this theory is a study of black American adolescents by Miranda 
Yates and James Youniss (1998) in which they found that students who a) enrolled in a 
service course that brought them in contact with the homeless on a weekly basis and b) 
performed other voluntary community service while in high school internalized the 
importance of community service and were still regular volunteers in adulthood.   
Structurally speaking, compulsory education ends at age 14 or 15 in many 
countries around the world, so if organizations wish to understand how students of all 
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kinds experience civic education and what their civic-oriented knowledge, values, and 
skills are, it is important to study students younger than or at that age (Baxter, 2008; 
Lehmann, 2004, p. 10).10   
 
2.2.4 The School’s Role in Civic Education and Development of Pro-Democratic 
Attitudes 
Schools, particularly those sponsored by public agencies like the national or local 
government, are the only countrywide institutions that have ready access to entire 
generations of citizens.  Since the nation-building projects of the 18th and 19th century 
West, it has been common for governments and societies wishing to consolidate their 
democratic system to teach the knowledge and skills students will need to be good 
citizens.  Initially civic education was very much “bound up with the legitimacy of the 
nation-state,” concerned with creating national allegiance and feelings of belonging—at 
the expense of non-nationals—through national symbols and lore (Keating, Ortloff, & 
Philippou, 2009).  However, in contemporary times, as Slovak scholar Silvia Matusová 
has written, “In democratic political systems children in school learn how to make 
decisions autonomously, how to lead, how to tolerate different opinions, to collaborate 
with and respect the rights of others—these are some of the most important values and 
attitudes promoted by democratic societies” (1997, p. 65).  Indeed they are the values that 
one hopes adolescents identify as the ‘best traditions’ of their countries, a desirable form 
of patriotism that goes beyond national allegiance. 
                                                
10 Of note, too, is the US’s experience with high school seniors taking its National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP).  These students are about to leave the mandatory education system and, like 
the CIVED study, are not required to complete the assessment, do not take it seriously, and have little 
motivation to do their best.  Several researchers have called for the National Assessment Governing Board 
(NAGB) either to scrap the assessment of this age group or dramatically alter its administration (Brophy & 
Ames, 2005; Ravitch, 2010). 
 38 
Of course civic education’s wide-ranging, ambitious aims lead to diverse 
incarnations across countries and schools.  Both the settings and the instructional 
methods vary, and some are more effective than others.  The settings for this instruction 
vary from classrooms devoted to civic instruction, history, or government; schools where 
civic education is “declared a cross-curricular principle” that guides all school activities, 
in which students experience democratic discussions, tolerance of minority opinions, and 
possibly student government (Schulz & Sibberns, 2004a, p. 7); or youth or civic 
organizations’ activities and events that occur outside of school hours.  Because this 
study is focused on students in schools, in the following sections, I first present the 
literature on students’ own characteristics that are related to their civic outcomes and, 
often, experiences in schools.  I then review relationships of particular features of the 
civic education classroom to students’ civic outcomes.  Many researchers have used the 
same data set I use—CIVED—to inform their understanding of how these features of 
educational contexts are related to preparedness for citizenship and pro-democratic 
attitudes, and I highlight these CIVED-based studies as the foundation of my own. 
Student characteristics.  Because schools are believed to be most influential on 
knowledge and civic engagement, most contemporary studies of civic preparedness are 
concerned with students’ civic knowledge and either their current participation in 
extracurricular activities (like volunteering or student government) or their intention to 
vote once they are of age.  Researchers have found gender to be generally unrelated to 
civic knowledge, but in CIVED, researchers found that in some countries more girls 
anticipated voting than boys, though in other countries there were no gender differences 
(Torney-Purta et al., 2001).  Attitudes toward traditional out-groups are sites of 
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differences between girls and boys, however.  Vera Husfeldt, a European scholar of 
education, finds that girls in CIVED are more supportive of immigrants’ rights than boys, 
while she and her colleagues find girls also to be far more supportive of ethnic 
minorities’ rights (Husfeldt, 2004; Husfeldt, Barber, & Torney-Purta, 2005; Torney-
Purta, Wilkenfeld, & Barber, 2008).  Just in general, females are more likely to be 
concerned with social justice and human rights than males, a finding not unique to 
CIVED.  Several other researchers have found adolescent girls to be more tolerant than 
boys of rights for feminists, homosexuals, and racists (Haste & Hogan, 2006; Sotelo, 
1999). 
Another significant predictor of students’ civic knowledge and participation is 
their socioeconomic status (SES): their educational resources (access to books and 
expectations for their education), and their parents’ educational attainment and income.  
CIVED-based studies have found that students from low SES backgrounds tend to have 
lower civic knowledge, just as they tend to achieve less highly on other academic 
subjects, and are less likely to participate in civic-oriented extracurricular activities, just 
as low-income, poorly educated adults are less likely to vote (students: Baldi, Perie, 
Skidmore, Greenberg, Hahn, & Nelson, 2001; adults: Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996).  
Nie and Hillygus (2001) found that American students’ verbal abilities, as measured by 
the SAT, influence civic participation, including voting.  Finally, some studies have 
found students of low SES to be more xenophobic than those of higher SES because they 
perceive a greater economic threat from foreigners (Hjerm, 2005; Kracke, Oepke, Wild, 
& Noack, 1998), while others have found no difference between more and less affluent 
students (Torney-Purta, Wilkenfeld, & Barber, 2008). 
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Inside the civic education classroom.  Just as labels for civic knowledge and 
citizenship differ between education and political science, so does the source of this 
content for school-aged youth: they may take part in classes as diversely named as social 
studies, moral education, values education, politics, and history, all of which may contain 
the material I associate with civic knowledge and citizenship.  As English scholar of civic 
education David Kerr noted, “The range of terms and subject connections underlines the 
breadth and complexity of the issues addressed within this area.  This breadth and 
complexity is both a strength and a weakness” (1999b, p. 2).  He points out that a lack of 
focus can make the subject unappealing for teachers, giving it “low status and low 
priority,” though the fact that the knowledge and skills under its purview are easily 
related to most other academic work is empowering (p. 10).   
Based on large-scale assessments and surveys of students’ civic knowledge and 
participation, scholars in political science and civic education have gotten mixed results 
about the effect of formal, course-based civic education on these outcomes.  The results 
of some studies support a popular belief that civic education courses—at least in high 
school—have little or no effect on students’ civic knowledge (Hutchens & Eveland, 
2009).  One of the original sources of this belief, a 1968 study by American political 
scientists Kenneth Langton and M. Kent Jennings, concluded with this:  
Our findings certainly do not support the thinking of those who look to the civics 
curriculum in American high schools as even a minor source of political 
socialization.  When we investigated the student sample as a whole we found not 
one case out of the ten examined in which the civics curriculum was significantly 
associated with students’ political orientations. (p. 865) 
Notably, however, a larger collection of studies conducted since then refute these 
findings, suggesting that civic education can indeed improve students’ civic knowledge 
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and, sometimes, “democratize” their political attitudes (Hahn, 1998).  Some of the 
programs investigated in these studies seem to be particularly successful in countries with 
a recent authoritarian past, such as South Africa, Argentina, and Poland (Finkel & Ernst, 
2005; McDevitt & Kiousis, 2006; Morduchowicz et al., 1996; Nie & Hillygus, 2001; 
Niemi & Junn, 1998; Slomczynski & Shabad, 1998).  These studies were mostly 
conducted on a relatively small scale, typically at the classroom or school level, rather 
than a regional level, which allowed the authors to factor in details of the pedagogical 
methods of civics-related courses, not just their names and how many of them students 
take.   
Instructional methods.  Methods of instruction in civics may include lecture, 
debate, experience with community service or political organizations, or participation in 
mock hearings or conventions.  Student attitudes, inclination to participate in civic 
activities, and knowledge are highly sensitive to the choice of teaching methods, 
teachers’ views of the value of civic education, and indeed to the kind and quality of 
discourse in the classroom (Flanagan et al., 2007; Flanagan & Faison, 2001).  As Carole 
Hahn, CIVED’s US research coordinator, found in her own longitudinal study of five 
western countries’ approaches to civic education, the teaching methods that are most 
effective in exciting students about the political and civic arenas in and out of school are 
those that engage them in experiential learning: discussions of controversial topics like 
immigration policy, welfare policy, and abortion; student-driven projects on the 
environment or local issues; and role-playing or attending actual panel discussions or 
debates on political issues (1998).  Additionally, discussion of controversial issues has 
been found to be associated with greater student trust in peers and school staff 
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(Bickmore, 1993; Hahn, 1991, p. 472; D. E. Hess, 2009; McDevitt & Kiousis, 2006).  In 
her discussion of the value of controversial issues in the social studies classroom, Hahn 
writes: “[S]etting off some subjects as taboo for investigation is a totalitarian practice 
inconsistent with democratic ideals; and it is only through resolving problems contained 
in controversial issues that meaningful, lasting learning will occur” (1991, p. 470).  A 
number of other studies support Hahn’s findings, including previous studies using 
CIVED data (Losito & Mintrop, 2001; Torney-Purta et al., 2001).  However, there is one 
element of a classroom environment that most supports the success of controversial 
discussions, improves civic knowledge and debating skills, and increases students’ 
tolerance of different opinions: an open classroom climate.   
Open classroom climate.  An open environment is one in which students feel safe 
to counter or question the teacher’s and peers’ statements, and where comments are not 
‘value-laden,’ assigning good or bad qualities to opinions (Hahn, 1991).  Flanagan, 
Cumsille, Gill, and Gallay (2007) contend that, to the extent that children feel they can 
influence adults in educational settings, such as teachers who encourage open, safe 
discussion, they may believe that capability extends to governmental functioning, which 
may explain why an open classroom climate is associated with more positive attitudes 
toward minority rights and stronger beliefs in one’s own political efficacy (Avery et al., 
1992; Hahn, 1991, 1998; Torney-Purta et al., 2001; Torney-Purta & Wilkenfeld, 2009).   
Judith Torney-Purta and Britt Wilkenfeld used CIVED data in the US to study the 
relationship of various teaching methods with several civic outcomes (2009).  They 
operationalized an open classroom climate as one that is discourse-based, where teachers 
and students share their own opinions, and discuss and respect others’.  Additionally, they 
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operationalized a more traditional, lecture-based classroom environment as one that is 
focused on facts and dates, teacher lecture, and use of the textbook.  They created four 
groups of students from these measures: students experiencing a) civic education with 
both a lecture and interactive focus, b) civic education with a predominant interactive 
focus, c) civic education with a predominant lecture focus, and d) civic education with 
neither focus.  The researchers found that students in groups (a) and (b) were consistently 
more knowledgeable, more tolerant, and more concerned with social responsibility than 
their peers in groups (c) and (d).   
Effects of civics courses and civic knowledge on other desirable civic outcomes.  
Multiple scholars now agree that taking any civics classes at all in high school, the 
recency of seniors’ civics courses, and critical discussion of current events tend to 
influence students’ political knowledge.  However, not all of these inputs influence 
learning or attitudes uniformly across demographic groups.  For example, it seems that in 
the US, black, Latino, and white students are differentially affected by course-taking and 
course content.  Political scientists Richard Niemi and Jane Junn found in the late 1990s 
that Black and Latino students tend to learn more in classes where current events are 
discussed frequently, but the amount and recency of civics courses significantly, 
positively affect only white students (1998).  Findings such as these leave questions about 
how other socially disadvantaged groups, such as immigrants, benefit differentially from 
civic education, which I discuss in greater detail in Chapter 3.     
Several studies, though not all, have found strong support for a relationship 
between controversial discussions, knowledge, and higher levels of tolerance for 
feminists and lower levels of xenophobia.  Spanish researcher María José Sotelo, for 
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example, studied adolescents in urban, suburban, and rural areas around Madrid.  She 
found that knowledge in general (higher ‘cognitive moral reasoning’) and, to some 
extent, support for democratic norms, are each associated with greater tolerance of 
feminists, but also that those who had experience with classroom debates were similarly 
tolerant:  
Those adolescents who are used to debating their ideas are more willing to accept 
different opinions.  So, an increased number of discussions of controversial issues 
within an open and supportive environment seems to be an efficient way of 
improving attitudes towards minority groups including feminists. (Sotelo, 1997, p. 
526) 
Greater civic knowledge was related to lower levels of xenophobia among Swedish 
adolescents, according to Mikael Hjerm (2005), but in the CIVED study, whose data I 
also use, researchers found that civic knowledge is not always positively correlated with 
pro-democratic attitudes toward immigrants’ and women’s rights (Malak-Minkiewicz, 
2005).   
Researchers have noted that highly educated people tend to be less satisfied with 
their country’s current course (interpreted by some as less patriotic) because they know 
much about democracy’s ideal practices and see a large gap between reality and the ideal 
(Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996).  Other scholars have found an association of greater 
civic knowledge with greater civic participation among US adolescents (Anderson, 
Jenkins, Leming, MacDonald, Mullis, Turner, & Wooster, 1990).  Of course, the 
direction of the latter association is uncertain: greater civic participation may lead to 
greater civic knowledge through firsthand experience of civic processes, but greater civic 
knowledge may pique someone’s interest in civic participation.  
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2.2.5 Service Learning, Community Service, and Political Activities as Civic 
Education 
There are many opportunities outside of academic schoolwork for adolescents to 
gain hands-on experience with civic and political projects and activism.  Whether run by 
community or youth organizations that are unaffiliated with schools, or by school faculty 
during extracurricular time, these activities are purely optional and less common than 
school-based civic education experiences.  Greater voluntary extracurricular participation 
is associated with a higher likelihood of civic involvement after a student leaves school 
and higher levels of political efficacy, which is why I investigate adolescents’ 
participation in my study (Beck & Jennings, 1982; Hanks, 1981; Patrick & Hoge, 1991; 
Quintelier, 2008; Smith, 1999; Stoll, 2001; Stolle & Rochon, 1998).   
However, not all extracurricular activities are equally influential on future civic 
involvement.  Sociologist Michael Hanks (1981) was the first to identify differential 
influences of instrumental versus expressive extracurricular activities for adolescents, and 
other scholars have refined his findings.  Instrumental groups—those that are externally 
oriented, whose activities are means to an end—include school newspaper, honorary 
clubs, academic clubs, and student council, as well as scouting, cultural, or religious 
groups.  Expressive groups—those that are more internally oriented, whose activities are 
ends in themselves—include sports teams, hobby clubs, and performing arts groups 
(these definitions were first laid out by Hanks, 1981, and refined by the work of; Stolle & 
Rochon, 1998).   
Precisely because instrumental groups are task-oriented, focusing on objectives 
outside the group, and interested in influencing “the creation or maintenance of a desired 
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condition,” participation in such groups is highly positively associated with later political 
and civic involvement.11  Conversely, while involvement in expressive groups for 
entertainment and self-esteem purposes has positive associations with development of an 
interpersonal identity and even academic achievement and attainment, it has little, if any, 
lasting influence on political involvement (Feltz & Weiss, 1984; Hanks, 1981; Lindsay, 
1984; Otto & Alwin, 1977; Stoll, 2001).   
Political activities, though more limited for adolescents than for those who can 
vote, are also associated with higher tolerance of minority groups, which is why I 
hypothesize an association between extracurricular participation and more inclusive 
attitudes among European adolescents.  Results from Sotelo’s study of Spanish 
adolescents suggested that political experience is associated with higher tolerance for 
feminists’ rights, even where political experience may range from campaigning for a 
candidate, wearing a campaign button, talking with friends about politics, running for 
school office, talking with family about political issues, joining a political club, or 
debating a political issue in class (1997, p. 521).  
Political participation—or just the anticipation of it—has been found to be 
strongly associated with decreased xenophobia.  Mikael Hjerm (2005) finds that Swedish 
adolescents who are more inclined to vote as adults, join a political party, participate in 
peaceful protests, and run for office are also less xenophobic.  However, while service-
                                                
11 Of course, the fact of being on a school’s student council does not guarantee that students will get 
meaningful experience with community service.  Participation on a student council’s planning committee 
for the school dance is quite a different experience from participating in a student group’s organization of 
and service at a soup kitchen for homeless community members (Reinders & Youniss, 2006).  Students 
using their social skills to address social problems are likely to get more out of their experience and 
develop a greater sense of personal efficacy than those who use their social skills purely for their own and 
their peers’ entertainment, as reported by Miranda Yates and James Youniss in their 1998 study of black, 
urban adolescents who participated in a yearlong service-learning course in high school, and most of whom 
continued to be active in their communities as middle-aged adults. 
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learning and community service experiences can influence students’ development into 
active citizens, educators must contend with the fact that socioeconomic status is 
positively associated with participation, as well as political interest and feelings of 
political efficacy, meaning that students of lower SES are less likely to feel that their 
opinion is important or worth expressing through participation (Hahn, 1998; Patrick & 
Hoge, 1991).   
 
2.3 ‘Curriculum’: Its Meaning and the Spectrum of Its Control 
Recall that in this study I am interested in school-level and national-level 
influences on students’ civic attitudes and knowledge.  One of these influences is the 
curriculum.  At the country level, I focus on the system for designing and controlling 
curriculum.  The choice of system is related to a country’s historical politics, 
demographics, and social values, and can look quite different across countries because of 
the plurality of meanings the word ‘curriculum’ takes on.  
At its most basic, educators and policymakers agree that ‘curriculum’ is a course 
of study—the ‘what’ of teaching (as opposed to the ‘how’).  Different interpretations 
arise in its level of detail or prescriptiveness.  At one end of the spectrum it means big 
ideas or standards, “broad … learning goals, usually for certain grades” (Marshall, 2004, 
p. 43).  At the opposite end, it means detailed daily lesson plans, including teaching 
methods and assessments, whether designed by the teachers who will use them or a 
commercial entity.  In between these, one finds teachers and researchers using 
‘curriculum’ to mean a grade-by-grade plan for the skills and content that must be taught, 
specific learning expectations for each grade, a textbook, or teaching methods for 
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particular subjects or learning expectations (Gewert, 2011; Marshall, 2004; Prideaux, 
2003).  In my study I address only the ‘formal’ or ‘intended’ curriculum, not the notions 
of ‘hidden,’ ‘latent,’ or ‘unintended’ curriculum.  Because I am studying national-level 
curriculum policy in relation to student outcomes, I address only the question of whether 
national agencies create documents that outline or prescribe academic content in the form 
of school subjects.12  This limited focus is interesting despite the commonly noted loose 
relationship between intended and implemented curriculum.  As comparative education 
scholar Aaron Benavot has written: 
In a world in which education is predominantly a creature of the nation-state, 
official policies themselves reflect commitments widely understood to carry 
authoritative intent.  At a minimum they affect, both directly and indirectly, the 
formal organization of schooling.  They distribute the content of instruction 
throughout the days and years of the schooling cycle according to relatively 
explicit and reasoned goals.  They indicate what types of classes will be offered to 
students and what general topics are to be taught in each type of class. … 
[O]fficial curricular timetables may directly determine the subject matter taught in 
local schools. (1992, p. 35)   
A typology created by French researcher Nathalie Mons, discussed in Janmaat 
and Mons (2011), identifies countries as falling into one of five categories of systems for 
central, regional, or local control of curriculum.  Essentially it describes the division of 
power and activities across these levels on issues of “curriculum design, textbook choice, 
and modes of assessment” (p. 63).  In democracies that, for reasons of diversity or 
political history, place great importance on limited central government, the tendency in 
education is to give local schools or communities more power over the curriculum than 
                                                
12 Though it is outside the scope of this study, another aspect of national curriculum policy is whether 
schools are expected to ‘track’ students according to ability.  Tracking ostensibly places students of 
differing abilities into course trajectories with different foci and, often, academic rigor, and to some 
societies is a desirable form of social efficiency.  It is also well documented as a process that maintains the 
status quo and reduces social mobility, most often by placing students of low socioeconomic status (which 
immigrants frequently are) in the lowest, most vocationally oriented tracks (Crul & Vermeulen, 2003; 
Green, Preston, & Janmaat, 2006; Kahne & Middaugh, 2008; Oakes, 1985).  For a lengthier discussion of 
the implications of tracking for immigrant students, see Appendix B. 
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the national government.  In a federal model, as in Germany, Belgium, and Switzerland 
(and the US), regional entities such as states or cantons are responsible for curriculum.  
These countries do this to honor the autonomy of historically close-knit and independent 
cultural or linguistic communities, and to avoid the political challenges of creating 
common expectations that could appease such diverse communities.  On the opposite end 
of this typology, countries such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Norway (and, perhaps 
more famously, France) have centralized models, wherein curriculum design, textbook 
choice, and assessment are solely the responsibility of the state.  Greece, for example, has 
a historically more homogeneous society than its northern neighbors, takes the opposite 
approach, indeed the most directive in all of Europe: 
[C]urricula, syllabi, the content of textbooks and pedagogical guidelines are 
uniquely the responsibility of the Ministry of National Education and Religious 
Affairs and its consulting agency, the Pedagogic Institute.  In Greek schools, only 
one textbook is used per subject taught, and textbooks are published by the state. 
(Makrinioti & Solomon, 1999, p. 292) 
This arrangement effectively denies any need for adaptation of content to local or 
individual circumstances, but has the potential to expose all students in the country to the 
same content, regardless of socioeconomic status or skill, which is why I find it important 
to study how this national characteristic plays out in students’ civic preparedness and 
attitudes.  Additionally, highly centralized, prescriptive curricula like Greece’s tend to 
present national values in a very particular way, establishing a sanctioned national 
understanding of what is ‘right,’ which can build unity and a sense of national identity 
(Janmaat & Mons, 2011; Kerr, 1999a).  Not all central systems are as uniform as 
Greece’s.  Norway and Portugal’s central governments are both prescriptive and 
descriptive, but communities are permitted to adapt at least some portion of the national 
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curriculum to address local circumstances.   
Most European countries fall somewhere between the federal and centralized 
extremes.  In decentralized models, as in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, local schools 
and communities are entirely responsible.  School autonomy models, as in England, 
Hungary, and Sweden, are characterized by some national-level regulation of curriculum 
objectives, but strong school autonomy in curriculum design, and strong central control 
of assessment.  In collaboration models, as in Denmark, central authorities determine the 
curriculum framework and assessment, giving only minor leeway to schools.   
Each of these shared arrangements offers some national consistency as well as 
local autonomy, a compromise between several levels of government.  Generally, on 
international reading and mathematics achievement tests like the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) and Trends in International Mathematics and 
Science Study (TIMSS), those countries whose students score highest have some national 
involvement in curriculum, whether defined just as broad standards or as articulated 
(grade by grade) learning expectations (Mons, 2007, as cited in Janmaat & Mons, 2011).  
A report written through a partnership between the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD, the agency that sponsors PISA) and CTB/McGraw-
Hill, a North American publisher of educational assessments, suggests that these high-
performing countries’ standards are not simply national, but rigorous, “premised, in 
detail, on the proposition that it is possible for all students to achieve at high levels and 
necessary that they do so”: 
Whatever the approach, such standards shape high-performing education systems 
by establishing rigorous, focused and coherent content at all grade levels; 
reducing overlap in curricula across grades; reducing variation in implemented 
curricula across classrooms; facilitating co-ordination of various policy drivers, 
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ranging from curricula to teacher training; and reducing inequity in curricula 
across socio-economic groups. (Paine & Schleicher, 2011, p. 5) 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
Across democratic countries, political structures, national and local educational 
policies, teaching methods, and economic circumstances vary widely.  Each of these 
features of a democracy has potential influences on students moving through the 
educational system, particularly with respect to the development of their identities as 
citizens.  Some of these features are more obvious or palatable levers for reform than 
others, such as the teaching methods that are most effective for inculcating inquisitive 
civic-mindedness in adolescents.  With this chapter I have laid the groundwork for the 
theme of the study: schooling and democracy.  However, up until now, I have ignored the 
question of immigrant students’ characteristics that contribute to the difficulty of their 
sociopolitical integration.  There are a number of reasons to believe that the civic-related 
experiences and outcomes of immigrants differ from those of their native-born peers, 
including the factors that lead to immigration; previous experiences with schooling, 
citizenship, and social attitudes; linguistic and cultural differences; and the social and 
political atmosphere that greets them on their arrival.  Determining the characteristics of 
schools and nations that contribute to immigrants’ social integration and development 
into citizens of an adopted country is essential, given that the flow of migrants into 
Europe is unlikely to be curtailed soon.  As the children of today’s immigrants will take 
civic cues from their parents, Europe cannot afford to ignore the political and civic habits 
and attitudes of its growing minority groups.   
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Chapter 3 
Immigration and Its Consequences for Education and Citizenship 
 
Immigrants and their children constitute a unique segment of contemporary 
societies that is both economically necessary and culturally difficult to weave into the 
‘social fabric.’  Recognizing that immigrants are permanent fixtures in all European 
countries, each liberal democracy must consider how to ‘incorporate’ them into civil and 
political society without alienating them and while still asserting a strong conception of 
what it means to be a citizen of that country—a national identity.  The means of 
integrating immigrants is not obvious, and on a number of fronts, countries have arguably 
experienced more failures than successes.  In all efforts, however, schools have been 
instrumental because, as I discussed in Chapter 2, they are positioned to be a part of every 
child’s life, regardless of citizenship status or ethnicity, and as such are poised to 
influence the next generation of civic actors and voters.  Instruction in academic subjects 
such as science, literature, and history are just as much a part of schools’ mission to 
produce thoughtful democratic citizens as civic education.  Thus many scholars are 
concerned with how immigrant children in modern democracies actually move through 
schooling, what opportunities they have to learn, which educational methods work for 
them, and how well they do, both in achievement and attainment.   
We know already that immigrant students’ achievement levels in all traditionally 
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tested academic subjects are generally lower than their native-born peers’, and they often 
encounter classroom environments that do not or cannot meet their linguistic, academic, 
or social needs (Alba & Silberman, 2009; Crul & Schneider, 2009; Crul & Vermeulen, 
2003; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010; Portes & 
Rumbaut, 2001).  Scholars know significantly less about immigrant students’ experiences 
with civic education and their overall democratic attitudes, however.  There are few 
studies on this topic that are published for an English- or French-speaking international 
audience, though there are more about the United States than about other countries or 
regions.  It would be inaccurate even to say that findings about immigrant adolescents in 
Europe are mixed, as the few studies that exist do not have the same focus.  For example, 
there are individual studies that suggest that immigrants have less civic knowledge, 
benefit more from an open classroom climate, are not as supportive of women’s rights as 
native students, yet are just as committed to community participation.  My study 
contributes to this literature by addressing several civic-oriented characteristics and pro-
democratic attitudes with large sample sizes (higher power) and controls for 
characteristics that make immigrants’ experiences in the host country distinct from 
natives’ experiences. 
In this chapter I first present a brief overview of immigration, how contemporary 
democracies deal with this phenomenon, and how immigrants themselves act in the civic 
realm and respond to the policies that affect them.  I then move to research on immigrant 
students’ educational experiences and how those experiences influence their adult lives.  
Based on lingering questions in these two bodies of literature, I narrow my focus in a 
third section to what is known about immigrant students’ civic attitudes and experiences 
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with civic education.  I conclude the chapter by restating my research questions and 
offering some hypotheses based on the reviewed literature. 
 
3.1 Migration, Immigrants, and Integration 
‘Migration,’ as distinguished from ‘travel,’ is the act of moving to a new country 
with the intention to live there, and with the expectation of greater economic, educational, 
or general life opportunities.  The term ‘immigrant’ applies to any person, at any stage of 
life (government or military employees excepted), who lives and—often—works in a 
country that is not his or her birth country (this same person is referred to as an 
‘emigrant’ in his or her birth country).  It applies equally to infants whose experiences in 
the new country tend to be radically different from the experiences of their parents or 
even older siblings.  Numerous factors contribute to immigrants’ reception and 
experiences in the host country: legal status, anticipated length of stay, and whether they 
are simply moving to a new country in order to improve the quality of their lives, or 
whether they are refugees or asylum-seekers (‘asylees’).  Whereas ‘immigrant’ tends to 
imply voluntary movement in the absence of danger, ‘refugee’ implies movement 
because of war, political or religious violence, or threats to personal safety, and ‘asylum-
seeker’ refers to a person who is unable or unwilling to return to his or her home country 
because of fears of persecution for political, religious, gender, or racial reasons (Russell, 
2002).  These groups’ post-entry experiences with the host country’s culture, 
bureaucracy, and economy may be somewhat similar, though illegal status—anticipated 
or not—generally complicates newcomers’ relationship with the host society and legal 
system.   
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3.1.1 Theories of the Social Consequences of Ethnic Diversity 
Immigrant populations inevitably diversify their host societies’ cultural and 
religious makeup, which can be a challenging process for the whole of society.  
Immigration flows that are growing are especially worrisome for societies that already 
have problems of social cohesion.  Social scientists have developed two opposing 
theories about interethnic relations—Conflict and Contact—that label, respectively, 
deleterious and beneficial effects of increased ethnic heterogeneity on democracy and the 
“social fabric.”  Though ostensibly in direct contradiction to one another, most 
contemporary studies find evidence of both in the same multiethnic situation.  The 
Conflict hypothesis suggests that ethnic heterogeneity breaks down people’s ability to 
live and work together by encouraging ethnic stereotyping and antagonism (Alesina, 
Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2003; Valenty & Sylvia, 2004).  The 
Contact hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that ethnic heterogeneity supports 
democracy by increasing social and political tolerance and acceptance, as well as 
interethnic trust, and reducing perceptions of group threat (Allport, 1954/1979; Pettigrew 
& Tropp, 2006; Putnam, 2007).  In my study I investigate whether and how each of these 
theories operates in schools, identifying whether large proportions of immigrant students 
in a school tend to increase the gap between immigrants’ and natives’ views of rights for 
immigrants and ethnic minorities. 
Conflict theory.  In the Conflict theory, prejudice against a non-native ethnic 
group has to do with the host society’s ‘threshold of tolerance,’ an abstract, ‘acceptable’ 
number of immigrants in the community beyond which immigration is seen as a problem.  
The work of American sociologist Lincoln Quillian (1995) supports the Conflict theory, 
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in which he finds that perceived ‘group threat’—modeled as a function of economic 
conditions and the size of minority groups relative to the majority group—explains large 
amounts of variance in country’s levels of anti-immigrant and racial prejudice.  
Moreover, the number of immigrants explains as much as 40 percent of the variance in 
European people’s perceptions of immigration as a problem, according to American 
political scientist Gallya Lahav’s study of public opinion’s relation to immigration policy 
in Europe (2004).  However, she finds an even stronger explanation of prejudice in the 
types of immigrants or ethnic minorities in a community or country, with prejudice higher 
in places where non-white, non-Christian immigrants (i.e., those not from the EU) 
predominate.   
In the summer of 1993, renowned political scientist and scholar of democracy 
Samuel Huntington published a controversial article in Foreign Affairs arguing strongly 
for the Conflict theory.  He hypothesized that not ideology or economic differences, but 
cultural differences—“fault lines between civilizations”—would define the coming years 
of global politics (p. 22).  Asserting that westerners tend to associate the ‘nation state’ 
with action in the global arena, he corrected this with a reminder that that has only 
recently been true.  In fact, civilizations have been actors on the global scene far longer.  
Moreover, because civilizations encompass many elements of a person’s closely-held 
identity, including geography, religion, language, customs, and history, they are 
associated with strong emotion (he gives primacy to religion).  Huntington argued that 
culture clashes will occur between civilizations for several reasons, among them:  
• precisely because cultural differences have evolved over centuries and are “far 
more fundamental than differences among political ideologies,” 
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• with interactions between citizens of different civilizations increasing, 
“civilization consciousness” is increasing, as well, possibly exacerbating any 
sense of difference or animosity, 
• modernization separates people from “longstanding local identities,” including the 
nation state, and religion moves into that gap, giving rise to “fundamentalist” 
movements, and 
• “cultural characteristics are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and 
resolved than political and economic ones,” such that in prior conflicts, people 
had to answer “Which side are you on?” and now must answer “What are you?” 
(pp. 25-27). 
Ultimately, Huntington warned, the world is primed for conflicts between ethnic and 
religious groups.  In Europe in particular, where western Christianity meets Orthodox 
Christianity and Islam along a fairly distinct geographical line, the “Velvet Curtain of 
culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in 
Europe” (p. 31).   
Contact theory.  In contrast to Huntington’s pessimistic view of interethnic 
relations, the Contact theory is supported by evidence of long- and short-term multiethnic 
experiences, and suggests a more positive result from the same situation of high numbers 
of ethnic minorities.  An example of a long-term multiethnic experience is that of the US, 
a country long understood as having been built by immigrants.  Putnam (2007) found 
that, despite US citizens’ knowledge of the country’s immigrant history, it has taken a 
long time for ethnic groups’ proximity and interactions to build toward national 
interethnic acceptance and trust (recall from Chapter 1 the importance of interpersonal 
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trust for democracy’s consolidation).   
This theory holds that higher numbers of minorities increase the likelihood of 
face-to-face interethnic contact on a regular basis, which in turn improves individuals’ 
attitudes towards other ethnic groups (studies do not tend to find improvement in group 
attitudes; Forbes, 1997).  Even in Germany and the Netherlands, where prominent 
political discussions are now occurring about the sustainability of immigration, 
researchers have found that, while a higher percentage of ‘foreigners’ in a geographic 
area does relate positively to perceived group threat, it also makes it more likely that 
natives see, work with, live near, and socialize with foreigners, which is related to lower 
levels of natives’ prejudice against them (in Germany, this effect is somewhat weaker as 
the percentage increases, but is nonetheless significant; Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010; 
Wagner, Christ, Pettigrew, Stellmacher, & Wolf, 2006).  Furthermore, West Germans 
have been found to be less prejudiced than their East German counterparts, and they 
happen to live in the part of the country with a much larger foreign population (Wagner, 
van Dick, Pettigrew, & Christ, 2003).  In Norway, sociologist Christopher Bratt (2002) 
found that adolescents’ friendships with minority students had positive relationships with 
attitudes toward those friends’ minority groups (though not necessarily with other 
minority groups). 
 
3.1.2 Models of Immigrant Integration 
Contact and Conflict theories, especially in relation to one another, provide a 
compelling frame for discussing the relationships between host societies and immigrants, 
or the integration process.  “In a sense, immigration and integration are two sides of the 
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same coin: the former involves the entry of foreigners into a country, while the latter has 
to do with what happens when they stay” (Howard, 2007, p. 238).  The challenges are on 
both side of the integration process: 
• immigrants seem to pose a threat to the host country’s sense of national identity 
and group prerogatives (Quillian, 1995); and for that reason, among others, 
• the host country’s cultural boundaries are often difficult for immigrants to 
penetrate.  
Immigrants’ life trajectories are not interchangeable solely by virtue of being 
immigrants, however.  True, immigrants tend to be poor, in disproportionate need of 
public services, and from a different culture (in Europe, often a non-Christian one), but as 
Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut write: 
Immigrants, even those of the same nationality, are frequently divided by social 
class, the timing of their arrival, and their generation. … Depending on the timing 
of their arrival and context of reception, immigrants can find themselves 
confronting diametrically different situations, and hence the course of their 
assimilation can lead to a number of different outcomes. (2001, p. 45)  
Immigrants who arrive with higher levels of education or skills and are met positively by 
the government and the receiving population have greater likelihoods of successful 
integration and economic success for themselves and their children (Crul & Vermeulen, 
2003). 
Official reactions to these inflows of people depend on a country’s understandings 
about immigration and nationhood, which Stephen Castles and Mark Miller (2003) 
categorize as one of three “models of integration”: differential exclusion, assimilationist, 
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or multicultural.13  Each model represents a different degree of tolerance for ethnic, 
racial, or cultural difference, which often has a legal corollary.  
Table 3-1. History of immigration and models of integration by European region and country. 
Region 
(Immigration 
since…) 
Country Model of Integration Types of Immigrants 
Western 
(1950s) 
Belgium Assimilation Historically: ‘Guest workers’, 
especially Italians, Poles, Turks, and 
Moroccans 
1990s: Moroccans, Turks 
England Assimilation/Multiculturalism Historically: Former colonials, ‘guest 
worker’ Poles 
1990s: Middle Easterners and North 
Africans 
Germany Differential exclusion  
(pre-2000) 
Historically: ‘Guest workers’, 
especially Turks 
1990s: Turks and Eastern Europeans 
Switzerland Assimilation/Differential 
exclusion14 
Historically: Southern Europeans 
1990s: Balkan citizens, refugees 
Scandinavia 
(1950s and 
1960s) 
Denmark Multiculturalism Historically: Nordic citizens, Turks, 
Yugoslavs, Pakistanis 
1990s: Iraqis, Palestinians, Somalians 
Norway Multiculturalism Historically: Turks, Vietnamese 
refugees, Pakistanis, Swedes 
1990s: East Africans, Latin Americans, 
South Asians, and Middle Easterners 
Sweden Multiculturalism Historically: Norwegians and Finns, 
Southern Europeans 
1990s: Iraqis, Iranians, and Yugoslavs, 
Turks and Moroccans 
Southern 
(1980s) 
Greece Assimilation Asians, North Africans, Eastern Europeans, Middle Easterners 
Italy Assimilation Asians, North Africans, Eastern 
Europeans, Middle Easterners 
Portugal Assimilation Former colonials, North Africans, 
Asians, Eastern Europeans 
Central 
(1990s and 
later) 
Czech 
Republic Assimilation Eastern Europeans and Slovaks 
Hungary Assimilation Ethnic Hungarians and other Eastern 
Europeans 
Slovakia Assimilation Eastern Europeans 
 
                                                
13 Sociologist Christian Joppke (2007) poses a counterargument: he suggests that nation states’ policies on 
immigrant integration are far less divergent from one another—more assimilationist than anything else—
than is generally supposed. 
14 Switzerland has the most stringent naturalization laws in Europe, such that it has an enormous foreign-
born population but very few naturalized citizens who are foreign-born (Fibbi, Lerch, & Wanner, 2007). 
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Though my study is not positioned to comment directly on these approaches’ influences 
on classroom dynamics, there may be indications in my findings that countries’ overall 
approaches have influenced how immigrants experience civic education.   
Note in Table 3-1 that geographic regions tend to have similar immigration 
histories and models of integration.  Whereas the economies of northwestern Europe 
were healthy enough after World War II to require additional labor, the countries from 
which they recruited were in poorer southern and eastern Europe.  It was not until many 
decades later that southern European economies developed enough that citizens were able 
to find jobs there and did not need to emigrate north.  Furthermore, it was not until the 
1990s that southern European countries really paid attention to the fact that immigrants 
from northern and eastern Africa, as well as many Middle Easterners, had taken up 
residence in their countries, rather than using southern countries merely as a stopping 
point on their way to northern Europe.   
Table 3-2. Stocks and inflows of foreign-born to selected European countries in 1999. 
Country Percent foreign-born, 1999 
Inflow of foreign-
born, 1999 
(thousands) 
Belgium 10.2 57.8 
England† 7.6 239.5 
Germany 12.4 673.9 
Switzerland 21.6 85.8 
Denmark 5.6 20.3 
Norway 6.6 32.2 
Sweden 11.1 34.6 
Greece 10.3* -- 
Italy 2.5* 268.0 
Portugal 5.1 10.5 
Czech Republic 4.4 6.8 
Hungary 2.8 20.2 
Slovakia 2.2* 5.9 
Source: OECD, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/885342748216 
and http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/885301511372 
†  Data for the whole United Kingdom 
*  Data from 2001, the earliest time point available 
-- Data not available 
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Up until 1998, Greece didn’t even have a legalization policy for immigrants (Castles & 
Miller, 2003, p. 84).  You can see in Table 3-2 that there are large differences in the size 
of the foreign-born population across regions, as well as dramatic variations in the 
number of people entering each country at the end of the ‘90s.  Especially in western 
Europe, these are the kinds of numbers that make frequent contact with immigrants 
highly likely. 
Differential exclusion.  Historically the most well known example of differential 
exclusion is Germany, in that its government and much of society saw immigrants as 
ethnic minorities who were inherently different from, and must remain permanently 
outside of, the dominant group, because homogeneity was essential to the nation.  
Differential exclusion accepts immigrants “only within strict functional and temporal 
limits,” which is to say that immigrants are welcome as individuals, but only temporarily 
(Castles, 2004, p. 23).  The focus on ‘German blood’ as the prerequisite for citizenship, 
rather than on linguistic facility or allegiance to German political or cultural values, gave 
rise to an odd problem of integration following the fall of the USSR.  On the one hand, if 
they had no evidence of German ancestry, even second and third generation descendants 
of immigrants (mainly Turks) had no hope of gaining legal German citizenship prior to 
the year 2000.  On the other, Aussiedler—ethnic Germans who had lived for generations 
in Soviet territories—were given permission to “return” to Germany, though most did not 
speak German and were unfamiliar with western culture’s quotidian practices.   
These people who looked different, sounded different, and acted differently, were 
yet labeled as “countrymen” whose German ancestry was all that was necessary to make 
them good, legal German citizens (Ignatieff, 1994; von Koppenfels, 2009).  But as 
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Michael Ignatieff explains in his 1994 book on nationalism, this ethnic nationalist view 
of citizenship—in which a society defines itself as a nation of peoples with common 
ancestry, culture, and values—cannot obtain in a democracy: “Common ethnicity, by 
itself, does not create social cohesion or community, and when it fails to do so, as it must, 
nationalist regimes are necessarily impelled toward maintaining unity by force rather than 
by consent” (p. 8).   
Ethnic nationalism involves an element of ethnic essentialism, as Ignatieff puts it, 
which works against those people who take up residence in an ethnic nationalist country 
but do not share its people’s ancestry, culture, or set of values.  Immigrants in such 
countries are then put at structural disadvantages, socioeconomically and politically.  
Ignatieff offers a straightforward illustration of ethnic essentialist philosophy, describing 
the view of a right-leaning, rural politician.  On the topic of why Turks born in Germany 
who worked and paid taxes their whole lives couldn’t become citizens, this politician 
remarked, “We are Germans.  They are Turks.”  From this perspective, being of a certain 
ethnicity “defines the limits of what [a person] can possibly know, understand, or 
sympathize with” (1994, p. 97).  Interestingly, just its early experiences with Aussiedler 
were enough to change the German government’s approach to integration and citizenship.  
It has since restricted Aussiedler return migration and set up a much more formal 
introduction to German society for returnees, as their integration was not as smooth as 
anticipated.  Additionally the legal citizenship requirements for other ethnic groups have 
expanded dramatically, moving Germany towards a more civic nationalist perspective 
and an attempt at a multicultural approach to integration (Joppke, 2007). 
While Germany is better known, Switzerland may be the more interesting site of 
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differential exclusion, as it also has some element of assimilation.  Switzerland has very 
stringent requirements for naturalization that persist into the 21st century (residency of at 
least twelve years, language fluency, effort to integrate into the labor market).  As 
recently as 2004 Swiss voters rejected a policy that would ease the naturalization process 
for second and even third generation immigrants.  Though voters in the last twenty years 
have also repeatedly rejected moves to substantially curb immigration, the changing 
demographics of the immigrant population in the country (from southern European guest 
workers to Muslim refugees) have set some citizens on edge, enough to ban [new] 
minarets from the country completely in 2009 (Cumming-Bruce & Erlanger, 2009). 
Assimilationism.  From a civic nationalist perspective, as Michael Ignatieff 
defines it, legitimate citizenship is not based on a national phenotype or religious 
heritage, but rather a belief that a nation is “a community of equal, rights-bearing 
citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values” 
(Ignatieff, 1994, p. 6; Mirel, 2010).  This perspective informs Castles and Miller’s two 
other, more inclusive models of integration, though perhaps more so in official 
documents than in practice.  The first of these is the assimilationist model, perhaps the 
best known exemplar of which is contemporary France, which welcomes immigrants into 
civil society to the extent that they are willing to surrender their culture, language, and 
social practices, and adopt—at least publicly—those of the dominant group.  In 
assimilationist countries, the “role of the state is to create conditions favourable to this 
process, through insistence on use of the dominant language and attendance at normal 
schools for migrant children” (Castles & Miller, 2003, p. 250).15   
                                                
15 Here, ‘normal’ is meant as ‘regular,’ not as ‘teacher education.’ 
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One of the major difficulties with this approach in historically Christian France is 
the predominance of Islam among recent waves of immigrants.  Islam is a religion whose 
various interpretations result in different modes of dress, cultural habits, and, often, value 
systems from those of predominantly secular Europeans.  Ostensibly, fair-skinned 
Europeans consider religion akin to a choice—one that could be made differently—and 
thus they see Muslims’ failure to adopt Christian values as problematic.  As Samuel 
Huntington predicted, the differences between these two cultures has caused repeated 
problems between native French and first- through third-generation immigrants.  These 
problems are not limited to local discrimination, but indeed in some instances are 
instigated by the government.  In one illustrative example, beginning in the 1980s, 
debates occurred frequently about the relationship of Islam and the republican philosophy 
of laïcité, the separation of church and state in which the emphasis is on keeping the 
church out of state and individual affairs.  These debates came to a head with the 2004 
banning of the headscarf for Muslim schoolgirls, which is well detailed in Joan Scott’s 
2007 book, Politics of the Veil.  Studying the history and implications of the all-
encompassing ban on “conspicuous signs of religious affiliation in public schools,” Scott 
describes the effective takeaway message this way: “it was either Islam or the republic” 
(p. 35).   
As sociologist Stephen Castles and political scientist Mark Miller have written, 
“political inclusion of minorities and cultural pluralism can threaten national identity, 
especially in countries in which it has been constructed in exclusionary forms.  If ideas of 
belonging to a nation have been based on myths of ethnic purity or of cultural superiority, 
then they really are threatened by the growth of ethnic diversity” (2003, p. 288).  France 
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claims that its ‘universalist’ approach to identity—one in which the nation’s unity rests 
on “seeing each person only as an individual”—ensures that, to the republic, all French 
citizens are only French, with no other public communal identities (only private ones; 
Scott, 2007, p. 83).  Yet clearly the publicly visible signs of the Islamic faith—without 
which Muslims could not be true to their faith—identified them as having a communal 
identity, and an objectionable one to the dominant group (Joppke, 2008).  Oddly, 
government officials by the time of the headscarf ban saw no difficulty with their 
decision.  Writes Joan Scott: “In the impeccable logic of former minister of education 
Bayrou: ‘The school is designed to integrate; therefore it must exclude.’  This was 
another way of saying that Muslims could never be French” (2007, p. 103). 
While I have ascribed the ‘assimilation’ model of integration to southern Europe, 
one might call it assimilation by default, because immigrants were officially ignored 
there for several decades (Cangiano & Strozza, 2008; Lahav, 2004; Tsoukala, 1999).  
Italians’ realization that there was an economic need for immigrants in the 1990s led 
them to institute quota systems for regulating how many newcomers were allowed in.  
The country’s previous experience as a stopping point for north Africans on the way to 
northern Europe gave them a sense of where its borders were least secure and the likely 
numbers of arrivals, should immigrants have some economic incentive (Cangiano & 
Strozza, 2008, p. 156).  These quotas, in addition to large flows across the Mediterranean 
of aspiring immigrants from places of unrest—Kurdish portions of Turkey and Iraq, 
Albania, and then-Yugoslavia—and from central Europe resulted in great difficulties 
with integration, because so many immigrants essentially ended up with illegal status 
("Italy, Albania take measures to control illegal immigration," 1995).  In the last six 
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months, the country’s proximity to northern Africa has once again made it a reluctant 
host to refugees from Libya’s civil war, whom it has threatened to expel to other 
European countries (Squires, 2011).   
In central Europe, immigration only became an issue once the USSR had fallen 
apart.  Central European countries were then working toward membership in the EU, 
which made them attractive to people in eastern Europe and the Middle East who would 
have freedom of movement within the EU, were they to become citizens of a central 
European country (see, for example, "Millions want to come," 1998).  These countries 
have not been exceptionally kind to or tolerant of immigrants, but neither have they 
enacted purely ethnicity-based citizenship laws.  Whereas most of Czech Republic and 
Slovakia’s immigrants tend to be, respectively, Slovak and Czech, because of the 
countries’ former union, Hungary’s immigrant population tends to be ethnically 
Hungarian and those immigrants are the ones who tend to acquire citizenship (Drbohlav, 
2005; Juhász, 2003). 
Recall that the process of integration is a two-way street: in countries concerned 
with assimilation, the challenge to immigrant or out-groups is whether to respond by 
assimilating.  The obvious options are—at least in the public eye—to reduce conflict by 
assimilating or to reaffirm ethnic solidarity by retaining cultural, religious, and other 
traditions or markers, which may induce conflict (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001).  A number 
of European countries have deemed their assimilative approaches to be failures, 
evidenced by unequal treatment and life chances for minorities.  To some, this is an 
argument for yet another model that perceives immigrants as an ethnic community to be 
celebrated—exemplifying the Contact theory—rather than an ethnic minority to be dealt 
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with—exemplifying the Conflict theory (Angenendt, Barrett, Laurence, Peach, Smith, & 
Winter, 2007; Castles & Miller, 2003).  Castles and Miller (2003) claim that 
assimilationist policies in many countries—which themselves grew out of differential 
exclusion models—have evolved into somewhat more flexible integration models, 
wherein assimilation may be important in some sectors, while multiculturalism 
(described next) prevails in others, like education.   
Multiculturalism.  The second of Castles and Miller’s more inclusive integration 
methods is the multicultural model, which ideally allows immigrants many rights without 
the expectation that they give up their culture, language, or social practices, though they 
are expected to adopt common political and civic values and become competent in the 
dominant language.  Multicultural education scholar James Banks believes that this is the 
ideal, returning to the idea of the two-way integration process.  He sees this model as the 
one that most benefits the host society’s democracy, too: 
Citizens should be able to maintain attachment to their cultural communities as 
well as participate effectively in the shared national culture.  Cultural and ethnic 
communities need to be respected and given legitimacy not only because they 
provide safe spaces for ethnic, cultural, and language groups on the margins of 
society, but also because they serve as a conscience for the nation-state.  These 
communities take action to force the nation to live up to its democratic ideals 
when they are most seriously violated. (2001, p. 7)   
In practice, though, a state commitment to ensuring equality of opportunity and 
cultural preservation may or may not accompany a multicultural orientation toward 
acceptance and, generally, does not result in greater immigrant integration socially or 
economically.  Christian Joppke writes that what some states have termed 
multiculturalism is actually “state neutrality”—openness to all religions without 
preference for or particular attention to any—and civic integration, focused on language 
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proficiency and skills for living in the host society (2008).  While Sweden, Norway, and 
Denmark’s multicultural policies have been to take responsibility for social justice for 
immigrant minorities, the United States is forever debating whether and how to do so 
(Castles & Miller, 2003, p. 252).   
This model may well be perceived as the most just and humane, but in practice it 
has not worked out as politicians expected it to, i.e., with highly integrated immigrants.  
Germany’s experiences, for example, following 2000 (the year that non-ethnic Germans 
gained access to German citizenship) have resulted in high level politicians proclaiming 
that multiculturalism has failed, that it is time to stop all immigration, and that 
immigrants do not want to be integrated (Dempsey, 2010a, 2010b).  Similarly, in the 
Scandinavian welfare states, policies for redistribution of wealth and protection of those 
at society’s margins have led to resentment on natives’ part and actually greater difficulty 
for low-skilled workers to break into the labor market, reducing their chances of 
integration (Andersen, Larsen, & Møller, 2009; Bjørklund & Andersen, 1999).  Best 
economic, social, and educational practices seemingly do not yet exist across the board 
and countries whose official integration practices were designed for equality, to be 
multicultural and tolerance-building, have backfired, leaving both immigrants and native 
people deeply dissatisfied (Angenendt et al., 2007; Caldwell, 2005; Ladd, Fiske, & Ruijs, 
2010; New York Times, 2010).  This is painfully obvious in the very recent murders in 
Oslo, Norway, perpetrated by a man who hated the multiculturalism that he felt had set 
Europe up for domination by conservative Islam (Erlanger & Shane, 2011). 
The side effects of efforts at multiculturalism in Europe range across the public 
sphere.  Dutch beliefs about freedom of choice in schooling have led to hugely 
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segregated urban schools, as native Dutch parents try to send their children to schools 
with lower proportions of “black”—immigrant or second generation—students because 
the quality of education is better (Ladd, Fiske, & Ruijs, 2010).  Political rhetoric in 
Germany, at least officially tolerant in the early 2000s, has become more ethnicized and 
anti-immigrant.  Race riots in northern England in the early 2000s turned public and 
political rhetoric away from multiculturalism, back toward assimilation ("Race 
'segregation' caused riots," 2001).  In what used to be politically and ethnically 
homogeneous Sweden, “there is evidence of profound exhaustion with immigration,” for 
it has brought diversity, the lack of which had previously given a tolerant sheen to 
Sweden’s international image (Caldwell, 2005).  Michael Ignatieff would argue that 
racism is at play in these complaints: “European racism is a form of white ethnic 
nationalism—indeed, it is a revolt against civic nationalism itself, against the very idea of 
a nation based in citizenship rather than ethnicity” (1994, p. 8).  He might say that, for all 
the talk of accepting and respecting multiple cultures, groups that are different are 
referred to as separate and lesser, not integrated equals.   
Dutch researcher Ruud Koopmans comes at this question from a different 
perspective, wherein he places the responsibility for the failure of multiculturalism at the 
intersection of the generous welfare state, easy access to equal rights, and weak 
incentives for intercultural contact.  Using the European poster child for multiculturalism, 
the Netherlands, he claims that it is the fundamental tenet of multiculturalism—that all 
people have equal rights to practice their religion and hold to their cultural beliefs without 
judgment—that sets up countries to forego their own interest in maximizing access to the 
labor market in order to make ethnic minorities feel welcomed and respected.  On top of 
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that, when, for example, a Muslim woman is declared unemployable because she wears a 
full face covering and clients would be unable to look her in the eye, a generous welfare 
state—one that does not base standards of living on employment—has just sentenced 
itself to subsidizing that woman’s subsistence for the rest of her life.  As Koopmans 
writes, “That this is a choice she is willing to make is, in turn, related to the level of 
benefits in the Netherlands, which does not (in combination with other forms of aid for 
low incomes such as rent subsidies) condemn one to abject poverty” (2010, p. 5).   
Overall, his study shows that in countries where multiculturalism was (at least at 
first) most strongly embraced, cultural rights were very generous, meaning that there 
were cultural provisions in public institutions (tolerance of the Muslim headscarf in 
schools, for example), allowances for non-Christian religious practices outside of public 
institutions, and special political representation rights.  In countries with lower income 
inequality and generous social benefits that disincentivize work, investments in 
employability like language learning, or interactions with non-co-ethnics, immigrants are 
least integrated into the fabric of society.  Though he concedes that multiculturalism may 
have had positive effects on political participation, Koopmans suggests that a less 
generous welfare state, or one that hitches citizenship to national language proficiency 
and independent economic status, is more likely to result in better socioeconomically 
integrated immigrant populations (2010).   
 
3.1.3 Immigrants’ Political Integration 
Modern nation-states are aware that the sustainability of a national identity is at 
risk where globalization is at work.  Diverse populations that move often and have 
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multinational affiliations may undermine the state’s link between nationality and 
citizenship (Castles, 2004).  While this can be difficult for countries to accept, 
immigrants are highly likely to have multinational affiliations and multiple identities 
associated with those affiliations.  As Castles and Miller write, those immigrants with 
multilayered sociocultural identities “frequently develop a consciousness of their 
transcultural position, which is reflected not only in their artistic and cultural work, but 
also in social and political action” (2003, p. 289).  Multiple identities obtain, moreover, 
regardless of legal status, and are very much affected by the culture of the host country, 
including national institutions and native people’s attitudes towards newcomers.  This is 
the source of my interest in immigrant students’ attitudes toward their host country.  
Interestingly, interviews with adult immigrants in the US suggest their loyalty to and 
respect for the host country is as strong as, if not stronger than, that of native-born people 
(Bittle & Rochkind, 2009; Mirel, 2010).  In France, Neto (1995) found a strong 
association between satisfaction with life in the host country and feelings of integration 
among Portuguese adolescents, while in Germany, Dita Vogel (2006) has found mostly 
positive views of Europe as an immigrant-receiving region among young, non-EU 
immigrant adults.   
If many immigrants are happy with their new countries, why be concerned with 
whether they and their descendants are integrated politically in democracies, especially if 
they do not constitute a large proportion of the total citizenry?  The answer lies in the 
question itself: democracy is a form of governance by the people, and as such, since 
immigrants constitute some percentage of the people, the government ought to represent 
the interests of those people.  Leave out of this discussion, then, the question of whether 
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democratic governments ought to invite immigrants in or allow them to stay, and focus 
on the problem of incorporating into political and civil society people whose linguistic 
skills and cultural norms may otherwise inhibit their social integration. 
A number of researchers find that participation in political and civic activities is 
not particularly low in immigrant groups.  This is not to say that immigrants are 
necessarily any more likely to be involved in politics or civic volunteerism, but rather 
that, given the opportunity to participate, there are few within-community differences 
between immigrants and natives in their participation.  Knowing that European countries 
are conscious of immigrants’ multinational affiliations, Ukrainian economist Mariya 
Aleksynska studied whether it was the culture of civic participation in the host country or 
the country of origin that had a greater effect on first-generation immigrants’ civic 
participation.  Using 2002-2005 data from the European Social Survey, she found that 
civic participation levels in the host country had a stronger influence on immigrants’ 
participation than did participation levels in the country of origin.  In other words, high 
participation in the host country was significantly influential on immigrants, resulting in 
high levels of their participation, as well.  Aleksynska argues that “It is by observing 
what natives do, that immigrants tend to do the same” (2007, p. 28).  This is a compelling 
finding that I explore in this study of adolescents, as well.   
Jennifer Hochschild and John Mollenkopf agree in part with the above findings, 
remarking that “many demographic traits associated with political activity among native-
born people are also associated with immigrants’ political activity.  Such traits include 
race, gender, education, homeownership, occupation, language ability, marital status, and 
age” (2009, p. 18).  But they also remind readers that discrimination—actual or 
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perceived—tends to inhibit political action.  Since first-generation immigrants are less 
likely to be comfortable with the host society’s language and customs, they are more 
likely to be on the receiving end of discriminatory remarks and practices.  In the 
introduction to their book on immigrants’ political incorporation on both sides of the 
Atlantic, Mollenkopf and Hochschild claim that the first-generation experience should 
not be taken as representative of an immigrant group’s political or civic assimilation, a 
point I am conscious of in my study of first-generation school-age immigrants: 
By definition, most adult members of the first generation spent their formative 
years outside the host country and resocialization as an adult can be difficult and 
painful.  Their children, the immigrant 1.5 and second generations, have much 
greater potential for incorporation.  The trajectory of immigrant assimilation 
therefore depends on whether the children in the second generation can close their 
parents’ gaps in achievement and participation and fully join their host societies, 
adding their own flavors, or whether they will also be blocked from opportunities 
and will turn into angry, alienated, and troublesome ethnic or racial minorities. 
(2009, p. 10) 
The general political and social context.  All discussion of how immigrants are 
socialized into the political and civic environment must be considered in light of a 
general decline in trust of national institutions and politicians, as well as a decrease in 
feelings of national unity among native citizens (Norris, 1999; Pharr & Putnam, 2000).  
Recall from Chapter 1, however, that findings from the World Values Survey suggest that 
trust in national institutions and characters is far less important for the maintenance and 
consolidation of democracy than self-expression values.  Indeed, though other researchers 
have found ethnic minority youth and adults in the US to trust government less (Flanagan 
et al., 2007), this lower level of trust is not a strong indicator of how supportive they are 
of democratic ideals.  More likely it is related to their treatment or perceived treatment by 
governmental agencies or policies.   
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Altogether, this makes a study of immigrant adolescents’ attitudes toward ethnic 
minorities’, immigrants’, and women’s rights important because it will shed light on 
some of the attitudes most essential for the consolidation of democracy across societies.  
If immigrants in Western democracies hold different values regarding these traditionally 
marginalized groups’ rights and opportunities, then to some extent, schools and the rest 
of society have potential to influence those values toward more pro-democratic ends. 
 
3.2 Immigrants in Schools 
As a state-mandated institution, schools have nearly universal access to the 
population during an influential developmental stage.  Furthermore, as I noted in Chapter 
2, schools are in a position to be valuable institutions for bringing immigrant students 
into contact with the general population, national history, and the nation’s sociocultural, 
democratic values.  How immigrants experience education depends heavily, however, on 
their own characteristics, the national model of integration, and local circumstances, all 
of which I review.  In most countries, educational policy is—at least officially—inclined 
toward a civic nationalist approach to immigrants’ children (national identity by 
commitment to civic values), regardless of the society’s view on adult immigrants.16  Just 
as Horace Mann believed, political and educational leaders of most societies claim that 
education can make newcomers into good citizens.  Unfortunately, most findings on 
immigrant students’ school experiences are not positive.   
In 2003, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
conducted a comparative, international study, the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA), whose results suggested that immigrant children are underserved 
                                                
16 See Appendix B for greater detail on the meaning of ‘civic nationalism.’ 
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educationally in most subject areas, including science, mathematics, and literacy.  
Particularly salient is that their lower achievement is more pronounced in western Europe 
than in countries founded on immigration, i.e., former British territories like the US, 
Australia, and Canada (Holdaway, Crul, & Roberts, 2009; Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2006; Schnepf, 2007).  Subsequent administrations of 
the PISA also suggest that immigrants are more likely to drop out and tend to repeat 
school years more often (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2010, p. 33).  This is problematic because it is well known that lower school achievement 
and educational attainment have negative consequences for immigrants’ socioeconomic, 
cultural, civic, and political integration as adults (Crul & Vermeulen, 2003; Faist, 1995; 
Kanas & Van Tubergen, 2009; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2006).17  Seemingly the only positive findings in the PISA study were that 
there is no association between the number of immigrant students nationwide and the 
performance differences between immigrants and native-born students (Holdaway, Crul, 
& Roberts, 2009), and that immigrant students have more or similarly positive attitudes 
toward school (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006).   
Student characteristics affecting educational outcomes.  Immigrant students’ 
outcomes are consistently highly correlated with their socioeconomic status (including 
their parents’ level of education and immigrant status), age at migration, and native 
language (DeFeyter & Winsler, 2010; Rumbaut, 2004; Schnepf, 2007).  Recall from 
Chapter 2 that both socioeconomic status and verbal ability are positively associated with 
                                                
17 Researchers find high dropout rates among certain groups of immigrant students in Europe, especially 
Turks (Joppke, 2007).  Reasons for dropout include low academic achievement, a desire to work instead, 
family need, or cultural reasons, and they often vary by immigrant group.  For example, while Turkish girls 
may do well in school, they are more likely than Moroccan girls to drop out in order to marry (Crul & 
Schneider, 2009).   
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greater civic knowledge and participation (Hahn, 1998; Nie & Hillygus, 2001; Patrick & 
Hoge, 1991).  These findings do not bode well for the experiences and civic behaviors of 
immigrant students in any country, as immigrants are typically at the low end of the 
socioeconomic spectrum, and also tend to be non-native speakers of the host country’s 
language.   
A student’s age at migration is clearly related to her time in the new country, 
which in turn affects her exposure to the dominant national culture.  The ability to learn 
the host country’s language is also wrapped up in a student’s age at migration, as those 
who arrive earlier in life have the neurological capacity to learn the language better 
(Birdsong, 1999).  Speaking a language other than that of the host country’s dominant 
group is problematic precisely because the dominant group’s language is typically the 
language of instruction and success in that country.  Without the ability to communicate 
with those in power, immigrants remain without power.  Each of these facts is an 
important consideration in my study, as it is likely that these elements affect an 
immigrant student’s acquisition of civic knowledge and enculturation into pro-democratic 
attitudes. 
Proficiency in the school language is a strong determinant of academic 
achievement and social integration (Schnepf, 2007; Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, & 
Todorova, 2008).  In homes where parents do not speak the school language, students 
only get practice in the school language at school, which, in a secondary analysis of the 
2003 PISA data, Gayle Christensen and Petra Stanat (2007) found puts immigrant 
students even further behind their native-born peers in school.  Of course, as youth are 
wont to learn the school language quickly in order to communicate with peers, “[s]chool-
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age children usually … become fluent in the new language faster than their parents,” the 
problem with this being that “difficulties may arise in communicating with their parents, 
whose affective language is different than theirs. … [T]he mother tongue is a vital link to 
the norms of the immigrant’s homeland, and an inadequate mastery of it represents a 
disruption of relationships with the original culture and parents” (Coll & Magnuson, 
1997, pp. 106, 111).  If students are able to learn the host country’s language without 
losing their parents’ language, most researchers see that multilingualism as an asset in the 
long term, allowing students to learn better, be better integrated into society, and thus 
have more economic opportunities in an increasingly globalized world (Mancilla-
Martinez & Kieffer, 2010).  Consequently, those students who speak a non-school 
language at home sometimes may in fact be in a better position academically and even 
civically than those who speak only their parents’ or the school’s language at home. 
School characteristics related to achievement and integration.  The schools 
immigrant students attend can have large influences on their integration into society and 
their academic achievement.  I present just a few here that I am able to take into 
consideration in this study.18  First, the socioeconomic composition of the school: lower 
overall SES tends to entail fewer material resources and, often, lower-quality human 
resources (i.e., worse teachers; Willms, 2006).  While poor students tend not to do as well 
in school as more affluent students generally, results from PISA 2000 and 2002 showed 
that there is a compounding problem for immigrants: there is a stronger effect of being of 
low socioeconomic status (SES) and attending a low SES school than of being of high 
                                                
18 There are many other school characteristics that researchers have found to be consequential for 
immigrants’ academic achievement and social integration, but which I cannot address in my study.  See 
Appendix B, Section 2, for the research on residential segregation, differential funding schemes for 
schools, language policies, and educational tracking systems. 
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SES and attending a high SES school.  This is to say that where immigrants—most often 
of low socioeconomic status—already score lower than native students on mathematics, 
reading, and science assessments, their scores drop even lower if their schools are 
composed primarily of other students with low socioeconomic status (Willms, 2006, p. 
49). 
In more ethnically homogeneous schools (either with few native or few immigrant 
students)—a common occurrence resulting from residential segregation—immigrants 
then have fewer interactions with native peers, which, according to Contact theory, 
reduces immigrants’ exposure to majority culture and thus their likelihood of positive 
social integration.  Additionally, it reduces native students’ exposure to ethnic minorities 
and, thus, the likelihood that they develop tolerant social attitudes toward members of 
those minorities (Hjerm, 2005).   
Beyond the effect of ethnic heterogeneity, since James S. Coleman and 
colleagues’ report in 1966 on the equality of educational opportunity in America, we 
have known that the characteristics of students’ peers have some influence on their 
academic outcomes (not as much as individual characteristics like SES), and numerous 
studies since then have reinforced the finding that placement in classes with high-
achieving or socially advantaged peers is particularly valuable for students from 
disadvantaged social backgrounds and with low achievement (Coleman, Campbell, 
Hobson, McPartland, Mood, Weinfeld, & York, 1966, pp. 302-304; Schneeweis, 2009).19   
 
                                                
19 The Coleman report found that primarily it is students’ own socioeconomic background that is most 
strongly related to academic achievement, but out of all the school-based characteristics he and his 
colleagues considered, peers’ characteristics were most strongly related. 
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3.3 Civic Education Experiences and Pro-Democratic Attitudes of Immigrant 
Adolescents 
I have laid out the characteristics of immigrants and their schools that are related 
to overall achievement and integration, many of which I hypothesize are similarly related 
to their civic knowledge, participation, and pro-democratic attitudes.  Now, though, it is 
important to present more specific findings on exactly those outcomes for immigrant 
adolescents, especially in the context of civic education.  There are not many studies 
written for an international audience (i.e., that reads English or French) of civic education 
for immigrants or of adolescent immigrants’ developing social attitudes in Europe.  
While there are numerous studies of the ‘integration’ or ‘adaptation’ of immigrants in 
European schools, these focus on social integration and cultural or ethnic identity, rather 
than on civic attitudes (Sabatier, 2008; Strohmeier & Schmitt-Rodermund, 2008).  There 
is a large amount of work on immigrant students’ experiences with civic education and 
general political socialization in the United States and Canada, though.  These studies 
find that immigrant students trust the government less and are less patriotic, know less 
about the civic and political realms, and have fewer traditional citizenship-oriented skills 
than their native counterparts, though they participate in community service slightly more 
often (Callahan, Muller, & Schiller, 2008; Flanagan et al., 2007; Levinson, 2007).  This 
said, while many characteristics are shared between immigrants to North American and 
European countries (linguistic and cultural differences from the dominant group, 
primarily, and parents with lower educational levels), we should not expect that the civic 
education experiences and attitudes of immigrants in European countries are the same as 
those of immigrants to North American countries founded on immigration.   
Since much of the research that does exist on immigrants’ civic education 
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experiences and political attitudes in Europe (and elsewhere, for that matter) is based on 
CIVED data (the same data I use), I highlight those studies in this review, giving 
particular attention to those whose methods or hypotheses I extend in this study.  The 
analyses that exist offer a number of salient findings, though they are limited in scope.  In 
the first Europe-only report on the data, Judith Torney-Purta, Chair of the IEA 
International Steering Committee, noted only this: “[being] an immigrant also appears to 
be a salient identity for many of these students.  In those countries with large enough 
numbers of immigrants to compute a stable attitude estimate, those born outside the 
country had more positive attitudes to immigrants and their rights than those born in the 
country” (2002, p. 138).  Subsequent studies have elaborated on this rather intuitive 
finding, but there is still much more to be learned from these data about how immigrant 
students perceive their host countries and democracy. 
In addition to CIVED-based studies, there are several others that address 
immigrant youths’ sociopolitical integration or knowledge using qualitative or economic 
data.  These perspectives are useful complements to those derived from educational 
survey data.  I first discuss the characteristics of immigrants themselves (primarily just 
immigrant status) that are related to pro-democratic attitudes, then review how the 
educational environment influences those attitudes and civic knowledge, and finally 
present studies on the influence of the national context for education and integration. 
 
3.3.1 Immigrant Status, Civic Knowledge and Participation, and Pro-Democratic 
Attitudes 
In Sweden, using nationally representative survey data (though not CIVED data), 
Mikael Hjerm found that immigrant students are less knowledgeable about civics, but 
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also less xenophobic than native-born students, a somewhat intuitive finding if one 
considers their experience on the other side of xenophobia (2005).  In Belgium, Ellen 
Quintelier investigated the political participation of immigrant adolescents, to see 
whether the pattern reflects that of adult immigrants.  Using survey data from 15- and 16-
year-olds in Dutch- and French-speaking Belgium, Ellen Quintelier (2009) found that 
these young people are no less likely to participate in civic and political activities than 
adult immigrants, and in fact that citizenship status has no effect on this likelihood.  
Interestingly, strong identification with co-ethnics, viewing ethnic-group-oriented 
television programs, and religion are unrelated to this outcome, though the die-hard 
characteristics of gender, native language (‘mother tongue’), and socioeconomic status do 
predict differential rates of participation (girls participate more, those who don’t speak 
the dominant regional language at home participate less, and those of low SES participate 
less).   
Supporting these findings, Tijana Prokic and Jaap Dronkers used CIVED data in 
eleven western countries (ten European) and found no difference between immigrants’ 
and native students’ participation in school- or community-based groups (2010).  They do 
find consistently strong negative attitudes towards the host country from all immigrant 
students, and fairly consistently negative attitudes toward women’s economic and 
political rights, though this finding was dependent on the country of residence.  However, 
across their analyses, they find no significant differences in attitudes between immigrants 
who speak the school language at home and those who don’t, nor between second-
generation students who were born in the country and first-generation students who 
arrived before or after age 6.   
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3.3.2 Educational Environment and Immigrants’ Civic Knowledge and Values 
Ethnic heterogeneity.  Contributing to the literature on Conflict vs. Contact 
theory, two studies based on Swedish data examine the influence of ethnic heterogeneity 
on immigrants’ and natives’ tolerance of out-groups.  Hjerm’s 2005 study suggested that 
the ‘density’ of immigrants in a school was not significantly associated with native 
students’ level of xenophobia, which fails to support the Contact theory.  That is to say, 
greater opportunities to ‘mix’ with students of other ethnic groups and cultures do not 
decrease the risk of prejudice.  In contrast, and using CIVED data, Andrej Kokkonen, 
Peter Esaiasson, and Mikael Gilljam found more mixed results for the effect of ethnic 
heterogeneity (2008).  The researchers determined that in schools with ethnically diverse 
student populations, students tend to know less about civics and democracy than students 
in more ethnically homogeneous schools, but supported Hjerm’s findings with no 
correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and tolerance towards immigrants’ rights.  They 
did find that immigrant students in ethnically heterogeneous schools tend to have higher 
confidence in their own rights (as immigrants) in a democracy than those in less 
heterogeneous schools.  Additionally, students in ethnically heterogeneous classrooms 
seem to be more trusting of Swedish governmental institutions than those in ethnically 
homogeneous classrooms.   
Instructional methods.  Returning to Chapter 2’s review of the characteristics of 
civics classrooms that are positively related to student outcomes, I suggest that teaching 
methods may be especially important determinants of minority students’ civic outcomes, 
whose ‘otherness’ may otherwise distance them from feelings of rights, respect, and civic 
responsibilities (Flanagan & Faison, 2001; Koh, 2010).  Students of different 
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demographic backgrounds do not necessarily have similar opportunities to experience 
open, discussion-based classes, though.  Using US CIVED data, Torney-Purta and 
Wilkenfeld found that black and immigrant students are less likely to experience an 
interactive civic education (2009, p. 18).  Another American scholar, Fernando Reimers, 
used the same data, looking specifically at the experiences of first- and second-generation 
Latino immigrants (born abroad and born in the US, respectively).  His results showed 
that regardless of their immigrant status, Latinos experience differential instruction in 
civic principles and have differential exposure to extracurricular opportunities to build 
skills in civic participation and responsible civic thinking.  However, while he finds that 
the gap in civic knowledge between immigrant and US-born Latino students is large, the 
relationship between civic instruction and civic knowledge is greater for immigrants.  
This suggests that schools “can add greater civic value to those who have been first 
socialized in other political cultures” (2005, p. 2).   
Constance Flanagan and her colleagues support this finding, but extend it to all 
US minority groups (2007).  These researchers found that an open classroom climate 
built up students’ sense of community and increased the likelihood that students 
identified their teachers’ practices as fair and respectful.  Through these pathways, the 
patterns of influence on white and ethnic minority students were the same.  Moreover, the 
models Flanagan et al. used explained somewhat more variance in minority students’ 
attitudes about a) America as a just country and b) their responsibility for acting to 
improve society, suggesting that an open classroom climate is indeed an even more 
important factor in minority students’ attitude development (p. 428).   
Controversial discussions.  Recall from Chapter 2 that several scholars have 
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identified ‘controversial discussions’ as experiences in civics that are especially salient 
for young people (Hahn, 1991, 1998; D. E. Hess, 2009).  I have found just one Europe-
based study that includes immigrants’ experiences with controversial discussions.  Frans 
Doppen’s brief case study of teachers’ approaches to discussion of recent political 
assassinations only superficially touches on immigrant experiences in an urban school in 
the Netherlands (2007).  He focuses on discussions of the assassinations of conservative 
politician Pim Fortuyn and filmmaker Theo van Gogh.  The study also examines 
teachers’ views on how the civic education curriculum has or should have been changed 
in light of those murders.20  In interviews, teachers remarked on the degree to which their 
immigrant or immigrant-background students (primarily Muslim) benefited or not from 
these discussions, especially given the ethnically heterogeneous makeup of the school.  
Teachers had mixed views of the value of discussing such violent events, especially in 
light of Muslim student discomfort with being associated with the violence.  One teacher 
was particularly negative about it because of some Muslim students’ hostile response 
(described by Doppen as “a riot”) to her presentation of the topic (p. 112).  Doppen does 
not include descriptions of these classes and the teachers’ framing of the discussion, so 
how much these data can actually say about immigrant students’ experiences with civic 
education is limited. 
 
3.3.3 National Characteristics and Immigrants’ Civic Knowledge and Values 
Size of the immigrant population.  Prokic and Dronkers were interested in 
whether the size of the immigrant population in a country made a difference in 
                                                
20 While Van Gogh was killed by a Moroccan Muslim fundamentalist, Fortuyn—whose anti-immigrant 
views were very outspoken—was assassinated by a native, non-Muslim Dutch activist.  Both of these 
public figures were associated with anti-Muslim sentiments. 
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adolescents’ civic attitudes, and while they found that certain countries had smaller 
immigrant/native differences in attitudes toward immigrants, they found no relationship 
between those attitudes and their indicator for the size of the immigrant population in 
these countries.21  That finding supports previous studies of other areas of academic 
achievement and integration.  Recall that Holdaway, Crul, and Roberts found no 
association between the number of immigrant students in a country and performance 
differences between native and immigrant students on reading and mathematics 
assessments (2009).   
Language policies.  In studying educational policies concerning citizenship and 
democratic education in the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, 
Norwegian comparativist Heidi Biseth speculates on the implications of those policies for 
immigrant students (2009).  These societies are increasingly diverse, with large numbers 
of immigrants, and she gives some thought to how education legislation and regulations 
might affect immigrants.  Policies for instruction in the school language (immigrants’ 
second language) explicitly relate linguistic competency to competency in civic 
participation.  But in multilingual Europe, schools do not offer instruction only in the 
dominant language: they tend to offer other European languages, as well, most often 
French, German, and Spanish, which are decidedly not the languages of most immigrants 
to those countries.  The absence of instruction in prominent immigrant languages is a 
subtle message to immigrant students that their languages are not valued, which may 
further alienate them from the civil sphere (p. 249).22   
                                                
21 Measured according to the number of immigrant students in each country’s CIVED sample. 
22 Biseth also notes that Norwegian schools are required to have student councils, and expresses concern 
that immigrant students may be less involved in these school-sponsored opportunities for democratic 
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National curriculum.  A very recent (2011) study focused on social cohesion and 
harmony makes use of CIVED data in conversation with a data set—compiled by French 
researcher Nathalie Mons—that documents educational policies and system 
characteristics in OECD and some developing countries.  The study is meant, in part, to 
determine whether a national curriculum is associated with smaller disparities between 
schools and between ethnic minority and ethnic majority students in tolerance of 
immigrants and patriotism.  What Jan Janmaat and Ms. Mons find is a compelling story 
of the damage that “territorial differentiation” (decentralized curriculum, assessment, and 
teacher education control) can do to a sense of national unity and to ethnic tolerance in 
increasingly diverse countries.   
In particular Janmaat and Mons find that greater central control of curriculum and 
assessment is associated with smaller disparities between majority and minority students 
in ethnic tolerance, suggesting that minority students are integrated enough with majority 
students that the latter are just as supportive of immigrants’ rights.23  Similarly, they find 
that countries with greater central control have smaller disparities in patriotic attitudes 
because there is great uniformity in the representation of a national identity.  They claim 
that this centralization results in low disparities between students by “preventing 
segregation and maintaining a commonality of values across schools” (Janmaat & Mons, 
2011, p. 77). 
Thus, even in countries where civics and citizenship are not unique academic 
subjects, but instead are expected to be “woven” through the rest of the social, historical, 
                                                                                                                                            
practice than native students because of lesser comfort with the school language and, thus, less knowledge 
of such opportunities (2009, p. 251).   
23 These researchers operationalize status as an ethnic minority as speaking a non-school language at home 
sometimes or always. 
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and economic curriculum, an otherwise national curriculum could conceivably result in 
immigrants having attitudes similar to those of their native-born peers, since the content 
to which they are exposed is the same.  Of course, while these researchers find no 
association of ethnic diversity with patriotism, those European countries with stronger 
national curricula also tend to be more racially and ethnically homogeneous (consider 
Greece and Norway), which could affect majority students’ attitudes toward immigrants 
and vice versa, especially given that students in classes with greater ethnic diversity have 
significantly lower levels of minority tolerance (2011, pp. 70, 73).   
National affluence.  Austrian economist Nicole Schneeweis (2009) finds that a 
nation’s relative level of affluence is negatively associated with immigrant students’ 
mathematics and science achievement.  These findings present an interesting frame for 
the part of my study that addresses national affluence’s association with civic attitudes.  
If indeed immigrant students achieve at lower academic levels in relatively wealthier 
countries, then they may experience disaffection with the school system and native peers 
who achieve higher, drop out of school and turn toward their ethnic group, away from the 
dominant group or culture, which may lead to less inclusive civic attitudes.   
Economic inequality.  In Chapter 2 I hypothesized a relationship between 
economic inequality and civic attitudes for the general populace.  Here I expand that 
hypothesis to have an ‘immigrant component.’  First, one viewpoint comes from CIVED 
researchers Hoskins, Barber, Van Nijlen, and Villalba, who suggest (but do not 
empirically study) that in countries with greater income equality, it is likely that 
immigrants’ and native people’s civic attitudes are more similar, since even immigrants 
at the lower end of the income scale might have material situations and social benefits 
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that are similar to native people’s situations (2011).  Recall that sociologist Lane 
Kenworthy agrees, hypothesizing, “A society with less dispersion between those at the 
bottom and those at the top may be characterized by greater social harmony and 
solidarity” (p. 120).  Indeed these hypotheses are supported by Wilkinson and Pickett’s 
recent (2011) findings that citizens of countries with lower income inequality also 
express higher levels of social trust, and by Schneeweis’s findings that higher income 
inequality is associated with lower immigrant achievement in math and science (2009).   
However, Dutch researcher Ruud Koopmans provides some jarring evidence that 
contradicts these theories and findings.  He looks at immigrant integration in countries 
with various degrees of income inequality, but also various degrees of social benefits, 
from the fairly austere Portugal to the highly generous welfare state of the Netherlands.  
Koopmans’ argument, explained in greater detail in Appendix B.1.3, is that immigrants 
are least integrated into the fabric of society in countries with low income inequality and 
generous social benefits that disincentivize work, investments in employability like 
language learning, or interactions with non-co-ethnics.  Though he concedes that such 
social benefits may have had positive effects on political participation, Koopmans 
suggests that a less generous welfare state, or one that hitches citizenship to national 
language proficiency and independent economic status, is more likely to result in better 
socioeconomically integrated immigrant populations (2010).  He finds that immigrants 
are better integrated—more language proficient, more likely to be employed and thus 
interacting with native people—in countries like Portugal, where economic inequality is 
higher and state-offered social benefits are fewer (2010).  Given Koopmans’, 
Kenworthy’s, and Schneeweis’ findings, it is likely that income inequality has a 
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moderating effect on differences in civic attitudes between immigrant students and their 
native-born peers.  It is not clear what that effect is, though I hypothesize that Koopmans’ 
theory is more applicable to the pro-democratic attitudes I study in this dissertation.  
 
3.4 Gaps in the Literature and Research Questions 
In this chapter I have shown that, while we know much about immigrants and 
their general schooling experiences, we know significantly less about their opportunities 
in Europe to learn about democracy and develop its concomitant social and political 
attitudes.  A number of studies using the CIVED data set have begun to flesh out where 
immigrant students are on the spectra of democratic attitudes, knowledge, and behaviors, 
but there is much more to be done with these data, especially with country- and 
classroom-level information, to determine whether civics and citizenship attitudes are yet 
more subject areas in which European countries need to address immigrant children’s less 
desirable levels of ‘achievement.’   
As an example, though Prokic and Dronkers’ CIVED-based study examines 
individual and national characteristics’ relationships to several civic outcomes, there are 
several drawbacks to their design.  1) They do not include school characteristics.  2) 
When they analyze national-level characteristics, they look at each country separately, 
which prevents them from making direct statistical cross-national comparisons.   
The other study whose design most resembles mine, but which I extend 
considerably, is Janmaat and Mons’ investigation of the relationship of a national 
curriculum with differences in ethnic groups’ patriotism and attitudes toward immigrants.  
The theoretical frame for these questions is the importance of social cohesion in 
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increasingly diverse countries.  I argue that my perspective—the maintenance of 
democracy—has a different thrust than social cohesion, which is mainly adherence to a 
“common overarching national identity” (2011, p. 57). 
Accordingly, I now pose several questions whose answers I believe will 
contribute to filling the gaps and resolving some of the conflicting findings in the 
literature.  I look first at students’ overall civic knowledge and participation, patriotism, 
and several self-expression values: their attitudes toward women’s, immigrants’, and 
ethnic minorities’ rights.  Along with overall ‘levels’ of these civic outcomes, I am 
interested in disparities between immigrants and native-born students, and the 
characteristics of students themselves that are associated with those differences.  I also 
explore how progressive educational methods in schools and national systems for 
controlling curriculum moderate overall levels and immigrant/native disparities. 
I have phrased these questions with the immigrant/native disparity in mind, and 
posed them according to the ‘site’ at which the independent variables (predictors) of 
interest are measured: first students themselves, then schools, then countries.  The 
structure of the questions also mirrors the structure of the data and analytical techniques 
that I use to answer them.  Along with each question I have briefly noted some 
hypotheses, all of which get more complete treatment in results chapters. 
 
3.4.1 Research Question 1: Student Characteristics 
What are European adolescents’ overall levels of civic knowledge, civic 
participation, patriotism, and self-expression values (attitudes toward rights for 
traditionally marginalized groups—women, immigrants, and ethnic minorities)?  To what 
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extent do immigrants and native-born adolescents differ on these civic outcomes? 
• Demographics: To what extent are overall levels and any immigrant/native 
differences associated with …  
o the amount of time students have lived in the country? 
o their home language? 
• Civic-related characteristics: To what extent are overall civic outcomes associated 
with …  
o their civic knowledge? 
o extracurricular participation? 
o perceptions of an open classroom climate?   
On attitudes toward ethnic minorities’ and immigrants’ rights, I am interested in 
the level of support from immigrant students, which I predict to be higher than native 
students’ because of in-group solidarity.  However, the more interesting focus here is in 
fact native-born students’ attitudes toward immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ rights, and 
how those attitudes are moderated by other characteristics.  Since native students are the 
majority of society, their opinions and values have somewhat greater weight in the 
political and cultural sphere, and their degree of tolerance for minority rights is thus very 
important. 
Otherwise, based on the literature on immigrants’ academic outcomes and their 
life circumstances, their knowledge and interpretive skills in civics are likely to be lesser 
than their native peers’, as is their affective connection to their host country.  Without 
being able to say for certain that the immigrants I study are indeed from non-western 
cultures, I hypothesize that immigrants’ attitudes toward women’s rights are less positive 
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because of more traditional gender roles in those cultures, though their participation in 
civic-oriented groups may be similar.  Based on other studies of immigrants’ 
characteristics, I hypothesize that immigrants whose home language matches that of the 
school and who have been in the host country longer are more similar to their native 
peers.  Finally it is likely that, overall, students with greater civic knowledge, who are 
more active in extracurricular activities, and perceive a more open classroom climate are 
less xenophobic and thus have cultural values more characterized by self-expression than 
survival. 
 
3.4.2 Research Question 2: Schools 
To what extent are European adolescents’ overall civic outcomes related to their 
educational environments, and to differences between immigrants and native students on 
these outcomes?   
Specifically, how are the following characteristics related to these civic 
outcomes? 
• instructional methods (discussion-based vs. traditional lecture/note-taking) 
• ethnic heterogeneity (the immigrant population) 
• average family educational resources (average and range of books in students’ 
homes) 
Finding that the relationship between immigrant status and civic outcomes is 
weaker in certain educational contexts would be somewhat encouraging because it would 
suggest that immigrant students are not uniformly destined to be civic outsiders.  Rather, 
immigrants’ educational contexts help to weave them into the ‘social fabric.’  The most 
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salient feature of schools to policymakers is instructional methods.  Reimers (2005) and 
Torney-Purta and Wilkenfeld (2009) found differences between US black, Latino, and 
white students’ civic knowledge and attitudes based on whether they were taught by 
teachers who used open, discussion-based, student-oriented methods.  It is likely that, 
similarly, smaller knowledge and value disparities are found between immigrants and 
native students in such open classrooms in Europe. 
I consider school averages of families’ educational resources as proxies, albeit 
weak ones, for the socioeconomic composition of schools, which has been cited 
repeatedly in studies as an indicator of the quality of material and intellectual resources to 
which students have access.  I also consider the range within schools of students’ number 
of books at home as a proxy for socioeconomic inequality.  That and the proportion of 
immigrants in a school are signs of social class and interethnic mixing which, if one 
extends the Contact and Conflict theories, may either enhance or reduce social cohesion 
and tolerance.  
 
3.4.3 Research Question 3: National Characteristics 
To what extent are characteristics of the countries in which adolescents reside 
related to overall civic outcomes, as well as differences in civic knowledge, participation, 
and self-expression values between immigrant and native students?   
Specifically, how are the following national characteristics related to students’ 
civic outcomes? 
• system of curricular control (most centralized to most decentralized) 
• relative affluence 
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• relative degree of income inequality 
Based on the work of Janmaat and Mons (2011), we know that in countries with 
more centralized curricular control, levels of patriotism and support for immigrants’ 
rights are more similar between ethnic minority students and their ethnic majority peers.  
I hypothesize that my data will support these findings and extend them to other self-
expression values, though the focus is on immigrants—not ethnic minorities in general.  
Previous studies have shown that national affluence is negatively related both to 
adolescents’ overall civic participation and academic achievement.  Though there are two 
schools of thought on the relationship of economic inequality to social cohesion and thus 
immigrant integration (Kenworthy, 2004; Koopmans, 2010), I hypothesize that in nations 
with greater income inequality, there are smaller immigrant/native disparities in civic 
knowledge, values, and behavior. 
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Chapter 4 
Data and Methods 
 
The previous chapters have detailed what researchers know about the influence of 
civic education and other forms of political socialization on adolescents’ civic knowledge 
and behaviors, and pro-democratic attitudes; how immigrant students’ personal 
characteristics and teachers’ expectations influence their school experiences and some of 
their democratic inclinations; and the educational systems, and history and status of 
immigrants in contemporary Europe.  Based on this literature, I have posed several 
questions whose answers will contribute to an increasingly rich picture of how immigrant 
adolescents’ characteristics and environments influence their civic values and practices in 
different European countries.  With this chapter I describe the design for a study that 
begins to answer these questions and improves on the existing research in three ways.  
First, it uses multilevel analytical techniques to answer two multilevel questions: how do 
characteristics of school and national contexts relate to the civic outcomes of 
adolescents—especially immigrants—within those contexts?  Second, it complements 
individual, country-by-country analyses of school features with a larger analysis of 
countries’ combined data that allows me to make cross-national comparisons and 
contribute to the development of an overarching, international theory of how national-
level characteristics are related to the civic-related qualities of students.  Third, it 
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investigates the relationship of national and school characteristics with several self-
expression values that have not previously been explored in European adolescent 
populations.   
 
4.1 Theoretical Model 
You will recall from Chapter 1 that the theoretical model displayed in Figure 4-1 
was created by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational 
Achievement (IEA) expressly for designing the CIVED 1999 survey, which I discuss in 
greater detail beginning on page 99.  I take several of its features into consideration in my 
study. 
In my study, the qualities of students I am looking to measure—my six dependent 
variables or civic outcomes—are civic knowledge, participation in civic-oriented 
extracurricular activities, patriotism, and attitudes toward the rights of women, 
immigrants, and ethnic minorities.  The student at the center of the theoretical model has 
unique demographic characteristics and an identity as a student and civic actor that 
provide the information for addressing research question 1.  In particular, RQ 1 puts 
special emphasis on the differences between immigrants and native-born students.  
Moving outward from there to the inner circle of ‘social actors,’ I address research 
question 2 with information about the educational environment: teachers’ instructional 
methods, ethnic heterogeneity, and socioeconomic composition in schools.  Finally, for 
research question 3, I move to the octagonal perimeter, where high-level contextual 
features influence everything inside the model.  Here I look at national socioeconomic 
stratification (for this study’s purposes, income inequality), economic process (as proxied 
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for with Gross National Income, which to some degree reflects industrial development), 
and educational values (as represented by the national system for designing and 
disseminating curriculum).     
Figure 4-1. Theoretical model for IEA’s study. 
Note. From “IEA Civic Education Study technical report,” by W. Schulz & H. Sibberns (Eds.), 2004, 
Amsterdam, p. 11.  Copyright 2004 by IEA.  Reprinted with permission. 
 
Within research questions I specify the characteristics of individuals, schools, and 
countries in which I am most interested.  Variables that operationalize each of these 
characteristics, including that for immigrant status, are required to address these 
questions.  In addition, I include statistical controls for three potentially confounding 
variables at the individual level: gender, age, and number of books in the home (a proxy 
for socioeconomic status).  I control for gender because of literature suggesting that girls 
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are more likely to express interest in community-oriented activities (Flanagan et al., 
2007; Husfeldt, Barber, & Torney-Purta, 2005; Metz, McLellan, & Youniss, 2003) and 
tend to be more tolerant of marginalized groups and their rights (Sotelo, 1997).  I control 
for age for three reasons: 1) it is related to how much experience one has with the world, 
and may influence a student’s attitudes or knowledge just by maturation; 2) it can reflect 
grade retention (being held back); and 3) older students tend to be more tolerant of more 
extreme activist’s rights, like abortion advocates’ protests (Sotelo, 1997). 
I control for the number of books in students’ homes—as a proxy for 
socioeconomic status—because study after study finds a strong association between 
socioeconomic status (SES) and civic participation, knowledge, and social tolerance.24  
Among adults and adolescents, more affluent and educated people tend to participate 
more, and indeed, as Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Grady found in their 
1990s study of American adults, parental education (a common indicator of SES) has a 
significant effect on political information and involvement in high school activities, 
largely because parents with more education tend to be more involved in and 
knowledgeable about politics and civic issues themselves (1995).   
 
4.2 Student Data Source: CIVED 1999 
To address my questions, I primarily make use of data from the IEA’s Civic 
Education (CIVED) study of 1999, a large-scale, nationally representative survey of 
adolescent achievement in and attitudes about civics.   
 
 
                                                
24 I discuss the limitation of this proxy measure in greater detail shortly. 
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4.2.1 Strengths of the Data 
These data are the best available on this topic to date.25  CIVED is similar to 
IEA’s better known Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and 
Progress in International Reading and Literacy Study (PIRLS), and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA).  Though the following was said of PISA, it is applicable to each of 
these other studies, as well.  They are all: 
policy-oriented, designed and guided by an international steering committee to 
provide regular data pertaining to the most pressing policy issues confronting 
educational administrators and policymakers around the world.  They include 
considerable information on the family and school factors that contribute to 
school performance in each country. (Willms, 2006, p. 8) 
This study was conducted in over 100 schools in each of 28 countries (over 20 of 
them in Europe), so the students included represent a wide swath of European 
adolescents: the sample sizes are very large and they come from many different countries 
in that region.  Furthermore, the content of questions included in the survey covers a wide 
array of topics: knowledge of democratic ideals and processes, opinions about citizens’ 
and government’s roles, students’ current and anticipated types of civic participation, 
characteristics of and experiences in school-based civic education, and characteristics of 
their everyday lives and selves that are related to developing an orientation toward active 
citizenship.  Finally, the study included information from teachers and principals on their 
training, experience, and perceptions of civic education’s use and status in their schools.   
 
 
 
                                                
25 IEA collected more recent data between 2008 and 2009 that are not yet publicly available.   
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4.2.2 Limitations of the Data 
However, there are design and sampling characteristics of CIVED that should 
give all researchers and readers pause.  In addition to the data being now 12 years old and 
thus no longer representative of Europe’s contemporary immigration situation, one major 
shortcoming is that the data are cross-sectional: they represent only a ‘snapshot’ of the 
world, based on a sample of a population of students at one particular time.  Because of 
this, there is no information about students’ opinions or knowledge prior to testing, which 
means researchers cannot assess actual learning or change over time, nor can they make 
causal inferences (x caused y).  It is longitudinal data, collected at multiple time points, 
that allows researchers to study students’ development over time.  This is unfortunate 
because change over time is arguably the more valuable and interesting finding when 
studying educational systems and societies.  CIVED data should therefore be considered 
suggestive—not conclusive—about countries’ situations of civic education, knowledge, 
participation, and self-expression values for immigrants, a typically underserved 
population.   
In addition, I am forced to define an ‘immigrant’ as a student who was born 
outside the country where he or she attends school.  This definition is imperfect, as it 
does not take into account students’ nationality or legal status.  In many countries, too, 
students were not asked about their ethnicity, so it is practically impossible to corroborate 
students’ immigrant status.  However, numerous researchers using the same or similar 
data have used this definition, among them the chief coordinator of the CIVED study, 
Judith Torney-Purta.26  Typically there is very little discussion of this limitation in 
                                                
26 See, for example, Torney-Purta, Barber, and Wilkenfeld (2006) and Reimers (2005) who used CIVED 
data.  Other, far more well-known surveys such as the IEA-sponsored TIMSS and PIRLS, or OECD’s 
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published work using these data, without which researchers appear to implicitly suggest 
that their data absolutely represent actual immigrants.  I make no such claim. 
Finally, as I discussed in Chapter 1, there are several countries in Europe that 
participated in the CIVED survey, but whose immigrant populations are very small or 
whose definitions of ‘country’ are frequently debated.  I excluded those countries from 
this study for reasons I discuss in section 4.4.  These exclusions reduce the degree to 
which my study represents adolescents’ civic outcomes across Europe, though the 
countries that remain have very strong data for explaining their own national situations. 
 
4.2.3 History, Administration, and Content of the CIVED Survey 
The first iteration of this assessment was administered to students in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Finland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Sweden, and the United States in 1971 (Torney, Oppenheim, & Farnen, 1975).27  After 
decades without a follow-up study, the collapse of the USSR and other worldwide 
political changes spurred the IEA to approve the development of the CIVED study in 
1994.  The after-effects of the USSR’s dissolution in 1989 were key to the participation 
of eleven formerly Communist countries, ten of which are now members of the European 
Union.28  Many schoolteachers in these nations had taught under the Communist system, 
as well, and their pedagogy in many cases was difficult to change.  Believing that schools 
were an important element in democratic nation-building, politicians and policy makers 
                                                                                                                                            
PISA, confirm immigrant status by asking students also to identify where their parents were born, which 
allows for a more refined definition of ‘immigrant.’   
27 Iranian data were not included in international analyses (p. 17). 
28 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia.  The Russian Federation, or Russia, is the successor state to the Soviet Union, and is not an EU 
member state. 
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wanted information about the influence of the current teaching corps or new teaching 
methods and materials at a national level.  Understanding youths’ knowledge, beliefs, and 
practices was essential for moving forward with democratic transition and consolidation.   
Countries wishing to participate in CIVED had to fund a portion of the 
assessment’s development and administration, and appoint national representatives—
typically university professors and researchers with expertise in civic and political 
education—to work with other nations’ representatives in designing the assessment.  
France, the Netherlands, Spain, and Ireland chose not to participate in the study.  It was 
essential to have international cooperation between participants in the design: all 
concepts of democracy and governance needed to be presented in universal ways, rather 
than in idiosyncratic national terms (for example, the study had to refer to freedom of the 
press, not the First Amendment).  The study examined “how students view their 
citizenship identity and how their views are influenced by the political, educational, and 
social context in the countries in which they live” (Amadeo, Torney-Purta, Lehmann, 
Husfeldt, & Nikolova, 2002, p. 12).  IEA offered to administer the study to both 14- and 
17-18-year-olds, but countries could choose whether to study one or both populations.29 
To employ their theoretical model for each country involved in the study, CIVED 
had two phases.  Phase 1 is a set of national case studies that investigated the country-
level elements around the perimeter of the model, and described public discourse about 
civic goals and values.  Based on a collective review of these national descriptions, 
national project representatives voted for three ‘domains’ as the most important to study 
                                                
29 Of the European countries included in my study, only Czech Republic, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, and Switzerland surveyed the 17- and 18-year-old population (in Switzerland, only its German-
speaking cantons; for information about other countries' participation, see Sibberns & Foy, 2004). 
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in Phase II.  These domains represent the civic-related knowledge and values of students 
that the researchers wished to measure.  Elements of each are reflected in my study:   
I. Democracy: What does democracy mean and what are its associated institutions 
and practices? 
II. National identity, regional and international relationships: How can the sense 
of national identity or national loyalty among young people be described and how 
does it relate to their orientation to other countries and to regional and 
international organizations? 
III. Social cohesion and diversity: What do issues of social cohesion and diversity 
mean to young people and how do they view discrimination?  (Schulz & Sibberns, 
2004a, p. 18) 
Next in the process, framework writers read the case studies from Phase I to flesh 
out the three domains.30  As noted in the study’s technical report, they: 
[D]eveloped general statements about what young people might be expected to 
know and believe about the three domains, and they elaborated on and illustrated 
these with quotations from the national case studies.  This material formed the 
Content Guidelines for the International Test and Survey….  (Husfeldt & Torney-
Purta, 2004, p. 18) 
The Content Guidelines constitute the assessment framework for Phase 2, the 
International Test and Survey.  One of the International Coordinators, Rainer Lehmann, 
described it as a “comparative empirical study, consisting of a test of civic knowledge 
and a survey of civic-related concepts and attitudes as well as reports on current or 
expected civic activities” (2004, p. 7).  The test of knowledge and a portion of the 
attitudes survey relate to Domain I: Democracy (and its associated institutions and 
practices).  None of the knowledge test, but some portions of the survey, relate to 
Domains II and III (see Table 4-1 for an overview of topics in each part of the 
assessment).  Note, therefore, that content in each domain provides information about at 
least one of the civic outcomes on which I focus.  Domain I provides information about 
                                                
30 Official documents for CIVED do not report who these framework writers were, though one can 
reasonably assume they were experts in social studies, history, or civic education, whether secondary 
teachers or university professors or researchers. 
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students’ civic knowledge and civic participation, Domain II provides information on 
students’ attitudes toward the country in which they live (patriotism, or national loyalty), 
and Domain III provides information on students’ attitudes toward human and civil 
rights, such as those for women, immigrants, and ethnic minorities. 
The framework, and thus the test and survey together, reflect the central portion 
of the theoretical model (the individual student and the five “carriers of goals into action” 
in his or her immediate environment).  Because the assessment was uniform across 
countries, the test and survey pose democratic values and concepts in universal ways, so 
as not to bias responses toward a particular democratic context (Torney-Purta, 2000, p. 
149).  Items therefore do not refer to specific legislation or real-world political parties.  
Instead, they ask about the democratic ideas that underlie legislation or the ways political 
parties promote their platforms.  
Table 4-1. Content of the test and survey portions of CIVED 1999. 
Multiple Choice Test 
Knowledge 
Democratic structures 
Democratic values 
Democratic institutions 
 
Cognitive skills 
Fact vs. opinion 
Interpreting political cartoons 
Interpreting campaign ads 
Survey 
Demographics 
Gender 
Age 
Immigrant status 
Number of people in the home 
Number of parents in the home 
Newspaper readership 
Number of books in the home 
Educational aspirations  
Parents’ educational attainment 
Participation in voluntary 
organizations 
 
Attitudes and habits (Likert-scale items) 
Situations good and bad for democracy 
An adult who is a good citizen… 
Government’s responsibilities 
Trust in institutions 
Country’s international policy and standing 
Opportunities that certain groups really do vs. should have 
in this country 
Attitudes toward immigrants 
Views on politics and this country’s political system 
Students’ participation in school life 
What students have learned in school 
Expected political action as a young person and as an adult 
Classroom climate 
 
In its final form, the test portion of Phase 2 was a norm-referenced multiple-
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choice test of 38 items that assessed students’ “understanding of democratic principles 
and their skills in interpreting political material, such as party leaflets and political 
cartoons” (International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, 
1999, p. 5.2; Torney-Purta, 2000, p. 148).  The survey portion—where questions had no 
right answers—asked about “their concepts of good citizenship, attitudes about trust in 
the government, opinions about the political rights of ethnic groups and women, and 
expected civic participation” (Torney-Purta, 2000, p. 149).  See Table 4-1 for an 
overview of the unique content of the test and survey portions (and see Appendix D for 
five released items from the knowledge and skills test portion). 
 
4.3 CIVED Sampling Methods and Data Structure 
The original sample of students, teachers, and principals resulted from a two–
stage stratified cluster sample design, conducted in all 22 participating European 
countries.31  In the first stage, national research coordinators identified strata—or 
groups—that represented important characteristics of the country or its school system, 
including geographical region, public/private status, or degree of urbanization, among 
others.  Based on these strata, they selected samples of schools.  Schools could be 
excluded for being geographically remote, extremely small in size, for offering a 
curriculum different from the mainstream, or for serving only students in the excluded-
students categories (see next paragraph).32   
                                                
31 French-speaking Belgium, Bulgaria, Greek Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, England (not the UK), 
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
32 See Appendix D in the CIVED Technical Report for countries’ unique stratification choices (Schulz & 
Sibberns, 2004a, pp. 187-233). 
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The second stage was a single, intact class of 14-year-olds from each sampled 
school.33  (The grade level in which one would find students of this age varies across 
countries.  In North America, it’s eighth grade, while in England it’s Year 10, and in 
Norway it’s Year 9.)  The choice to sample only one classroom from each school makes 
data collection easier, but it creates theoretical and statistical difficulties.  There is no 
obvious reason to assume that the students or the teacher in one class are representative 
of the students or teachers in an entire school, especially given the common practice of 
tracking students of different (perceived) abilities into more or less academically rigorous 
coursework.  Furthermore, there is no information available about why the sampled 
classrooms were chosen within each school.  The study’s technical report suggests that 
civic education classes coincided with homeroom in “most educational systems,” but 
there is no information about whether the sampled class was volunteered by their teacher, 
chosen by the principal, or represents the high-achieving students (Schulz & Sibberns, 
2004a, p. 44).  Any of these reasons might change our understanding of the population to 
which we can generalize findings.   
Statistically, because only one classroom was sampled per school, these levels of 
information—as represented by teachers and principals—are confounded, i.e., they are 
statistically indistinguishable and must be considered as one level of clustering, even 
though conceptually and educationally they represent two levels.  Through the rest of this 
dissertation, for brevity’s sake, I refer to this level of clustering as schools.34 
                                                
33 Of course it is exceedingly rare to find a class that has only 14-year-olds in it; the average age is 14, 
however.  
34 To get information on school-based “social actors” and the school structures that influence students’ 
civic knowledge and experiences, in each school included in the sample, IEA administered a questionnaire 
to several teachers who taught students in the tested class that asked about their own education, beliefs 
about what a good citizen needs to know and do, as well as their teaching methods.  At the school level, 
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The subject of the sampled class was ideally civic education, if available; 
otherwise it was history, social studies, or government (Sibberns & Foy, 2004).  
Countries were allowed to exclude certain types of students from the sample, as well as 
schools, but had to ensure that the excluded population was less than five percent of the 
national population of 14-year-olds (or eighth-graders).  It is most likely that students 
who met exclusion criteria did not take the test in the first place; in most systems, these 
students would not be in regular classrooms, anyway.  Students could be excluded if they 
were: 
• Mentally disabled, but educable: includes students “emotionally or mentally 
unable to follow even the general instructions of the…test”; 
• Functionally disabled: includes students permanently physically disabled such 
that they could not perform the test; or 
• Non-native speakers of the language of the test: “These were students who could 
not speak or read the language of the test.  Typically, a student who had received 
less than one year of instruction in the language of the test was excluded” 
(Sibberns & Foy, 2004, p. 43). 
This last criterion is likely to affect the number of immigrants included in the 
original sample to some degree, making that sub-group less representative.  Limiting as 
this is, I repeat that these data were not meant to represent all immigrants.  It is possible 
that students who had received less than one year of instruction in the language of the test 
(usually the dominant language in the country) were also likely to have been in the 
country for less than a year.  Therefore, it could be that they had limited exposure to civic 
                                                                                                                                            
principals filled out a questionnaire about student, teacher, and school demographics, as well as course 
offerings and requirements.  Because there are large amounts of missing data in these files, I do not use 
their information because missing data reduces my sample size. 
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education in that short time, and, possibly, to democracy in the host country, which could 
make their views and understandings non-representative of immigrant students on the 
whole, anyway.  However, it is plausible that this restricted representation of immigrants 
means that my findings represent a ‘lower bound’ of real-world relationships (meaning 
that actual findings for immigrants on the whole could be stronger). 
Another challenge to studying immigrant students in this particular data set is that 
they represent no more than 20 percent of the population in any country included in my 
study, and more often they represent less than 10 percent.  While the original data are 
meant to be nationally representative, IEA did not oversample underrepresented groups.  
Oversampling for a larger sample size would increase the confidence researchers can 
have in these findings for immigrants, since with small samples, one cannot be sure they 
accurately represent the real-world population.  These already small sample sizes become 
even smaller with the creation of a more tightly focused analytic sample.   
 
4.4 Analytic Sample: Countries 
Before I describe the students in my study, I explain why I have excluded nine 
countries.  Twenty-two European countries participated in the CIVED 1999 survey, 
including many post-Communist countries.  To address the questions I pose and to make 
this study useful to those who use it as a baseline for studies of later data, it was 
important that I include those countries in which immigration is substantial and whose 
definition of “country” is widely accepted.  This is because the definition of an immigrant 
is based on the response to the question, “Were you born in this country?”  These criteria 
exclude the Baltic countries, Finland, and the far eastern European countries like Bulgaria 
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and Romania, whose populations of immigrants are quite low (my cutoff point was 1.5 
percent immigrant students).  Cyprus is also excluded because Turks and Greeks contest 
its status.  This poses possible interpretation problems for the question that identifies 
immigrant students (i.e., ‘Were you born in this country?’).   
Had I followed on OECD’s convention of reporting on immigrant students’ PISA 
performance, I would have chosen only to include those countries with a minimum of 
three percent immigrant students in the sample and data for at least 100 immigrant 
students.  However, these more stringent criteria would exclude even more countries 
from my study.  The countries that would be removed are in regions with a shorter 
history of immigration—southern and central Europe, and have different characteristics 
from their northern neighbors.  Since it is precisely those national differences that I am 
interested in with research question 3, and because my aim is to make some broad claims 
about immigrant students’ experiences across Europe, to render the total sample even 
less representative of Europe could be counterproductive.   
The countries that I retain are those that I discussed more completely in the 
previous chapters: French-speaking Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, England, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland.  
Appendix C provides a detailed description of the original data in each of these countries.  
Here I offer the most salient characteristics of these data.  In all countries together, 
immigrants are just 7.2 percent of the sample, though this percentage ranges from just 
under 2 percent in central Europe to as high as 19 percent in western Europe.  Immigrants 
are far more likely to speak a non-school language at home and tend to be less patriotic 
and knowledgeable about civics than native students (remember, though, that reporting 
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these superficial descriptive statistics does not imply that we know whether these 
differences are actually significant).  Oppositely, they tend to be more supportive of 
immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ rights.  Data are missing from many variables, but 
typically no more so for immigrants than for natives.   
 
4.5 Analytic Samples: Students and Classrooms 
Within these 13 countries, I restricted my analytic sample to those students that 
had the most complete and statistically powerful information.  I included students who 
had known (non-missing) data on all important measures, including controls:  
• gender 
• age 
• immigrant status 
• number of books in the home (proxy for socioeconomic status) 
• frequency of speaking the school language at home 
• perception of an open classroom climate 
• all outcome variables (civic knowledge, civic participation, patriotism, and 
attitudes toward rights and opportunities for women, immigrants, and ethnic 
minorities) 
In addition, I only selected immigrant students who had data on their age at 
arrival in the receiving country.  These initial student samples were nested in initial 
samples of schools that also had to meet certain criteria.  To be included, a school had to 
have at least five students who met all of the above criteria for inclusion, which 
consequently also reduced the size of the student sample.  For a broad overview of this 
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sample, see Table 4-2.   
Table 4-2. Descriptive characteristics of students: Pooled data (all 13 countries).  N=33,534 
Student Characteristics Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Immigranta 0.07  0 1 
Femalea 0.52  0 1 
Under-age (≤12 years) 0.001  0 1 
Target age (13-15 years) 0.97  0 1 
Over-age (≥16 years) 0.029  0 1 
Books: Fewa 0.27  0 1 
Books: Averagea 0.23  0 1 
Books: Manya 0.28  0 1 
School language at home: Nevera 0.01  0 1 
School language at home: Sometimesa 0.07  0 1 
School language at home: Alwaysa 0.92  0 1 
Time in country 13.73 1.75 0 19 
Perception of open classroom climate 0.02 0.99 -3.7 2.66 
Civic knowledge and skills 0.01 0.5 -1.6 1.54 
Extracurricular participationa 0.69  0 1 
Immigrants’ rights 0.02 0.99 -2.84 2.04 
Minorities’ rights 0.02 0.99 -2.98 1.94 
Women’s rights 2.06 0.85 1 3 
Low 0.34  0 1 
Medium 0.27  0 1 
High 0.39  0 1 
Patriotism 0.02 1.0 -3.29 1.92 
a Dichotomous variable where the mean indicates the proportion represented in 
the sample of 33,534 students. 
 
All the criteria for inclusion reduce the original sample by 20% for a total of 
33,534 students.  Immigrants make up about 7 percent of all students in the sample, and 
girls are 52 percent.  Though the study was meant to include students around age 14 (in 
eighth grade), the age range is actually 10 to 19 years.  Students who are young for their 
grade (under-age) make up less than one percent of the sample, while students who are 
old for their grade (over-age) make up nearly three percent (and, as you will see later, are 
concentrated in just a few countries).  Just one percent of students speak a non-school 
language at home all the time, while seven percent speak one at least sometimes.  I 
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discuss civic outcomes for the total sample in section 4.6 and in Chapter 5 break down 
descriptive information for native-born and immigrant students by country.   
 
4.6 Measures 
I use continuous, dichotomous, and ordinal measures for this study.  Continuous 
measures are those for which, technically, any value is possible.  For these variables, a 
normal distribution (shaped like a bell curve) is preferred.  A dichotomous—or dummy—
variable has just two possible values, typically 0 and 1; ordinal measures have at least 
three possible values, with higher numbers representing higher values on that measure, 
though the intervals between the numbers may not be equal (think low, medium, high).  
For each continuous dependent variable and for a few continuous independent variables I 
describe how the variable was derived (if applicable), how it is measured, its distribution, 
and its reliability.35   
Reliability, represented most often with Cronbach’s alpha (α), ranges from zero to 
one and measures ‘internal consistency’ of composite variables (made up of information 
from more than one original variable).  Essentially it indicates how well a set of items 
describe the same underlying concept (Nunnally, 1978).  Alpha increases as the 
correlations among items increase.  Researchers prefer a higher than lower value (greater 
than .7 is widely considered satisfactory, according to Bland & Altman, 1997; Cronbach, 
1951).  Reliability can also be measured in hierarchical linear models (HLM), though its 
interpretation there is slightly different.  I explain this is in greater detail in section 4.7.2 
on multilevel analysis, but for the moment it suffices to say that reliability in HLM—
                                                
35 The reliability values I report come from countries’ original, full samples, as reported by IEA. 
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lambda (λ)—also ranges from zero to one with higher values being more favorable.  
However, in HLM it is interpreted as an indicator of how easy it is to distinguish between 
schools within a country: the closer reliability is to 1, the more likely it is that researchers 
can identify differences in, say, overall civic knowledge between schools.   
I include the original variable names in all caps so that future researchers could 
easily replicate or expand on this work. 
 
4.6.1 Dependent Variables: Six Civic Outcomes 
Civic knowledge & skills (TOTCGMLE).  This dependent variable is a scale 
created by IEA that measures how much students know about democracy and civil 
society and how strong their skills are in interpreting political communications like 
campaign ads.  This composite measure was created with Item Response Theory methods 
that consider the difficulty, appropriateness, and comparability across countries of the 38 
multiple-choice items that made up the test portion of the assessment (see Appendix D 
for example items).  Although the test was not particularly difficult, its items did have 
reasonable ability to differentiate between students who knew more and less about civics.  
Items that were too difficult or too easy were removed from the final scale score in 
individual countries.36  For more information about how IEA made item-inclusion 
decisions, see the CIVED technical report chapter on the scaling process for cognitive 
items (Schulz & Sibberns, 2004b).   
A higher score indicates greater content knowledge and interpretative skills 
(Schulz & Sibberns, 2004b, pp. 90-91).  To make students’ scores comparable across 
                                                
36 One item was excluded in French Belgium, England, Portugal, and Sweden; two in Denmark, and three 
in Greece (Schulz & Sibberns, 2004b, p. 83). 
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countries, the international mean on this scale was originally standardized across all 28 
participating countries to be 100, with a standard deviation of 20.  I re-standardized this 
variable across my thirteen countries for a mean of 0, standard deviation of 1.  The 
variable is close to normally distributed in every country and internationally, with a slight 
positive skew, meaning the distribution has a longer ‘tail’ on the right side than on the 
left (true across all countries).  As most cognition-related scales are, this variable is 
highly reliable in most countries (>0.7 in 11 of 13 countries).  In the absence of IEA-
provided reliability information, here I report this measure’s reliability in HLM: λ ranges 
from .434 in Denmark to .934 in Czech Republic (remember that λ is mostly an indicator 
of how different schools are on an outcome, so in Denmark, students’ civic knowledge is 
not very different between schools, whereas in Czech Republic, it very much is). 
Though students’ mean score on the civic knowledge and skills measure is similar 
in my sample to the original sample mean, the standard deviation has been reduced from 
1.0 to 0.5 (see Table 4-2).  Essentially this means that my inclusion criteria removed the 
highest- and lowest-scoring students from the sample, nearly halving the overall 
differences between students.  I have kept the measure this way in the model so that 
results are comparable to the overall sample in future studies.   
Extracurricular civic participation or community service.  This dichotomous 
(0 or 1) variable represents whether students are currently active in any civically oriented 
youth organizations that are sponsored by their school or community.  Of items that 
asked about student participation in 15 types of youth organizations, I selected 11 items 
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that reflected participation in organizations with a civic orientation.37  There are many 
missing data, such that an attempt to represent students’ amount of participation—as 
opposed to participating in such activities at all—would require removing hundreds of 
students from the sample because they answered some, but not all, items.38  Therefore, I 
exclude students who are missing data on all 11 items, and measure participation with a 
dummy variable: either students participate in at least one of these organizations or they 
do not.  In my sample, civic-oriented extracurricular participation is high at nearly 70 
percent.   
Attitude measures.  Each attitude variable is based on a composite scale 
(meaning it is a continuous variable) created by IEA.  The bases for these scales are 
factor analyses of several 4-category Likert-type items from the survey portion of the 
assessment.39  A factor analysis is a way of identifying how items ‘cluster’ around a 
theme or underlying, ‘latent’ variable.  As Wolfram Schulz, Associate International 
Coordinator, wrote in the Technical Report, each scale was developed using the same 
process: 
• Analysis of: missing values, the distribution of item responses, exploratory 
principal component analyses;40 
                                                
37 Based on participation in any of the following civically oriented organizations: student 
council/government (BSGAS01), youth organization affiliated with a political party or union (BSGAS02), 
group that prepares school newspaper (BSGAS03), environmental organization (BSGAS04), U.N. or 
UNESCO club (BSGAS05), human rights organization (BSGAS07), group conducting activities to help the 
community (BSGAS08), charity collecting money for a social cause (BSGAS09), Boy or Girl 
Scouts/Guides (BSGAS10), cultural association based on ethnicity (BSGAS11), and an organization 
sponsored by a religious group (BSGAS15).   
38 I investigated the possibility that missing data might actually mean students didn’t participate in those 
activities, but curiously, students often answered “yes” for some items, “no” for others, and left others 
blank. 
39 Possible responses to these Likert items were ordinal: strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree. 
40 Exploratory principal components analysis is a form of factor analysis that allows researchers to see how 
items in a set are correlated with others. 
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• Confirmatory factor analyses based on international (200 students per country) 
and national data;41 
• Analysis of Item Response Theory (IRT) models for scales based on an 
international sample (200 students per country);42 
• Computation of comparative item statistics—item fit and scale reliabilities—
across countries; and 
• Country-by-country item calibration that resulted in excluding items with poor 
scaling properties in particular countries. (Schulz, 2004, p. 93)43 
Each scale was standardized originally so the international mean would be 10, 
with a standard deviation of 2.  To make my analyses more interpretable, I standardized 
all but one across the thirteen countries in my study, giving them an international mean of 
0, standard deviation of 1.  
Attitude toward women’s rights (WOMRTMLE).  This scale is based on items 
from the previous set on marginalized social groups, made up of six items about rights 
women should have: 
• Women should run for public office and take part in the government just as men 
do; 
• Women should have the same rights as men in every way; 
• Women should stay out of politics (reversed item); 
• When jobs are scarce, men [should] have more right to a job than women 
(reversed);44 
• Men and women should get equal pay when they are in the same jobs; and  
• Men are better qualified to be political leaders than women (reversed). 
                                                
41 Confirmatory factor analyses allow researchers to specify how many factors they wish to create from 
specific items, based on results from an exploratory analysis.  
42 Item Response Theory is a means of using students’ patterns of responses to items to determine both 
item difficulties and students’ proficiency.   
43 This chapter of the Technical Report provides much more information on the methods used for factor 
analyses and IRT models. 
44 This item was excluded from the scale in Belgium and Germany (Schulz, 2004, p. 123). 
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Higher scores indicate more positive attitudes toward rights and opportunities for women.   
The original measure’s α reliability ranges from .66 to .84, with an international 
mean of .78 for this sample.  However, this scale is highly negatively skewed (a long tail 
to the left of the value with the highest frequency), which means that the overwhelming 
majority of students have highly positive attitudes toward women’s rights, and few 
students have highly negative attitudes.  This is an encouraging finding in the data (but 
sensible, too, since half the students are female), though it makes statistical analyses 
difficult because an extremely skewed distribution of scores violates the assumption 
(implicit in statistical analyses) that variables are normally distributed, i.e., in a bell 
shape.  I tried several options for transforming this variable into one with a more normal 
distribution, but none worked.  Because of this, I created a three-category measure to 
capture the lower third, middle third, and upper third of this distribution.  In my sample, 
34 percent of students fall into the least supportive category and 39 percent fall into the 
most supportive category. 
Attitude toward immigrants’ rights (IMMIGMLE).  This variable is based on 
eight items—only five were retained for the scale—measuring attitudes towards 
immigrants and their rights and opportunities: 
• Immigrants should have the opportunity to keep their own language; 
• Immigrants’ children should have the same opportunities for education that other 
children in the country have; 
• Immigrants who live in a country for several years should have the opportunity to 
vote in elections; 
• Immigrants should have the opportunity to keep their own customs and lifestyle; 
and 
• Immigrants should have all the same rights that everyone else in a country has. 
A higher score indicates a more positive, inclusive, tolerant attitude toward 
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immigrants and their rights.  Across countries, this variable’s reliability ranges from .67 
to .90 with an international mean of .82 for this sample.  The distribution of scores on this 
measure are fairly normal overall, with slight rises in both tails (again, transformations 
did not make the distribution more normal).  Within countries, the distribution tends to be 
similar to the overall distribution, with some right-hand tails higher than others (in 
Greece, for example).  Students’ average score on this measure is only slightly higher 
than in the original sample (.02, compared to .00).  
Attitude toward ethnic minorities’ rights (MINORMLE).  This variable is based 
on four items that measure attitudes toward ethnic minorities and their rights.  The scale 
relies on four items: 
• All ethnic groups should have equal chances to get a good education in this 
country; 
• All ethnic groups should have equal chances to get good jobs in this country; 
• Schools should teach students to respect members of all ethnic groups; and 
• Members of all ethnic groups should be encouraged to run in elections for 
political office. 
Higher scores indicate a more positive, inclusive, tolerant attitude toward rights for ethnic 
minorities.  This variable’s reliability ranges from .61 to .86 across countries, with an 
international mean of .76 for this sample.  The distribution of scores on this measure is 
close to a normal distribution with a slightly higher, denser tail on the right than the left 
(generally true in individual countries, as well as overall).  Practically speaking, that is a 
positive finding in itself because it suggests that there are more students who have highly 
tolerant attitudes toward ethnic minorities’ rights than those with highly intolerant 
attitudes.  Transformations did not help this distribution’s shape.  On this measure, too, 
students’ average scores are not much higher than in the original sample (.02 compared to 
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.00). 
Attitude toward the nation, or patriotism (PATRIMLE).  One of two factors 
identified in an analysis of twelve items that measured students’ attitudes toward their 
nation (the other of these factors is ‘protective feelings toward the nation’), this scale 
consists of four items measuring “the importance of national symbols and emotional 
affection towards the country,” or patriotism: 
• The flag of this country is important to me;  
• I have great love for this country;  
• This country should be proud of what it has achieved; and  
• I would prefer to live permanently in another country (a reversed item).45   
Higher scores on this scale indicate more positive, patriotic attitudes about the nation.  
The variable’s reliability ranges from .56 to .77 across countries, with an international 
mean of .67 for this sample.  The distribution of scores on this measure is slightly left 
skewed, which I tried to fix with transformations, but none helped (individual countries 
vary in their respective degrees of left skew—in Greece, for example, the distribution is 
entirely left skewed, as the greatest frequency is at the positive extreme).  Students’ 
average levels of patriotism are not much different from those in the original sample (.02 
compared to .00).   
 
4.6.2 Independent Variables: Student Characteristics 
Immigrant status (BSGBRN1).  The primary independent variable is derived 
from students’ answer to the question, “Were you born in [country of test]?”  The data 
are not ideal, in that there are no verifying questions that would determine whether 
students’ parents are immigrants, or whether those who answer “yes” are children of 
                                                
45 This item was not included in Sweden’s scale because of unreliability (Schulz, 2004, p. 123). 
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foreign diplomats, nor was there a question about legal national citizenship.  I also have 
no way of knowing whether students immigrated as refugees or because their parents 
were seeking new economic opportunities.  However, as I have previously noted, papers 
by the coordinator of the IEA CIVED 1999 study (Judith Torney-Purta) and other 
prominent researchers in the field have used this definition of an immigrant, and I follow 
their convention. 
Length of time in host country (BSGBRN2).  Students who were born outside 
of the country where the test took place were asked to note at what age they came to the 
country.  I subtracted their age at arrival from their current age to derive a measure of 
how long immigrant students had been in the host country.  Native-born students were 
assigned a number equivalent to their age in years.  The measure overall has a dramatic 
negative skew because of the immigrants who have been in the country only a short time.  
For immigrants alone, the measure is still negatively skewed, but is more dense.  I did not 
attempt to transform or standardize this variable, as I believe a year is an easily 
interpreted unit. 
Language of the home (BSGLANG).  This is an ordinal measure of how 
frequently students speak the language of the school at home (never, sometimes, or 
always).  This is the variable that previous researchers have used to define ‘ethnic 
minority’ students.  I examine the interaction of home language with immigrant status to 
determine whether there are different ‘effects’ of speaking a non-school language at 
home for immigrant and native-born students.  To use it as a predictor, I created three 
dichotomous variables, one for each category. 
Civic knowledge and skills (TOTCGMLE).  This variable, also a dependent 
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variable, is described in section 4.6.1.  I use it as an independent variable in analyses of 
each of the other five dependent variables.  
Extracurricular participation.  This variable, too, was previously described on 
page 115, used as an independent variable in analyses of each of the other five dependent 
variables.   
Perception of an open classroom climate (CCLIMMLE).  This independent 
variable is another composite scale created by IEA.  It is the result of a factor analysis of 
six items on students’ perceptions of their history/civics/social studies/economics 
teachers’ teaching style (six other items make up a complementary factor, lecturing style, 
which I discuss in the Independent Variables: School Characteristics section on page 17).  
The six items are: 
• Students feel free to disagree openly with their teachers about political and social 
issues during class; 
• Students are encouraged to make up their own minds about issues; 
• Teachers respect our opinions and encourage us to express them during class; 
• Students feel free to express opinions in class even when their opinions are 
different from most of the other students; 
• Teachers encouraged us to discuss political or social issues about which people 
have different opinions; and 
• Teachers present several sides an issue when explaining it in class.   
A higher score on this measure indicates that students perceive a more open classroom 
climate.  Across countries, this variable’s reliability ranges from .71 to .82 with an 
international mean of .77 for this sample (Schulz, 2004, p. 122).  The distribution of 
scores on this measure is quite normal, with only a slight negative skew (true across 
individual countries, as well).  Students’ scores are only slightly higher in this sample 
than in the original sample (.02 compared to .00). 
Control variables.  It is important to control for variables that, while not of 
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primary interest, may be related to knowledge, behavior, or attitudes and thus confound 
findings.   
Female (GENDER).  A dummy variable where female=1, male=0. 
Age (AGEYEAR).  Because students in the target grade are approximately 14, it 
is reasonable to expect most students to be between 13 and 15 years old.  However, since 
the age range in some countries goes from 10 to 19 years, suggesting that a number of 
students are held back, I created three dummy variables: under-age (≤12 years), target 
age (13-15 years), and over-age (≥16 years). 
Number of books in the home (BSGBOOK).  This measure is a weak proxy for 
socioeconomic status.  It is not an ideal proxy; it would clearly be made stronger by the 
inclusion of parental education levels or family income.  However, the latter data are not 
available and the former are missing at very high rates.  Several other researchers of the 
CIVED study have proxied for SES using this measure, including Jan Janmaat and 
Nathalie Mons (2011), Tijana Prokic and Jaap Dronkers (2010), and Judith Torney-Purta, 
Rainer Lehmann, Hans Oswald, and Wolfram Schulz (2001).  As the former note, “The 
number of books in the home can be interpreted as a proxy for the emphasis placed on 
education, the resources available to acquire and support literacy and, more generally 
speaking, the academic support a student finds in his or her family” (2001, p. 65).   
Responses to this measure included: none, 1-10, 11-50, 51-100, 101-200, more 
than 200.  The distribution of number of books in the home is negatively skewed, but in 
the upper four categories, frequencies are high and quite similar; in real-world terms, 
that’s a good thing because it means there are relatively few students who own very few 
books.  I calculated the 33rd and 66th percentiles of this measure across all countries to 
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create a three-category measure: few books in the home (lower third of the distribution), 
average books in the home (middle third), and many books in the home (upper third).  
Effectively this labeled students who had between 0 and 50 books as having few books, 
51-100 books as average, and 101 to more than 200 as many.  From this measure I 
created three indicator variables for use as independent variables.  
 
4.6.3 Independent Variables: School Characteristics 
School-level data are aggregates of original student data (discussed in 4.6.2), 
which more accurately represent the school even if individual students have been dropped 
from the analysis.  Ideally I would use measures from the teacher and principal surveys 
for the school level, but there are three problems with that approach: one theoretical, two 
practical.  The theoretical issue is that there is more to be said about a group than just the 
aggregate of individual characteristics can say (Bidwell & Kasarda, 1975).  Consider the 
different understandings one can have of interpersonal trust: researchers can ask people 
how trustworthy other people are and aggregate that measure to the group level, or they 
could measure how many lost wallets are returned to their owners with nothing missing 
from them.  Practically speaking, only one class per school was sampled, while several 
(between one and three) teachers in each school were surveyed.  It is not possible to 
determine which teacher was responsible for teaching civics.  Furthermore, in both 
teacher and principal surveys, there are large amounts of missing data.  Therefore, while 
the students in the sampled class may not be representative of the rest of the school, nor 
necessarily of individual students’ classmates in all other classes, aggregated data are the 
best choice for the situation.     
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Average number of books in students’ homes.  This variable is a proxy for 
school socioeconomic composition and is based on the original measure for number of 
books in a student’s home (as is the student-level version of this measure, as you’ll recall 
from section 4.6.2).  For two-level models (discussed in 4.7.2), I standardized that 
measure within countries, aggregated it by school, then standardized it again, for a 
country mean of 0, standard deviation of 1.  For three-level models, I standardized the 
scale across the thirteen countries I study, for an international mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1.  This measure is quite normally distributed overall, with only a hint of 
negative skew.  Within countries, the skew tends to be right or left-skewed.   
Range of number of books in students’ homes.  This variable is a proxy for 
socioeconomic inequality and is based on the internationally standardized measure of 
number of books in the home.  For two-level models, within countries, I calculated the 
standard deviation of that measure by school, then standardized it, again for ease of 
interpretation (so schools with values higher than 0 have higher than average 
‘inequality’).  For three-level models, I performed this same procedure, but with data 
from all thirteen countries.  Overall and within countries, this variable is quite normal in 
its distribution. 
Proportion of immigrants.  This variable is a proxy for intercultural contact and 
ethnic heterogeneity.  It is based on the number of immigrants in a class divided by the 
total number of students in the class.  Because it is highly positively skewed (large 
numbers of classrooms with small numbers of immigrants), I created a dichotomous 
variable.  For two-level models (within countries), schools in my sample with a 
proportion of immigrants higher than the 50th percentile in the individual country were 
 126 
coded as having a high immigrant proportion.  For three-level models (using combined 
data from all thirteen countries), schools in my sample with a proportion of immigrants 
higher than or equal to the international median (50th percentile=8.3%) are equal to 1, and 
schools with a lower proportion of immigrants are equal to 0.   
Instructional methods.  To test the different relationships of an open classroom 
climate and a traditional, teacher-centered climate with civic outcomes, I created a 
composite measure of ‘traditional’ or lecture-style instructional methods: 
• Teachers place great importance on learning facts or dates when presenting 
history of political events; 
• Teachers require students to memorize dates or definitions; 
• Memorizing dates and facts is the best way to get a good grade from teachers in 
these classes; 
• Teachers lecture and the students take notes; and 
• Students work on material from the textbook. 
Response options to these items were never, rarely, sometimes, and often.  Cronbach’s 
alpha is .57 for this composite scale.46   
Using school aggregates of this ‘traditional methods’ measure and the measure of 
open classroom climate (CCLIMMLE), I created four dummy variables to capture the 
combinations of each of these, as Torney-Purta and Wilkenfeld did in their CIVED-based 
study of US students (2009): 1) high classroom openness and high traditional teaching 
methods, 2) high classroom openness and low traditional teaching methods, 3) high 
traditional teaching methods and low classroom openness, and 4) low traditional teaching 
methods and low classroom openness.  For two-level models, I created these dummy 
                                                
46 As I mentioned in section 4.6, this reliability value is relatively low.  There are several reasons to use the 
factor anyway: there isn’t yet strong consensus on how best to factor ordinal items like these with relatively 
few categories that measure agreement rather than objective values (Holgado-Tello, Chacón-Moscoso, 
Barbero-García, & Vila-Abad, 2010; Kampen & Swyngedouw, 2000); this is an exploratory study in which 
I see value in the theoretical correlations between these items; and the use of this factor has precedent in 
Judith Torney-Purta and Britt Wilkenfeld’s (2009) work.   
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variables within countries, so that a highly open and highly traditional classroom may not 
be as highly open and traditional in one country as in another, but the data refer to the 
country’s unique range.  For three-level models, I created these dummy variables across 
all thirteen countries, so there may be more highly open, highly traditional classrooms in 
one country than in another because on an international spectrum, one country’s methods 
are more intensive than another’s. 
 
4.6.4 Independent Variables: National Characteristics 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita.  GNI per capita is an internationally 
comparable measure that represents the average income of a country’s citizens.  
Essentially it is a measure of affluence.  It is a dollar value based on a country’s final 
(gross) national income in a year, divided by its population size.  The values for this 
variable are based on World Bank data for the year 1999, though they are calculated in 
current international purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars, which means that one 
international dollar has as much purchasing power as one US dollar has in the United 
States.  As an independent variable, I divide its value by 1,000 so its association with 
outcomes is more interpretable.  The measure in this sample has 9 unique values across 
13 observations and the data are not normally distributed, but are about evenly spread 
across their range from 10.25 in Slovakia to 32.08 in Switzerland.   
Gini coefficient.  This is a measure of income inequality within a country ranging 
from 0 to 1.  0 represents perfect equality—each ‘share’ of the population gets the same 
share of income.  1 represents perfect inequality—all income goes to the share of the 
population with the highest income.  Therefore, lower values represent greater equality.  
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As a point of reference, the average for all 20 European, OECD-member countries that 
have data for “around 2000” is 0.29, ranging from 0.23 in Denmark to 0.37 in the United 
Kingdom.47  This range is much smaller than the range for the world in general.  I 
multiplied all Gini coefficients by 100 to make results more easily interpretable.  Again, 
because there are nine unique values for 13 observations at this level, it would be 
misleading to call these data normally distributed, but there are tails on either side, so 
they approximate a normal distribution. 
Curricular control.  This variable is based on Nathalie Mons’ typology, 
discussed in Chapter 2.  In my study, I combine countries with so-called ‘collaboration’ 
and ‘centralized’ models of responsibility for curriculum into one dummy variable, 
complemented by dummy variables for school autonomy, decentralized, and federal 
models.  Collaboration/centralized systems are most dependent on national-level 
decisions, while federal systems are least dependent on national-level decisions. 
 
4.7 Analyses 
In this study I conduct descriptive and multivariate, multilevel analyses.   
 
4.7.1 Descriptive Analyses 
Descriptive information provides an illustration of how students ‘look’ overall on 
several measures.  It helps researchers to know at the outset how groups of participants 
differ.  In this study, descriptive statistics calculate and compare immigrants’ and native 
students’ means on all demographic and civic-oriented measures.  For continuous 
                                                
47 The Gini coefficient is not measured separately for member countries of the United Kingdom, so I use 
the whole UK’s value for England. 
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measures, I used t-tests to determine whether mean differences were significant, and for 
categorical measures, I used χ2 tests (see Appendix D for details).   
All descriptive analyses of student data use weights because these students are 
part of a probability sample—they have different likelihoods of being selected for the 
study, so one student does not necessarily represent the same number of students in the 
overall population as another student.  Appropriate sampling weights are essential for 
getting accurate estimates of survey values.  To appropriately weight student data, I 
created a normalized version of IEA’s “total weight” (TOTWGT), which represents the 
inverse of a student’s joint probability of being selected given that his or her class and 
school were selected (Sibberns, 2004).  In each country I normalized this weight by 
dividing it by the mean, giving it a mean of 1.  This allows the sum of students’ weights 
to equal the operant sample size, so that statistical tests still take into account unequal 
probabilities of selection, but are based on the analytic sample’s data, not the original 
sample’s.  Results from descriptive analyses for students are discussed in Chapter 5. 
Descriptive information on schools was weighted using a normalized version of 
the IEA-assigned school weight (SCHWGT).  In each country in the sample, I divided 
school weights by their mean, again in order to make sure that estimates reflected the 
analytic sample data and schools’ different probabilities of selection.  Results from 
descriptive analyses of school data are discussed in Chapter 6.  Descriptive information 
on countries (Chapter 7) was unweighted, although these countries were not selected at 
random and do not represent a larger sample of countries.   
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4.7.2 Multilevel Analyses 
First, a quick illustration of the purpose of multilevel analyses.  Figure 4-2 shows 
standardized average civic knowledge scores for native-born and immigrant students in 
the thirteen countries in this study.  You can see that these overall scores are different by 
country: Belgian adolescents score well below the mean (0 on the y-axis), no matter what 
their immigrant status, while Czech students score well above the mean.   
Figure 4-2. Differences in civic knowledge (standard score) between immigrants and native students 
in 13 European countries. 
 
On the face of it, too, looking only at whether a young person was born in or 
outside of the country, there are some large differences in scores within countries.  
Immigrants score much lower than their native peers in the Nordic countries of Denmark, 
Norway, and Sweden, for example.  But this difference is not the same across countries.  
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In Czech Republic, immigrants appear to be more knowledgeable about civics than their 
native peers, though the difference is not so drastic as in Denmark.  This picture provides 
a useful way to think about the questions that I ask in this study: to what extent do overall 
levels of civic outcomes differ between countries (e.g., the difference between Belgian 
and Czech students)?  To what extent does a gap exist between immigrants’ and native 
students’ outcomes (the difference between Danish natives and immigrants)?  And to 
what extent does that gap differ between countries (the size and direction of the gap in 
Denmark versus the size and direction of the gap in Czech Republic)?   
It is too simplistic, though, to look at overall civic outcomes and immigrant/native 
gaps without considering other characteristics of those students and their environments.  
What is it about Belgian students that makes them know less about civics than their peers 
in Czech Republic?  It seems unlikely that it is just “Belgian-ness” that makes this so—
what are the features of Belgium as a nation and of its schools that are related to these 
low scores?  What is it about immigrants in Czech Republic that makes them know more 
than native-born peers?  Is that difference really significant?   
To investigate questions like mine about student- and school-level relationships 
with student outcomes in these “nested” data (students in schools in countries), 
researchers must take that complex sample design into account.  Therefore I use 
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) techniques for all three of my research questions.  In 
all hierarchical analyses, I weight school data instead of student data, because the latter is 
partially based on the former (schools were selected before students).  School data are 
weighted in two-level models with country-specific normalized weights (so those weights 
refer just to individual countries’ sample sizes).  In three-level models, where all 
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countries’ data are combined, I weight school data with a normalized weight for the 
whole combined sample (the mean is still 1, but the sum of the school weights is equal to 
the combined sample size).  Country data in three-level models are unweighted.  
For multilevel modeling, I used HLM v. 6.08 to build two-level models (students 
in schools) that are separate by country and three-level models (students nested in schools 
nested in countries) that combine all countries’ data.  Multilevel techniques in HLM can 
do many things for researchers working with survey data, but two major functions are:  
• the ability to ‘partition’ variance in civic outcomes into within-school, between-
school, and between-country components, and  
• more accurate estimation of outcomes and of effects on outcomes because 
variance at multiple levels is taken into account at the same time. 
First, to partition variance means to show how much variance in civic outcomes 
happens within schools (students have different outcomes based on individual 
characteristics), between schools (students have different outcomes based on school 
characteristics), and between countries (students have different outcomes based on 
national characteristics).  With the results of this partitioning, a researcher can say, for 
example, that a large amount of the difference between different students’ civic 
knowledge is due to school characteristics, particularly some kind of teaching method.  
With that information policymakers can consider ways to make changes in schools—
through teacher education reform or professional development—so that students’ civic 
knowledge is more similar across schools.  Closing the achievement gap is a common 
goal in educational studies, and finding out how features of students and their 
environment are related to that achievement is a big part of that process.   
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Second, HLM is able to calculate more accurate standard errors of estimates 
precisely because it takes into account the different variances in and effects of 
characteristics found at each level in nested data at the same time.  Whereas OLS 
regression assumes that individuals are entirely independent of one another and might put 
school-level information into the same equation as individual-level data, HLM recognizes 
that students in the same school have some characteristics in common and are more like 
one another than students in other schools, even if those schools are similar.  Considering 
variance and effects at the proper level improves estimation (Arnold, 1992). 
The first step: A Fully Unconditional Model.  All multilevel analyses began 
with a ‘fully unconditional model’ wherein no independent variables were included at 
any level (see Appendix D for examples of the equations and interpretations of their 
parameters).  To answer RQs 1 and 2, I used two-level models, separate for each country.  
To address RQ 3, I used three-level models with all countries’ data combined.  This 
model does two things on its own: 1) it partitions the variation of an outcome into 
components that are attributable to students, schools themselves, and, in a three-level 
model, countries; 2) it gives reliability information.  Reliability (λ, as you’ll recall) is a 
function of the within-school sample size and how much variance exists between schools.  
As such, it is an indicator of how likely it is that one can identify differences in means 
between schools.  It should be considered in combination with the variance components, 
because together they show researchers the likelihood of explaining any differences 
between schools.  Reliability in HLM decreases with successive models if they include 
variables that explain variance between schools.  This is because more of the outcome is 
being explained, so it becomes increasingly difficult to identify differences between 
 134 
schools.   
With the variance components for each level that HLM provides, researchers can 
calculate the intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs), which measure how similar 
students outcomes are within a given school, and thus the proportion of variance (0 to 1) 
in the outcome that occurs between schools.48  If the ICC is high, that means much of the 
difference in outcomes occurs between schools.49   
Student characteristics: Within-school models.  RQ 1 concerns overall levels 
of adolescents’ civic outcomes as well as the difference, or ‘gap,’ in civic outcomes 
between immigrants and native students.  I am interested in determining whether there is 
a gap in the first place, and if so, which group’s average score is higher.  To address this 
question I built within-school models that deal with characteristics of individual students 
within schools.  First iterations of this model assumed three things (using patriotism as 
the outcome): 1) overall adolescent patriotism differs between schools and 2) there is a 
gap between immigrants’ and native students’ patriotism, and 3) the size of that gap 
differs between schools.  For example, adolescents in School A might be overall much 
more patriotic than students in School B, but it also might be that in School A, 
immigrants are two times less patriotic than native students, and in School B immigrants 
are only one and a half times less patriotic.   
                                                
48 ICCs for dichotomous and ordinal outcomes are calculated differently than for continuous outcomes 
because the within-school variance is a constant (Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 2004).  See Appendix D for 
how each of these is calculated. 
49 ICCs can be calculated for countries in three-level models, as well, and interpreted similarly (West, 
Welch, & Galecki, 2007, p. 162).  In my study country ICCs—essentially correlations—are, as correlations 
go, quite low.  However, as Greg Duncan and Steve Raudenbush discussed in a study of contextual effects, 
low ICCs at the third level can translate into appreciable effect sizes (d).  Country ICCs run from .01 to .04 
and .12, which respectively translate into small (d=.20), medium (d=.40), and large (d=.70) effect sizes 
(Duncan & Raudenbush, 1999, p. 33). 
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HLM provides information about the existence of any immigrant/native gap, as 
well as about any significant difference in patriotism overall or the patriotism gap that 
occurs between schools.  As an example, the software might show a coefficient for 
immigrant status that is negative and significant, which means that immigrants are less 
patriotic than native-born students on average.  If the initial analysis also shows that the 
between-school variance in the gap between immigrants and native students is 
nonsignificant, I would know that immigrants are less patriotic no matter what school 
they attend, and I would adjust the model accordingly.  (Please refer to Appendix D for 
an example and interpretation of the equations that constitute the between-school model.)   
Once I determined whether overall outcomes and the gap between immigrants’ 
and native students’ vary, I added covariates and controls to the within-school model 
according to RQs 1a and 1b.  Because I wished to focus only on immigrant status’s 
relationship with outcomes, I assumed that the effects of covariates and controls were the 
same across schools.   
Testing interactions.  To address the differential effects of various demographic 
variables for immigrant and native students, I created within-school models that included 
interaction terms of immigrant status with number of books in the home, age, gender, 
language of the home, and time in the host country.  An interaction of immigrant status 
with gender allowed me to see whether, for example, immigrant girls are more similar to 
immigrant boys on patriotism than native girls are to native boys.  With age, I could see 
whether being old for one’s grade has a more negative relationship with civic knowledge 
for immigrants than for native students.  Similarly, with language of the home, I could 
determine whether being a multilingual immigrant had a more positive relationship with 
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civic knowledge than being a multilingual native student. 
Initially I tested all of these interactions, but those that did not improve the 
model’s fit (according to HLM’s general linear hypothesis testing function) were 
discarded (which left some that are non-significant, but which nonetheless improve the 
model’s fit).  I present and discuss these results in Appendix E. 
Centering independent variables.  In initial models, when I was testing to see 
whether the size of the difference in immigrants’ and natives’ outcomes changed between 
schools, I ‘group-mean centered’ it, which involves subtracting each student’s school 
mean from his or her score.  This is because I wish to look at group differences in the 
relationship between immigrant status and the outcome.  If the immigrant/native gap did 
not change in size between schools, I adjusted the model by grand-mean centered it, 
meaning I subtracted the country’s overall mean from each student’s score to make the 
mean of the variable equal to zero, which enhances interpretability.  Grand-mean 
centering effectively makes it possible to refer to a score for a student who is ‘average’ 
on all predictors.  All other student-level measures were grand-mean centered because, as 
you’ll recall, I assumed that there was no difference between schools in those measures’ 
relationship with the outcome.  
Moderating effects of school characteristics: Between-school models.  
Consider RQ 2, now, which looks at the moderating effects that school characteristics 
might have on overall outcomes and the gap between immigrants’ and native students’ 
outcomes.  This is where it may be possible to explain away some of the differences that 
exist between schools.  Interested readers may turn to Appendix D for an example of the 
equations that constitute this model.  Assume for a moment that average levels of 
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patriotism are different between schools within a country, and that immigrants are less 
patriotic than native students.  If I were to test whether ethnic heterogeneity had any 
relationship with overall levels of patriotism and found the coefficient to be significant 
and negative, I would interpret that to mean that in schools with higher proportions of 
immigrants, overall levels of patriotism are lower than in schools with lower proportions 
of immigrants.   
If I find the coefficient for ethnic heterogeneity to be significant and positively 
related to the immigrant/native gap in patriotism, then I would interpret it to mean, 
broadly, that in schools with more immigrants, the gap in patriotism between immigrants 
and native students is smaller than in schools with fewer immigrants (because a positive 
number added to a negative number brings it closer to 0, reducing its ‘negativeness’). 
I only investigated school characteristics’ relationship with the immigrant gap in 
countries where I knew between-school differences in that gap were significant.  In some 
of those countries, the immigrant gap overall was non-significant.  While other scholars 
may have chosen not to investigate school ‘effects’ in relation to non-significant 
immigrant gaps, I suggest that precisely because I am interested in how the immigrant 
gap differs across schools, it is important to explore school characteristics even when the 
overall gap is not significant. 
Moderating effects of national characteristics: Between-country models.  I 
turn now to RQ 3, which looks at the potentially moderating effects of national 
characteristics on overall outcomes and the immigrant gaps I investigated in the within- 
and between-school models.  These models have three levels because they combine 
student and school data into one large set, rather than analyzing countries separately.  
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Because of the combined data, the variance in outcomes is greater across countries and 
schools, which makes finding significant between-school differences more likely, even 
when they did not obviously appear in two-level results.  On each outcome I first tested 
whether there were significant between-school or between-country differences in the 
immigrant gap without other modifying variables.  If one was non-significant, I did not 
model variables at that level on the immigrant gap.  The only outcome for which this was 
true is attitudes toward women’s rights.  All other outcomes had significant differences 
between schools and countries in the immigrant gap. 
Assuming that immigrants are overall less patriotic than native students, if I were 
to find the coefficient for income inequality to be significant and positive, I would 
interpret it to mean, broadly, that in countries with greater income inequality, immigrants 
feel less negative about the country they live in. 
It is especially important to note here that I have potentially large statistical 
problems based on using just 13 countries as my level-3 units.  So few countries at this 
highest level of the model means initially just twelve degrees of freedom (thus, low 
power), and even fewer degrees of freedom available for estimating relationships when I 
add national characteristics to the model.  Low power makes it very difficult to find 
results. 
 
4.8 Presentation of Results 
In the chapters that follow, I first present results and discussion for research 
question 1, students within schools.  This is followed by results and discussion for 
research question 2, the between-school models, then results and discussion for research 
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question 3, the between-country models.  Discussion of findings in chapters 6 and 7 build 
on the results from prior chapters’ analyses. 
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Chapter 5 
Results: Overall Civic Outcomes and the ‘Immigrant Gap’ 
 
As stated in Chapter 3, research question (RQ) 1 is related to European 
adolescents’ civic knowledge, civic participation, and self-expression values, and the 
extent to which immigrants and native-born adolescents differ in these outcomes.  
Additionally, RQs 1a and 1b ask the extent to which immigrants’ length of residence in 
the host country and use of the school language at home are related to their civic 
outcomes, and how adolescents’ civic knowledge, extracurricular participation, and 
perception of an open classroom climate are associated with overall civic outcomes.  
With these questions in mind, I begin this chapter by describing the student data and my 
hypotheses.  I then share results from within-school models and discuss the patterns in 
these results. 
 
5.1 Descriptive Information on Students 
I provide an overview of the sample here, but detailed tables of descriptive 
information on students in each country are available in Tables 5-2 to 5-5.  After 
removing students who did not meet criteria for inclusion (see Chapter 4), just over 80 
percent of the students remain (n=33,534; see Table 4-2).  Sample sizes within countries 
range from 1,513 in Belgium to 3,364 in Italy.  Immigrants make up between 1.8 percent 
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of the sample (in Czech Republic and Slovakia) and 20.9 percent (Germany).50  The 
patterns of difference between immigrants and native students in each country closely 
reflect the original data.   
For statistical power and reliability, HLM is sensitive to the number of students in 
each school, referred to as nj.  In this sample, across countries, you see in Table 5-1 that 
the number of students per school ranges from as few as 5 to as many as 47, but that the 
mean only ranges from 13.7 in Denmark to 23.7 in Greece. 
Table 5-1. Student sample size, and mean and range of the number of students per school (nj) for 
thirteen countries. 
Country Student Sample Size Mean nj Range nj 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
England 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Italy 
Norway 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
TOTAL 
1513 
3236 
2185 
2440 
2639 
3256 
2346 
3364 
2517 
2306 
3249 
1903 
2580 
33534 
15.9 
23.3 
13.7 
21.2 
18.7 
23.7 
18.3 
20.7 
18.4 
17.4 
23.4 
16.0 
18.5 
19.7 
5-24 
6-32 
5-24 
7-29 
5-30 
7-31 
5-31 
7-29 
6-47 
5-31 
9-34 
5-32 
5-41 
5-47 
 
5.1.1 Demographics, Home Language, Years in the Country 
In most countries immigrants are significantly older than their native-born 
classmates, a possible indicator of having been held back at least once.  In countries with 
larger immigrant populations (Germany, Switzerland, Sweden), native students have 
significantly more books in their homes than do immigrants.  In nearly every country, far 
greater proportions of immigrants speak a non-school language at home at least 
sometimes.  Consequently, significantly greater proportions of native students speak the 
                                                
50 Where immigrant sample sizes are quite small, standard errors for estimates of their scores tend to be 
larger.    
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school language at home all the time (greater than 90%, except in Italy).  It is notable that 
immigrant status does not map perfectly onto speaking a non-school language at home.  
These students who were born in the country of the test but speak a non-school language 
may be second-generation immigrants.  Finally, the average number of years immigrants 
have lived in their host country varies across countries, from fewer than eight years in 
Greece and Portugal to just over eleven years in Germany. 
 
 
5.1.2 Civic Knowledge, Participation, and Perceived Classroom Climate 
On average, native students seem to perceive a more open civics classroom 
climate.  In most countries, too, native students tend to have significantly greater civic 
knowledge than their immigrant peers, though never more than a fifth of a standard 
deviation.  Extracurricular participation is far more common in the Nordic countries, as 
high as 94% in Norway, with practically no differences between immigrants’ and native 
students’ participation (only in Italy, where nearly 60% of immigrants participate, and 
just 46% of natives do).  Slovakia has the least involved student population, with just 
30% of native students participating.  In all other countries, participation levels are 
between 50 and 90%.   
 
5.1.3 Self-Expression Values and Patriotism 
There is a pleasing finding already in these preliminary analyses: there are 
practically no significant differences between immigrants’ and native students’ attitudes 
toward women’s rights (only in Germany).  There are certainly cross-national differences 
in attitudes toward women’s rights, with much more positive attitudes in western and 
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Nordic Europe, slightly less positive attitudes in southern Europe (only between 22 and 
36% of students are highly supportive of women’s rights), and even less positive attitudes 
in central Europe (only between 17 and 30% are highly supportive).   
In most of these countries, immigrants have significantly more positive views of 
immigrants’ rights (as high as a standard deviation).  In several countries, though, native 
students’ views are comparable to their immigrant peers’ views.  This pattern mostly 
holds for adolescents’ attitudes toward ethnic minorities’ rights, but generally immigrants 
are more supportive of immigrants’ rights than of ethnic minorities’ rights in general.  
Finally, as predicted, in nearly every country immigrants tend to be significantly less 
patriotic than their native-born classmates, as much as two-thirds of a standard deviation 
less so.  Greek adolescents are the most patriotic of all these students, likely because of 
the extreme involvement of the state in curriculum and textbook design, which results in 
an overwhelmingly negative portrayal of Greece’s neighboring countries, reinforcing a 
strong Greek ethnic identity (Flouris & Pasias, 2003, p. 79).  
 
5.2 Hypotheses 
5.2.1 RQ 1: Main Effect of Immigrant Status on Civic Outcomes 
Most studies tend to find negative academic outcomes for immigrants, and a 
number of studies find that young immigrant adults engage differently in the civic sphere 
than their native-born peers.  Civic knowledge, as an academic subject, has been found to 
be similarly difficult for this group (Hjerm, 2005; Reimers, 2005).  As other studies have 
shown, because of in-group solidarity and a stronger connection to their parents’ 
homeland than their current country, I hypothesize that immigrant students’ attitudes are 
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significantly more positive than natives’ toward immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ 
rights, while their attitudes toward the host country—patriotism—are less positive.  
Additionally, I hypothesize that immigrants’ attitudes toward women’s rights are less 
positive because of more traditional gender roles in non-western cultures; but that their 
participation in civic-oriented groups is similar (Prokic & Dronkers, 2010).  
 
5.2.2 RQ 1a: Home Language and Years in the Country 
Previous studies of immigrant students’ encounters with language barriers tell a 
story of immense difficulties with social integration for those who arrive as older 
children, and family difficulties when a child develops greater facility in the host 
country’s language than in the parents’ language (Christensen & Stanat, 2007; Coll & 
Magnuson, 1997).  Additionally, the students who have lived in the host country longer 
have had greater exposure to the language, culture, and politics of that country.  Thus, I 
predict that the civic values, knowledge, and participation of immigrant students who 
have been in the country longer, and who speak the school language at home more 
frequently are more similar to native-born students’ attitudes because of greater 
familiarity with the host country’s culture.   
 
5.2.3 RQ 1b: Civic Knowledge, Participation, and Perceived Classroom Climate 
Researchers have found that civic knowledge, gleaned from schooling and 
political experience, is associated with a higher tolerance for feminists’ rights (Sotelo, 
1997), lower levels of xenophobia (Hjerm, 2005), and greater civic participation 
(Anderson et al., 1990).  Additionally, civic or political participation is strongly 
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associated with more democratic attitudes and greater civic knowledge in numerous 
studies.  Mikael Hjerm (2005) finds that adolescents who are more willing to vote, 
participate in protests, and run for office are also less xenophobic.51  Finally, as Carole 
Hahn has found repeatedly, the ability to speak one’s mind about difficult issues seems to 
be a liberating quality of effective civic education classrooms.  Researchers have found 
such an open classroom climate to be associated with greater interpersonal trust, civic 
knowledge, and more inclusive attitudes toward marginalized groups (Flanagan et al., 
2007; Hahn, 1991, 1998). 
Given the findings of Hahn (1998), Flanagan and Faison (2001), Sotelo (1997), 
and Hjerm (2005), I hypothesize that a) a student’s perception that his/her teachers and 
peers are open to discussion of controversial topics and b) his/her participation in 
extracurricular activities are associated with greater patriotism, civic knowledge, and 
openness to rights for marginalized groups.  Furthermore, I predict that civic knowledge 
is positively related to extracurricular participation and civic values, and negatively 
related to feelings of patriotism, as those who know more about how the country is 
supposed to be run are that much more likely to be disappointed by reality (as suggested 
by Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996, in relation to adults). 
 
5.3 Civic Outcomes: Fully Unconditional Models 
Recall that the first step in running a multilevel analysis is the Fully 
Unconditional Model, which gives four vital pieces of information: how much variation 
                                                
51 Note that I am using the phrase ‘associated with,’ rather than terms like ‘influence’ or ‘cause,’ because in 
these studies, the research design did not allow for causal claims.  Civic participation may increase 
knowledge or vice versa; with current studies it isn’t easy to know what the direction of that relationship is, 
or whether a change in one causes a change in the other or is merely coincidental. 
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in an outcome occurs between students and between schools, what proportion of the 
variance is attributable to schools (the ICC), and how reliable the outcome is.  From 
Table 5-6 (page 161) we see that differences between schools explain the most variation 
in civic knowledge (the ICC row: between 6 and 41%) and the least variation in 
patriotism and attitudes toward women’s rights.  Civic knowledge is also the most 
consistently reliable outcome, while in some countries extracurricular participation is the 
least reliable (largely because there is little variation in this outcome to begin with in 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden).  Many outcomes’ ICCs are quite low, but in 
combination with reliability information, they suggest that there is significant variation 
between schools, giving me confidence that my models will help to explain those 
differences. 
 
5.4 Research Question 1: Within-School Model Results 
With descriptive information in mind, recall that my first research question 
concerns the extent to which immigrants and native students differ in their civic 
outcomes based on individual characteristics.  In the following sections I first focus on 
the main effect of immigrant status for individual outcomes, then provide a broad 
overview of the relationship of home language, civic knowledge and participation, and 
perception of an open classroom climate to outcomes overall.  In Appendix E I provide 
much more comprehensive interpretation of how each demographic variable is related to 
different outcomes for immigrant and native students (interactions).  Recall that, because 
HLM involves so many controls and constraints, it is standard practice to interpret 
findings as significant at the p < .10 level (Torney-Purta & Wilkenfeld, 2009).   
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5.4.1 Civic Knowledge and Skills 
Beginning with civic knowledge and skills, in Table 5-7 we see first that, overall, 
adolescents in western Europe tend to know less than their peers elsewhere in Europe, a 
noteworthy finding in itself, especially since this is not typical of these countries in 
international assessments (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
2001).  We also see that, controlling for all other characteristics, in only four countries do 
immigrant students know significantly less than their native peers: Germany, Sweden, 
Italy, and Portugal.  This gap in knowledge and skills ranges from a twentieth of a 
standard deviation in Germany (γ = -0.056, p < .01) to nearly a third of a standard 
deviation in Portugal (γ = -.299, p < .001).  It seems that other demographic and civic-
related characteristics are more strongly associated with civic knowledge than immigrant 
status, a promising finding.   
 
5.4.2 Extracurricular Participation 
First, keep in mind that this variable does not include sports, drama, or music; I 
am focused only on students’ participation in civic-oriented extracurricular activities.  
Second, results for this dichotomous outcome are displayed as odds ratios (abbreviated 
OR).  An OR greater than 1.0 indicates greater odds of a student ‘scoring’ a 1, or in this 
instance, participating in civic-oriented activities.  An OR less than 1.0 indicates lower 
odds (a.k.a. lower likelihood) of participation in those activities.   
We see in Table 5-8, reminiscent of the descriptive data, that Norwegian 
adolescents are the most likely to participate in extracurricular activities (OR = 21.107, p 
< .001), and Slovak adolescents are least likely (OR = .458, p < .001).  Each of these is 
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sensible, given the state of civil society in each country: Norway’s is highly active, while 
Slovakia’s at this point in time was still recovering from decades of communist 
prohibition of civil groups (Glenn, 1995, p. 179).  Across these countries, there are only a 
few instances of significant differences in immigrants’ and natives’ participation rates 
(Denmark, Italy, Portugal).  In each of these three countries, immigrants are much more 
likely to participate in civic-related activities than their native peers (p < .10). 
 
5.4.3 Attitudes toward Women’s Rights and Opportunities 
Before discussing these results, I wish to be clear about the interpretation for 
ordinal outcomes like this.  It is somewhat counter-intuitive, especially because results 
for dichotomous outcomes are interpreted oppositely.  Ordinal outcomes’ results are odds 
ratios (OR) that represent probabilities of a student falling into a lower category versus a 
higher one.  On this measure, a ‘lower’ category could be the ‘low’ category versus both 
the ‘middle’ and ‘high’ categories, or it could be the ‘low’ or ‘middle’ categories versus 
the ‘high’ category.   
Analyses of students’ attitudes toward women’s rights (Table 5-9) show that 
adolescents in Hungary and Slovakia are, on average, the most likely to fall into a lower 
(less supportive) category out of these 13 countries (Hungary OR = .760; Slovakia OR = 
.782).  This may be because of women’s relatively unequal employment situation and 
social role under communism, which actually only worsened once capitalism took hold in 
central Europe (Mertus, 1998).  Generally immigrant status is unrelated to this measure, 
though there are exceptions in Norway, where immigrants are actually more likely than 
native students to be supportive of women’s rights (Norway OR = .749, p < .05), and in 
  
149 
Portugal, where immigrants are significantly more likely to be unsupportive of women’s 
rights (OR = 2.226, p < .05).  Note that an OR of .749 indicates that immigrants in 
Norway are about 25 percent less likely to fall into a lower category.  Immigrants’ lack of 
a consistent relationship with attitudes toward women’s rights and opportunities 
contradicts, to some degree, a common perception among European natives that 
immigrants’ cultural values around the role and rights of women are illiberal (Sniderman 
& Hagendoorn, 2007).   
 
5.4.4 Attitudes toward Immigrants’ Rights and Opportunities 
Results for this outcome (Table 5-10) are particularly interesting because, in part, 
it measures immigrant students’ beliefs about what their own rights and opportunities 
should be.  At first glance, we see that average adolescent support for immigrants’ rights 
and opportunities varies by country: Norwegian, Swedish, and Greek adolescents are 
more supportive than are Swiss, Danish, and Hungarian adolescents, for example.  
Perhaps most interesting about this finding is that—at least in Norway—it does not 
reflect other studies’ findings that native Norwegian students generally know very little 
“about the culture and lifestyles of immigrant groups such as the Vietnamese, the 
Chileans, the Turks, and the Moroccans” (Stiles & Eriksen, 2003, p. 209).   
In seven of thirteen countries, immigrants are significantly more supportive of 
rights for immigrants, mostly in western and Nordic countries. It is certainly surprising 
that this is not true across the board, as one would think that immigrant status in any 
country would give someone cause to be supportive of one’s own rights.  In the Nordic 
countries, this may reflect exactly the multiculturalist perspective officials have been 
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promoting there: immigrants have taken on a sense of their rights because they have been 
given extraordinary rights.  The same may go for the predominantly ethnic Hungarians 
who are immigrants to Hungary: they are the group that tends to get citizenship most 
easily and thus may feel more entitled to rights in that country.  However, I suspect that 
different forces are at work in the views of immigrants to Italy: there, though they were 
clearly needed in the economy at this point in time (1999) and were given occasional 
easy access to citizenship, they were either given no socializing attention or regarded as a 
threatening nuisance, a rather schizophrenic approach.  Immigrants could understandably 
desire their rights more strongly in such a country, though the fact that neither Greek nor 
Portuguese immigrants have similar feelings is odd, since southern European 
immigration approaches and experiences have been quite similar (Pastore, 2004).  These 
are particularly interesting findings because in Chapter 6 I can pay special attention to 
school features’ relationship with the immigrant/native gap in these countries, hoping to 
explain some of the variation.   
 
5.4.5 Attitudes toward Ethnic Minorities’ Rights and Opportunities 
For this outcome (Table 5-11) we see no consistent patterns across regions in 
attitudes toward ethnic minorities’ rights to respect and opportunities for education, 
employment, and political office. In only four countries—England, Switzerland, 
Denmark, and Italy—are immigrants significantly different in their attitudes from native 
students, and in only the latter three of those are they more supportive. It is unclear what 
is driving this finding in these countries, particularly what would make immigrants’ 
attitudes toward ethnic minorities different from their attitudes toward other immigrants 
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in Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Hungary (the countries where immigrants are also 
more supportive of immigrants’ rights)—perhaps this is a matter of solidarity with other 
first-generation immigrants without a larger understanding that ethnic minorities tend to 
be descendants of immigrants.  It may be that immigrant groups feel especially different 
from one another in these countries, as there is wide diversity of immigration flows into 
them: e.g., East Africans, South Asians, and Middle Easterners meeting Turks and 
Pakistanis in Norway; Asians, North Africans, and eastern Europeans in Italy (see Table 
3-1).  
On this outcome, the immigrant/native gap is significantly different between 
schools in Italy, but in no other country.  This means that in all other countries, the 
difference between immigrants’ and natives’ attitudes toward ethnic minorities’ rights is 
similar no matter what the school context, but in Italy, school features are related to either 
a bigger or smaller difference. 
 
5.4.6 Patriotism 
I urge readers to consider my previous discussions of ‘best traditions’ patriotism, 
and keep in mind that CIVED’s construct of patriotism may or may not do justice to that 
loftier idea of national loyalty.  I will discuss this comparison in greater detail in Chapter 
8, in light of this study’s results.   
Of particular note in the results for patriotism (Table 5-12) are the very high 
levels of patriotism in Greece and Portugal, followed by increasingly low levels in 
central, Nordic, and western Europe, especially Belgium.  Greece and Portugal’s high 
levels might be well explained by their relatively recent democratic transition; as recently 
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as the mid-1970s, Greek and Portuguese citizens were ruled by authoritarian military 
regimes.  The mark of those regimes seems still to be imprinted in Portuguese textbooks 
that laud a national identity without much reference to controversial events in the 
country’s past (Menezes, Xavier, Cibele, Amaro, & Campos, 1999).  In Greece, there are 
few parts of society that operate independent of the state, despite it not being a ‘welfare 
state’ like Sweden (Makrinioti & Solomon, 1999).  Belgium, oppositely, is fundamentally 
split into different linguistic ‘communities’ that have little tolerance or respect for one 
another, essentially rendering it, as historian Tony Judt wrote, not one “or even two states 
but an uneven quilt of overlapping and duplicating authorities” (2005, p. 711).  As such, 
the nation of Belgium is barely regarded as worthy of allegiance by its citizens.  
However, whereas descriptive information would have us believe that immigrants 
are uniformly less patriotic, these findings suggest differently.  In only seven countries, 
mainly in western and Nordic Europe, are immigrants significantly less patriotic toward 
the host country.  It is these countries that have the longest history of immigration and 
also the most strained relationships with their immigrant populations, which makes 
immigrants’ lesser affection for those countries understandable. 
As you will see in the Random Effects portion of Table 5-12 in several countries 
the size and, possibly, direction of the difference between immigrants’ and native 
students’ patriotism changes in different kinds of schools (Belgium, England, Germany, 
Denmark, Italy, and Hungary).  With between-school models in Chapter 6 I attempt to 
explain some of that variation in the immigrant/native patriotism gap. 
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5.5 Research Questions 1a and 1b: The Roles of Other Student-Level Variables 
The differential relationships of these other demographic and civic-related 
variables with immigrants’ and native students’ civic outcomes are quite complex.  So as 
not to distract from the main theme of this study—immigrants—I have included a 
thorough discussion of those different relationships in Appendix E.  Here I look at how 
those variables are related to outcomes overall, for this study’s adolescents in general. 
 
5.5.1 RQ 1a: Demographics 
Home language.  Where students’ home language is different from the school 
language—i.e., students are multilingual—generally patriotism and civic knowledge and 
skills are lower, but support of immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ rights is greater.  These 
findings are understandable if indeed this measure is an indicator of ethnic minority 
status, or having an immigration background (self, parents, or grandparents who were 
immigrants).  If that is so, then it is sensible that a group identity would lead them to be 
more supportive of minorities’ rights and to have strong ties to an ancestral homeland that 
impedes somewhat their feelings of patriotism for their current country. 
Time in the country.  Students who have lived in the country longer tend to be 
less knowledgeable about civics and have less positive views of immigrants’ and ethnic 
minorities’ rights, but these same students tend to have greater odds of civic participation.  
Perhaps being a longer-term resident in the country (native or immigrant) engenders 
apathy toward academic subjects that are outside the usual reading, writing, and 
arithmetic.  Too, longer residence certainly entails greater possible exposure to negative 
political or social rhetoric related to minority groups.   
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5.5.2 RQ 1b: Civic Knowledge, Participation, and Classroom Climate   
I have found that students’ civic-related characteristics—their perception of an 
open classroom climate, civic knowledge, and extracurricular participation—are 
significantly related to nearly all civic outcomes.  Anywhere students perceive a 
classroom climate that is more open to discussion, they tend to have greater civic 
knowledge and skills, stronger patriotism, and more inclusive attitudes toward rights for 
marginalized groups.  Civic knowledge, too, tends to be strongly related to positive 
attitudes toward marginalized groups, but as expected, is negatively related to patriotism, 
confirming other studies’ findings (Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996).   
In countries with relatively larger immigrant populations (i.e., western and Nordic 
Europe), students who participate in civic-oriented extracurricular activities appear to be 
more knowledgeable about civics.  In five of this study’s countries, students who 
participate more are also more patriotic, but there are few consistent relationships 
between participation and self-expression values.   
 
5.6 Discussion 
Overall it seems that immigrants are not much different from native students in 
their civic knowledge and interpretive skills, extracurricular participation or support for 
ethnic minorities’ or women’s rights, though they are more supportive of immigrants’ 
rights in more than half of this study’s countries.  The Nordic countries, Switzerland, and 
southern European Italy and Portugal stand out somewhat because immigrant adolescents 
in those nations have several significantly different civic outcomes from their native 
peers.  These differences tend to reflect more negatively on the native students, rather 
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than on immigrants, though.  There are not obvious regional patterns, but it is interesting 
that the central European countries have so few significant differences.  Whether this is 
because of low sample size, or because immigrants are relatively rare in those countries 
and are thus more easily ‘absorbed’ into society, is unclear.   
Regarding immigrants’ occasionally lower levels of patriotism, it may be that in 
these countries they see themselves as treated differently by the ethnic majority in their 
countries both socially and politically.  Furthermore it is likely that they and their parents 
have strong emotional and social ties to the country of origin still.  Especially in the cases 
of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, each of which is known for its multiculturalist 
approach to integration, the fact that immigrants are so much less patriotic than their 
native peers gives some support to Koopmans’ theory that a stronger multicultural bent 
leads to less integrated immigrants.   
 This said, it is rare that immigrant status has one constant, main effect for all 
immigrants; more often, these students’ outcomes vary by other demographic features.  
These interesting differential relationships with immigrant status get full treatment in 
Appendix E.   
 
5.6.1 Variation Between Schools 
In addition to learning how several individual characteristics are related to civic 
outcomes, HLM provides information about how these findings may differ between 
schools.  At the bottom of Tables 5-5 through 5-10, in the Random Effects panel, notice 
that the variance components for mean outcome levels are statistically significant in 
nearly all cases.  This means that, though my findings may be true of the ‘average’ 
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school, there are significant differences in overall levels between schools, suggesting that 
elements of the school environment are somehow related to different outcomes.  
Additionally, the gap between immigrants’ and natives’ patriotism and attitudes toward 
immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ rights appears to differ significantly between schools 
in a few countries.  Evidently features of the school environment also make those gaps 
larger or smaller.  
With these findings in mind on students’ preparedness for citizenship and life in a 
social democracy, I build the next set of models to address research question 2 on how 
school characteristics are related to students’ civic outcomes and to the differences 
between immigrants and native students. 
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Table 5-2. Western Europe: Weighted means and standard errors for the analytic sample. 
    Belgium England Germany Switzerland 
  n=1513 n=2440 n=2639 n=2580 
    Native Imm Native Imm Native Imm Native Imm 
Unweighted 
sample size 
1381 132 2311 129 2091 548 2176 404 
Weighted 
percentage of n 
91.3 8.7 94.7 5.3 79.1 20.9 84.4 15.6 
% Female 51.3 44.4 51.3 46.2 51.6 50.6 51.6 50.0 
Age 13.48 
(0.02) 
13.88*** 
(0.09) 
14.22 
(0.01) 
14.24 
(0.04) 
14.29 
(0.02) 
14.47** 
(0.05) 
14.38 
(0.02) 
14.74*** 
(0.04) 
Books: %         
     Few 30.4 46.7 32.2 31.0 29.3 42.3*** 32.1 58.0** 
 Average 27.8 13.3 30.4 30.0 29.7 29.2 33.3 24.0 
 Many 41.8 40.0 37.4 39.0 41.0*** 28.5 34.6** 18.0 
School language at 
home: %         
 Never 1.0 10.5 0.2 3.1 0.3 3.5 1.0 10.3 
 Sometimes 6.6 21.1 2.5 23.1 2.8 22.1 8.0 43.1 
 Always 92.3** 68.4 97.3*** 73.8 96.9*** 74.4 91.1*** 46.6 
Time in country -- 8.69 (0.43) -- 
8.35 
(0.44) -- 
11.03 
(0.18) -- 
8.80 
(0.20) 
Perception of open 
classroom climate 
-0.37 
(0.03) 
-0.23 
(0.16) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
0.16* 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.16† 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
Civic Characteristics        
Civic knowledge -0.18 
(0.02) 
-0.18 
(0.06) 
-0.07 
(0.01) 
-0.11 
(0.04) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.16 
(0.02) 
-0.09*** 
(0.01) 
-0.27 
(0.02) 
% Participating in 
extracurriculars 73.8 77.8 79.1 76.2 59.3 59.2 68.2 57.6 
Patriotism -0.64** 
(0.03) 
-1.01 
(0.11) 
-0.19*** 
(0.02) 
-0.61 
(0.07) 
-0.40** 
(0.03) 
-0.57 
(0.05) 
-0.26*** 
(0.02) 
-0.56 
(0.05) 
Attitude toward 
immigrants’ rights 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.21 
(0.12) 
-0.10 
(0.02) 
0.09† 
(0.10) 
-0.36 
(0.03) 
-0.05*** 
(0.06) 
-0.37 
(0.02) 
0.34*** 
(0.05) 
Attitude toward 
ethnic minorities’ 
rights 
0.09 
(0.03) 
0.13 
(0.13) 
0.30 
(0.02) 
0.26 
(0.10) 
-0.32 
(0.03) 
-0.02*** 
(0.06) 
-0.32 
(0.02) 
0.34*** 
(0.06) 
Attitude toward 
women’s rights: %         
 Low 41.5 42.1 23.7 31.0 30.3 36.3** 27.6 32.8 
 Middle 20.5 21.1 23.6 22.5 22.2 23.6 27.0 25.9 
  High 37.9 36.8 52.7 46.5 47.5** 40.1 45.4 41.4 
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Table 5-3. Nordic Europe: Weighted means and standard errors for the analytic sample. 
    Denmark Norway Sweden 
  n=2185 n=2517 n=1903 
    Native Imm Native Imm Native Imm 
Unweighted sample 
size 
2016 169 2347 170 1625 278 
Weighted percentage 
of n 
92.3 7.7 93.6 6.4 89.2 10.8 
% Female 48.2 50.0 51.7 50.0 50.0 51.5 
Age 14.32 
(0.01) 
14.42† 
(0.05) 
14.29 
(0.01) 
14.41** 
(0.04) 
13.82 
(0.01) 
13.96** 
(0.05) 
Books: %       
 Few 25.4 45.5 20.9 40.0 21.5 53.6** 
 Average 28.5 27.3 27.9 30.0 30.7 21.4 
 Many 46.2 27.3 51.2 30.0 47.8** 25.0 
School language at 
home: %        
 Never 0.6 7.1 0.6 8.3 1.5 15.2 
 Sometimes 1.2 28.6 2.3 41.7 4.4 39.4 
 Always 98.2*** 64.3 97.1*** 50.0 94.1*** 45.5 
Time in country -- 9.37 (0.30) -- 
9.05 
(0.33) -- 
9.27 
(0.32) 
Perception of open 
classroom climate 
-0.06 
(0.02) 
-0.11 
(0.08) 
0.29† 
(0.02) 
0.16 
(0.07) 
0.11 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
Civic Characteristics       
Civic knowledge -0.01*** 
(0.01) 
-0.23 
(0.04) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.21 
(0.04) 
-0.04*** 
(0.02) 
-0.28 
(0.05) 
% Participating in 
extracurriculars 89.1 85.7 93.7 83.3 83.3 81.8 
Patriotism 0.01*** 
(0.02) 
-0.41 
(0.08) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
-0.35 
(0.07) 
-0.23*** 
(0.03) 
-0.80 
(0.09) 
Attitude toward 
immigrants’ rights 
-0.20 
(0.02) 
0.52*** 
(0.08) 
0.19 
(0.02) 
0.76*** 
(0.09) 
0.36 
(0.04) 
1.09*** 
(0.10) 
Attitude toward 
ethnic minorities’ 
rights 
-0.19 
(0.02) 
0.26*** 
(0.08) 
0.17 
(0.02) 
0.31† 
(0.08) 
0.08 
(0.03) 
0.21 
(0.08) 
Attitude toward 
women's rights: %       
 
Low 23.6 28.6 22.9 27.3 29.3 43.8 
 Middle 21.8 21.4 21.7 27.3 27.4 25.0 
  
High 54.5 50.0 55.4 45.5 43.3 31.3 
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Table 5-4. Southern Europe: Weighted means and standard errors for the analytic sample. 
    Greece Italy Portugal 
  n=3256 n=3364 n=2306 
    Native Imm Native Imm Native Imm 
Unweighted sample 
size 
3073 183 3292 72 2166 140 
Weighted percentage 
of n 
94.4 5.6 97.8 2.2 94.0 6.0 
% Female 52.1 57.6 51.4 46.3 51.5 55.6 
Age 14.12 
(0.01) 
14.65*** 
(0.06) 
14.44 
(0.01) 
15.27*** 
(0.17) 
13.87 
(0.02) 
14.09* 
(0.08) 
Books: %       
 Few 49.4 60.0 54.4 51.1 64.2 62.5 
 Average 32.4 26.7 28.7 26.7 23.1 29.2 
 Many 18.3 13.3 16.9 22.2 12.7 8.3 
School language at 
home: %       
 Never 0.0 3.0 2.9 14.5 0.2 3.7 
 Sometimes 0.2 21.2 19.4 23.6 1.6 18.5 
 Always 99.8*** 75.8 77.7*** 61.8 98.1*** 77.8 
Time in country -- 7.69 (0.29) -- 
9.19 
(0.48) -- 
7.87 
(0.34) 
Perception of open 
classroom climate 
0.21 
(0.02) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
0.13† 
(0.02) 
-0.11 
(0.14) 
-0.22 
(0.02) 
-0.24 
(0.07) 
Civic Characteristics       
Civic knowledge 0.12*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
0.04** 
(0.01) 
-0.14 
(0.06) 
-0.17 
(0.01) 
-0.19 
(0.03) 
% Participating in 
extracurriculars 89.0 82.4 45.7 59.3* 71.2 74.1 
Patriotism 0.84*** 
(0.02) 
0.17 
(0.08) 
-0.12† 
(0.02) 
-0.32 
(0.10) 
0.48*** 
(0.02) 
0.17 
(0.07) 
Attitude toward 
immigrants’ rights 
0.30 
(0.02) 
0.62*** 
(0.07) 
-0.06 
(0.01) 
0.17† 
(0.12) 
0.16 
(0.02) 
0.46*** 
(0.08) 
Attitude toward 
ethnic minorities’ 
rights 
0.15 
(0.02) 
0.27* 
(0.06) 
-0.06 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.12) 
0.29 
(0.02) 
0.33 
(0.08) 
Attitude toward 
women's rights: %       
 
Low 38.5 39.4 37.7 43.6 33.7 32.1 
 Middle 
25.5 24.2 29.0 34.5 31.6 32.1 
  
High 
36.0 36.4 33.2 21.8 34.7 35.7 
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Table 5-5. Central Europe: Weighted means and standard errors for the analytic sample. 
    Czech Republic Hungary Slovakia 
  n=3236 n=2346 n=3249 
    Native Imm Native Imm Native Imm 
Unweighted sample 
size 
3178 58 2272 74 3187 62 
Weighted 
percentage of n 
98.2 1.8 96.8 3.2 98.2 1.8 
% Female 51.4 50.0 51.0 53.8 52.0 66.7 
Age 13.89 
(0.01) 
13.96 
(0.11) 
13.91 
(0.01) 
14.07* 
(0.07) 
13.74 
(0.01) 
13.78 
(0.09) 
Books: %       
 Few 19.7 25.0 21.3 36.4 32.2 40.0 
 Average 41.0 50.0 26.2 18.2 39.7 40.0 
 Many 39.4 25.0 52.5 45.5 28.1 20.0 
School language at 
home: %       
 Never 0.2 10.0 0.0 7.7 2.0 16.7 
 Sometimes 0.9 20.0 0.5 0.0 7.7 0.0 
 Always 98.9*** 70.0 99.5*** 92.3 90.3* 83.3 
Time in country -- 9.73 (0.79) -- 
9.13 
(0.43) -- 
10.8 
(0.53) 
Perception of open 
classroom climate 
-0.31 
(0.02) 
0.07* 
(0.15) 
-0.35 
(0.02) 
-0.45 
(0.13) 
0.02† 
(0.02) 
-0.20 
(0.13) 
Civic 
Characteristics       
Civic knowledge -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.01) 
-0.10 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.07) 
% Participating in 
extracurriculars 64.0 50.0 72.0 71.4 30.1 42.9 
Patriotism 0.20*** 
(0.02) 
-0.25 
(0.12) 
0.11 
(0.02) 
0.08 
(0.11) 
0.32*** 
(0.02) 
-0.09 
(0.12) 
Attitude toward 
immigrants’ rights 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.24 
(0.21) 
-0.22 
(0.02) 
0.24*** 
(0.11) 
-0.10 
(0.02) 
-0.13 
(0.09) 
Attitude toward 
ethnic minorities’ 
rights 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.19 
(0.17) 
-0.25 
(0.02) 
-0.05* 
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(0.02) 
0.09 
(0.13) 
Attitude toward 
women's rights: %       
 
Low 
38.4 50.0 44.6 50.0 46.6 50.0 
 Middle 
31.3 30.0 26.5 21.4 32.7 33.3 
  
High 30.3 20.0 29.0 28.6 20.7 16.7 
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Table 5-6. Fully Unconditional Models: Civic outcomes by country. 
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Civic knowledge/skills              
Between-schl variance (τβ) .070*** .046*** .078*** .068*** .016*** .024*** .055*** .049*** .092*** .046*** .123*** .061*** .082*** 
Level-1 error (σ2) .135 .182 .134 .124 .261 .274 .225 .249 .153 .127 .175 .159 .137 
Reliability (λ) .869 .828 .895 .897 .434 .565 .768 .814 .919 .834 .934 .849 .927 
ICC .340 .202 .368 .356 .059 .080 .198 .164 .376 .263 .413 .277 .374 
Civic participation              
Between-schl variance (τβ) .473*** .169*** .374*** .308*** .107 .005 .350*** .172** .299*** .270*** .157*** .235*** .484*** 
Level-1 error (σ2)              
Reliability (λ) .534 .346 .576 .523 .117 .004 .384 .288 .580 .441 .423 .413 .672 
ICC .126 .049 .102 .086 .031 .001 .096 .050 .083 .076 .046 .067 .128 
Women’s rights              
Between-schl variance (τβ) .522*** .116*** .292*** .290*** .033† .073* .259*** .171 .534*** .249*** .251*** .131*** .192*** 
Level-1 error (σ2)              
Reliability (λ) .655 .385 .564 .572 .101 .233 .506 .528 .753 .518 .603 .371 .541 
ICC .137 .034 .082 .081 .010 .022 .073 .049 .148 .070 .071 .038 .055 
Immigrants’ rights              
Between-schl variance (τβ) .121*** .146*** .182*** .161*** .121*** .075*** .223*** .020*** .066*** .008** .020*** .028*** .046*** 
Level-1 error (σ2) 1.053 1.018 .905 .990 .993 1.270 1.128 .890 .620 .629 .599 .598 .625 
Reliability (λ) .606 .733 .752 .723 .594 .473 .727 .343 .671 .174 .414 .424 .614 
ICC .103 .125 .167 .140 .108 .056 .165 .022 .096 .013 .032 .045 .069 
Minorities’ rights              
Between-schl variance (τβ) .159*** .061*** .192*** .169*** .067*** .030*** .052*** .014** .083*** .045*** .054*** .029*** .056*** 
Level-1 error (σ2) 1.119 1.021 1.107 1.039 1.001 .951 .973 .786 .724 .791 .727 .682 .759 
Reliability (λ) .654 .539 .725 .723 .450 .327 .430 .286 .689 .458 .606 .400 .613 
ICC .125 .056 .148 .140 .063 .031 .051 .017 .103 .054 .069 .041 .069 
Patriotism              
Between-schl variance (τβ) .069*** .039*** .143*** .097*** .035*** .044*** .075*** .049*** .038*** .050*** .027*** .026*** .125*** 
Level-1 error (σ2) .846 .852 .876 .876 .768 .812 1.077 .871 .668 .677 .622 .665 .776 
Reliability (λ) .523 .475 .713 .642 .357 .454 .492 .559 .525 .522 .479 .375 .775 
ICC .075 .044 .140 .100 .043 .052 .065 .053 .054 .069 .042 .037 .139 
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Table 5-7. Civic knowledge and interpretive skills: Within-school results by region and country. 
 Western Europe Nordic Europe Southern Europe Central Europe 
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FIXED EFFECTS              
Mean civic knldg/skills -.199*** -.083** -.111*** -.113*** -.023† .074** -.048* .115*** .041† -.177*** .167*** -.040† .127*** 
Immigrant gapa  -.021 .068 -.056** -.047 -.019 -.091 -.085† -.093 -.244* -.299*** -.023 .033 .063 
Femaleb   -.006 -.046 -.107*** -.077*** -.121*** -.166* -.079** .031 -.024 -.048** -.104*** -.049** -.050* 
Under-agec .187†  -.084 -.027          
Over-agec -.051  -.069* -.067* -.048 -.182† -.171 -.205*** .014 .000 .240** -.353*** -.253 
Books: Fewd -.057* -.175*** -.068*** -.089*** -.167*** -.133** -.089** -.148*** -.097*** -.110*** -.147*** -.164*** -.118*** 
Books: Manyd .109*** .171*** .090** .077*** .079** .165*** .161*** .127** .045† .108** .134*** .144*** .065** 
Time in country -.008 .015† -.009† -.004 .021* .012 -.009 -.010 -.026† -.048*** -.022† -.006 -.001 
Language: Nevere -.163** -.351† -.109 -.064 -.242* -.098 -.239*** -.364** -.232*** -.030 -.486** -.173 -.161** 
Language: Sometimese -.189*** -.121** -.068 -.105*** -.143* -.213*** -.174*** -.056 -.169*** -.067 .024 -.208* -.109* 
Open climate .075*** .073*** .055*** .033*** .127*** .107*** .099*** .075*** .072*** .053** .077*** .055*** .058*** 
Extracurricularsf .041† .099*** .060** .032* -.009 .176† .073* .179*** .008 .011 -.018 .023 .013 
              
RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN…            
Mean knldg/skills, τ00 .048*** .026*** .063*** .052*** .010*** .016*** .035*** .036*** .061*** .029*** .096*** .041*** .067*** 
Level-1 error .125 .163 .125 .118 .231 .243 .204 .231 .142 .121 .165 .146 .131 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. All variables have been centered around their grand mean.   
Reference groups: a Native  b Male  c Target age (13-15 years)  d Average # of books  e School language at home always  f No extracurricular participation   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001   
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Table 5-8. Extracurricular participation: Within-school results by region and country. 
 Western Europe Nordic Europe Southern Europe Central Europe 
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FIXED EFFECTS              
Mean participation 3.076*** 4.919*** 1.294** 1.915*** 8.466*** 21.107*** 5.936*** 8.334*** .826** 2.740*** 2.018*** 2.863*** .458*** 
Immigrant gapa  1.230 1.461 1.218 1.383 2.559† 1.096 1.329 .913 2.076† 1.936† .686 .826 1.322 
Femaleb   1.122 1.976*** 1.404** 1.499*** 1.138 2.745*** 1.137 1.506* 1.238* 1.107 1.575*** 1.221† 1.752*** 
Under-agec 3.224  2.740*           
Over-agec .777  .752 1.058  2.594  .642† 1.155 .929 1.431 1.078  
Books: Fewd .807 .884 .756* .642*** .653* .276** .962 1.007 .860 .591*** .717* .801 .858 
Books: Manyd 2.009*** 1.675** 1.705*** .950 1.473* .893 1.938** 1.129 1.772** 1.052 1.610*** 1.104 1.264* 
Time in country 1.077 1.100* 1.066† 1.072* 1.152* 1.082 1.034 1.015 .968 1.067 1.045 .935 1.068 
Language: Nevere 1.513 2.179 1.158 .872 .920 2.178 1.254 .448 .718 .627 .302  .740 
Language: Sometimese 1.404 2.505* 1.030 .854 .563 .934 1.062 .588 1.140 .942 1.297 1.211 1.050 
Open climate 1.091 1.217** 1.046 1.043 1.123 1.160 1.098 1.015 1.034 1.144 1.179** 1.164* 1.080 
Civic knowledge 1.372† 1.988*** 1.555** 1.355** .957 2.085 1.353 2.201*** 1.124 1.124 .908 1.067 1.073 
              
RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN…            
Mean participation, τ00 .450*** .100* .381*** .285*** .070 .001 .309*** .184** .266*** .261*** .150*** .238*** .488*** 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects.  All estimates are in the form of odds ratios.  All variables have been centered 
around their grand mean.   
Reference groups: a Native  b Male  c Target age (13-15 years)  d Average # of books  e School language at home always  
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001   
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Table 5-9. Attitude toward women's rights: Within-school results by region and country. 
 Western Europe Nordic Europe Southern Europe Central Europe 
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FIXED EFFECTS              
Mean odds of less 
positive attitude .565*** .228*** .415*** .291*** .243*** .203*** .312*** .544*** .525*** .429*** .449*** .760*** .782*** 
Immigrant gapa  1.237 1.298 1.005 .973 .626 .749* 1.318 .818 .724 2.226* 1.592 1.566 1.668 
Femaleb   .246*** .170*** .218*** .177*** .196*** .138*** .230*** .136*** .216*** .463*** .282*** .212*** .401*** 
Under-agec .602  1.861           
Over-agec .528  1.030 1.221 .416 .414 1.353 1.301 1.125 .784 .463 1.077 1.108 
Books: Fewd 1.400† 1.252 .927 1.101 1.149 1.220 1.200 1.145 1.214* 1.163† .905 1.348 1.344** 
Books: Manyd .962 1.191 1.007 .881 .798† .818* .966 .959 .817 1.052 1.018 .702*** .910 
Time in country 1.043 .964 .963† .995 .914* .977 1.041 1.006 1.045 1.145** .934 1.036 1.038 
Language: Nevere .969 3.770* 1.058 1.532 .183** 1.277 1.360 2.618* 1.933** .652 .938 1.304 1.220 
Language: Sometimese 1.106 1.354 1.017 .788 .894 .808 .812 1.458 1.230† 1.005 .855 .450 1.288 
Open climate .770** .736*** .738*** .798*** .756*** .713** .787*** .788*** .844** .699*** .793*** .859** .810*** 
Civic knowledge .232*** .396*** .389*** .295*** .316*** .321*** .202*** .172*** .203*** .195*** .419*** .295*** .336*** 
Extracurricularsf  .713** .893 .831† .904 .798 .690 1.003 .955 .959 .987 .865 .841 .947 
RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN…            
Mean attitude, τ00 .218*** .105*** .152*** .229*** .009 .095** .156*** .120*** .090*** .070** .166*** .150*** .115*** 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects.  All estimates are in the form of odds ratios.  All variables have been centered 
around their grand mean.   
Reference groups: a Native  b Male  c Target age (13-15 years)  d Average # of books  e School language at home always  f No extracurricular participation   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001   
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Table 5-10. Attitude toward immigrants' rights: Within-school results by region and country. 
 Western Europe Nordic Europe Southern Europe Central Europe 
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FIXED EFFECTS              
Mean attitude .086† -.004 -.331*** -.218*** -.101** .202*** .621*** .315*** -.045* .194*** .060** -.219*** -.058* 
Immigrant gapa  -.096 .083 .105† .371*** .345* .583* .239* .196 .347† .048 -.202 .338* -.038 
Femaleb   .216** .302*** .217*** .387*** .462*** .489*** .323*** .204*** .239*** .048 .253*** .156** .149*** 
Under-agec .152  -.157 -.623          
Over-agec .373  .030 -.128 .148 .504* -.667 .172 .052 -.013 .024 .058 .635 
Books: Fewd .020 -.049 -.040 .037 .038 .079 .100 .004 -.056 .073† -.036 .153* .019 
Books: Manyd -.081 .004 -.027 .029 .046 .210** .104† -.021 -.006 .004 .014 .034 .007 
Time in country -.052** .008 -.017 -.022† -.010 .008 -.049* -.024 -.013 -.036* -.010 -.034† .002 
Language: Nevere .391 .868 .534 .176 .482* -.291 .252† .092 .050 .625** .307 .340 .309** 
Language: Sometimese ..399** .448* .725*** .647*** .790*** .674** .435*** -.072 .034 .079 .383 .068 .051 
Open climate .109** .090* .186*** .039* .137*** .209*** .251*** .187*** .155*** .181*** .087*** .094*** .162*** 
Civic knowledge .300*** .187** .308*** .377*** .421*** .313*** .298*** .342*** .328*** .265*** .181*** .138** .146** 
Extracurricularsf  -.022 -.001 -.096* -.026 .083 .262* .092 -.011 .065* .024 .093** .032 -.029 
RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN…            
Mean attitude, τ00 .093*** .171*** .121*** .133*** .095*** .036*** .145*** .018*** .030*** .008* .018*** .028** .042*** 
Immigrant gap, τ11     .375***   .129* .465***   .403***  
Level-1 error 1.009 .966 .818 .860 .811 1.092 .985 .795 .559 .590 .559 .559 .592 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects.  All variables have been centered around their grand mean, except where the 
immigrant gap has a random effect.  In that instance, immigrant status is centered around its group mean.   
Reference groups: a Native  b Male  c Target age (13-15 years)  d Average # of books  e School language at home always  f No extracurricular participation   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001   
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Table 5-11. Attitude toward ethnic minorities' rights: Within-school results by region and country. 
 Western Europe Nordic Europe Southern Europe Central Europe 
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FIXED EFFECTS              
Mean attitude .149** .311*** -.325*** -.179*** -.144*** .158*** .189*** .147*** -.054* .321*** .080* -.236*** -.024 
Immigrant gapa  -.062 -.311† .117 .505*** .684*** .162 .027 .114 .310† -.084 -.237 .162 -.139 
Femaleb   .392*** .377*** .267*** .454*** .424*** .466*** .183*** .205*** .230*** .167*** .313*** .197*** .178*** 
Under-agec .073  -.170 -1.748          
Over-agec .538†  .025 -.130 .115 .092 .118 -.058 -.108 .123 -.180 -.070 .162 
Books: Fewd .008 -.119* .011 .055 -.046 .013 .124* .087* -.137** -.030 .028 .209*** -.110** 
Books: Manyd -.113 -.028 .051 .105* -.028 .165** .124* -.030 -.006 -.121† .016 .127** .045 
Time in country -.036† -.031† -.030* .002 .063** -.036 -.012 -.018 .004 -.034* .017 -.001 -.032 
Language: Nevere -.024 .142 .381 .275* .503* -.269 .024 -.808*** .052 .694** .338 .131 .222† 
Language: Sometimese .141 .251* .472** .466*** .586*** .130 .218** -.106 -.010 -.054 .277 -.250 .059 
Open climate .152*** .184*** .200*** .075*** .123*** .209*** .225*** .170*** .142*** .176*** .138*** .155*** .165*** 
Civic knowledge .474*** .563*** .354*** .396*** .416*** .391*** .544*** .272*** .394*** .502*** .252*** .091* .230*** 
Extracurricularsf  .053 .108† -.043 -.050 .073 .366** .144* .047 .096** .034 .045 .071 .060 
RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN…            
Mean attitude, τ00 .087*** .023*** .108*** .153*** .042*** .015** .018* .011** .032*** .015** .040*** .030*** .040*** 
Immigrant gap, τ11         .419**     
Level-1 error 1.035 .864 1.027 .908 .871 .768 .833 .717 .653 .738 .667 .638 .714 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects.  All variables have been centered around their grand mean, except where the 
immigrant gap has a random effect.  In that instance, immigrant status is centered around its group mean.   
Reference groups: a Native  b Male  c Target age (13-15 years)  d Average # of books  e School language at home always  f No extracurricular participation   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001   
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Table 5-12. Patriotism: Within-school results by region and country. 
 Western Europe Nordic Europe Southern Europe Central Europe 
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FIXED EFFECTS              
Mean patriotism -.672*** -.208*** -.399*** -.290*** -.028 .050 -.397*** .802*** -.089*** .495*** .147*** .112*** .186*** 
Immigrant gapa  -.155 -.481† -.129 -.221* -.264† -.235† -.234* -.571*** -.295 -.179 -.019 .041 -.305* 
Femaleb   -.019 -.288*** -.435*** -.210*** -.113* -.252*** -.315*** .133** -.216*** -.171*** -.113** -.082* -.178** 
Under-agec -.341**  -.161 .556          
Over-agec .468†  -.006 .106 .044 .032 1.622 -.035 -.050 -.074 -.138 .022 -.735** 
Books: Fewd -.083 .028 .065 -.047 -.076 -.033 .194** .025 .033 -.034 .016 .012 .025 
Books: Manyd -.094 -.177** -.101† -.081† -.023 .017 -.030 -.118 -.051 -.087 .075* -.005 -.127** 
Time in country .019 -.025 -.007 -.017 .007 .002 .007 -.014 -.015 .022 .013 .013 -.005 
Language: Nevere -.350 -.856** -.872** -.431** -.004 -.134 -.598*** -.669† -.029 -.108 -.613** -.160 -.156 
Language: Sometimese -.389** -.629*** -.349** -.388*** -.635*** -.544*** -.381*** -.632** .094* -.341** -.302† -.277 -.119 
Open climate .101** .119*** .030 .115*** .078** .162*** .120*** .225*** .118*** .169*** .105*** .126*** .084** 
Civic knowledge .051 -.071 -.329*** -.179** -.159** -.199*** -.161** .038 -.033 -.045 -.201*** .088* -.260*** 
Extracurricularsf  .114† .144* .069 -.032 .087 .167 -.155* .077 -.004 .090* .053 .090† .092* 
RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN…            
Mean patriotism, τ00 .050*** .032*** .098*** .072*** .032** .034*** .064*** .033*** .027*** .044*** .025*** .024*** .089*** 
Immigrant gap, τ11 .218* .376*** .129***  .549***    .540***   .263*  
Level-1 error .807 .790 .807 .842 .701 .766 1.018 .796 .642 .650 .605 .639 .762 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects.  All variables have been centered around their grand mean, except where the 
immigrant gap has a random effect.  In that instance, immigrant status is centered around its group mean.   
Reference groups: a Native  b Male  c Target age (13-15 years)  d Average # of books  e School language at home always  f No extracurricular participation   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001   
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Chapter 6 
Results: Moderating Effects of Schools 
 
The findings from within-school models suggest interesting differences between 
immigrants and native students in several civic outcomes.  In all countries, overall levels 
of these outcomes differ depending on school characteristics.  Also in some countries, 
immigrant/native disparities differ between schools.  Thus, with this chapter, I respond to 
research question 2, aimed at identifying how some characteristics of schools are 
associated with civic outcomes generally and also with the differences between 
immigrants and native students on those outcomes.  The HLM analyses to answer this 
question are the between-school models. 
Primarily RQ 2 is concerned with the moderating effects that instructional 
methods (discussion-based vs. traditional lecture/note-taking) have with civic outcomes, 
but also with the relationships of a school’s degree of ethnic heterogeneity (proportion of 
immigrant students) and socioeconomic composition (average and range of number of 
books students own).  Finding that the relationship between immigrant status and civic 
outcomes is weaker in certain schools—particularly those characterized by different 
instructional methods—would be encouraging because it would suggest that immigrant 
students are not uniformly destined to be civic outsiders.  Rather, immigrants’ 
educational contexts help to weave them into the ‘social fabric,’ including them in youth 
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civil society.  As in Chapter 5, this chapter first describes school-level data, then presents 
my hypotheses about school features’ relationships with outcomes, explains results for 
each outcome, and summarizes these findings with a discussion of the patterns across 
countries and outcomes. 
 
6.1 Descriptive Information on Schools 
Criteria for inclusion in the student sample resulted in students from 1,891 
schools across 13 countries (see Table 6-2 on page 191).52  Recall that in this sample, a 
school with a relatively high proportion of immigrants has greater than the median 
proportion in the individual country.53  Note that, viewed as regions, western European 
countries have higher proportions of high-immigrant groups than—in order—Nordic, 
southern, and central European countries. 
Looking across countries, average book ownership in schools is highest in central 
Europe, followed by the Nordic countries, western, and southern Europe (based on 
standard scores created using all thirteen countries’ data at once, purely for comparison’s 
sake).  Portuguese schools have the lowest average number of books per student, while 
Czech schools have the highest.  Average ‘inequality’ (a standardized score representing 
the range of the number of books students own in a school) is lowest overall in central 
Europe, and highest in Belgium. 
                                                
52 HLM is sensitive to the number of schools within each country.  In this sample, the mean number of 
schools is 147.6, while the range is 105-173 schools per country.  
53 I include in Table 6-2 the proportions of immigrants based on the international median (7.4 percent), as 
well, as a means of understanding how these countries compare to each other.  There are far more schools 
with high proportions of immigrants in western Europe, followed by the Nordic, southern, and central 
European countries.  In Germany almost 90 percent of schools have a high proportion of immigrants, 
whereas in Czech Republic, fewer than 17 percent do.   
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 There are large differences between countries in how students characterize their 
classroom climate (in terms of traditional instruction or an open, discussion-based 
climate).54  In some, highly open climates accompanied by highly traditional instruction 
seem to dominate (e.g., Portugal, the Czech Republic, and Hungary), while in others, a 
combination of little discussion and little traditional instruction is most prevalent (e.g., 
Belgium, England, Norway, and Sweden). 
Table 6-1. Descriptive characteristics of schools: Pooled data (all 13 countries).  N=1,891 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
High proportion immigrantsa 0.51    
Average books -0.04 1.00 -3.25 2.21 
Range of books 0.03 1.00 -3.59 3.60 
Instructional methods     
Low openness/ 
Low traditionala 0.28    
Low openness/ 
High traditionala 0.23    
High openness/ 
Low traditionala 0.24    
High openness/ 
High traditionala 0.25    
a Dichotomous variable where the mean indicates the proportion represented in 
the sample of 1,891 schools. 
 
A grand overview, Table 6-1, shows that roughly half of the schools across these 
thirteen countries have high proportions of immigrants, 28 percent are characterized by a 
less open climate and little traditional instructional methods in civics, while in a fourth of 
                                                
54 I also include in Table 6-2—for comparative purposes—the percentages of schools in each country that 
would fall into each category of instructional methods combinations based on all thirteen countries’ data 
taken together (so there’s a cross-national understanding of what constitutes high openness/high traditional, 
etc.).  More than 50 percent of Belgian, Danish, and Portuguese schools are characterized by civic 
instruction that is not very open and has little lecture or note-taking, suggesting that students in those 
schools get very little civic instruction.  Oppositely, more than 50 percent of students in Greece 
characterize their instruction as being both highly open and highly traditional, suggesting an equal mix of 
instructional methods.  Compared to other countries, Belgian, Portuguese, and Hungarian adolescents 
experience the least open classroom climate in the sample. 
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schools, students characterize their instruction as highly open with much traditional 
instruction.   
 
6.2 Hypotheses 
6.2.1 Instructional Methods 
The characteristic of schools with the most obvious policy implications is method 
of instruction.  Where teachers use more interactive, student-oriented instruction, students 
have higher civic knowledge and participation.  Based on several studies’ findings on 
differences between ethnic minorities/immigrants and native students (Reimers, 2005; 
Torney-Purta & Wilkenfeld, 2009), I expect that in classrooms characterized as having a 
more ‘open’ (interactive, student-oriented) climate, there are smaller differences between 
immigrants’ and natives’ civic knowledge, values, and participation.  Indeed, if such 
classrooms foster a respect for discussion and other’s opinions, this could also be 
indirectly associated with greater overall levels of patriotism (Flanagan et al., 2007).  Of 
course, as noted in Willms (2006), in cross-sectional data, outcomes are really 
“cumulative effects of all factors that bear on a child’s…development from birth,” which 
makes it hard to say that data about students’ classes in just one year of their schooling 
has much to do with their outcomes, unless one assumes that teachers in a school or 
school district tend to have similar pedagogical inclinations (p. 55). 
 
6.2.2 Other School Characteristics 
Ethnic heterogeneity.  Investigating the relationship of proportion of immigrants 
to overall levels of civic outcomes and disparities between immigrants and natives is an 
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attempt at finding evidence either of the Contact or Conflict theories.  I predict that 
immigrant/native differences in attitudes toward marginalized groups will be smaller in 
high-immigrant-population schools because of more frequent contact with multiple 
cultures.  Mikael Hjerm (2005) supports this with his finding that native Swedish students 
who attended an “immigrant-dense” school tended to have a lower likelihood of 
xenophobia.  One can reasonably expect immigrant students to have more positive 
attitudes toward immigrants and ethnic minorities solely by being a member of those 
groups.  In addition, I hypothesize that immigrant students in schools with larger 
immigrant populations may have lower civic knowledge than immigrant peers in low-
immigrant-population schools.  Likely this would be due to lesser access to good teachers 
and resources, as well as linguistic or cultural difficulties with the expectations of 
schools, which may proxy for low social integration (Kokkonen, Esaiasson, and Gilljam’s 
2008 study using CIVED’s Swedish data found this to be true). 
Socioeconomic composition.  Remember that in this study, the number of books 
in students’ homes proxies for socioeconomic status, in the absence of a more complete 
measure.  Socioeconomic composition is important to any study of schooling systems 
“because it is directly relevant to issues concerning the manner in which students are 
allocated to schools, classrooms and instructional groups” (Willms, 2006, p. 46).  It has 
been documented internationally that higher SES students attend schools with smaller 
class sizes and better physical resources and teachers (Buruma, 2011; Rothstein, 2004; 
Willms, 2006).  In schools with high-SES peers, students stand to benefit from peers’ 
parents’ intellectual and social capital as well as more strongly qualified teachers who 
tend to use more effective teaching methods (Chiu, 2010; Rowan, Correnti, & Miller, 
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2002).  Thus I hypothesize that in schools where the average number of books in 
students’ homes is higher, immigrant students are more similar to their native-born peers 
on civic outcomes.   
Socioeconomic diversity, on the other hand, indicated by a wider distribution of 
the number of books within a school, may intensify differences between immigrants and 
native students in values, for reasons similar to those of national income inequality: lesser 
social cohesion and greater differences in material security.  
 
6.3 Research Question 2: Between-School Model Results 
Results from the within-school models showed that the size of the gap between 
immigrant and native students varies between schools in some countries on three civic 
outcomes: patriotism and attitudes toward immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ rights.  
These findings suggest that characteristics of schools are associated with significantly 
larger or smaller gaps between these groups on those outcomes.  Within-school models 
for the remaining three outcomes—civic knowledge, extracurricular participation, and 
attitudes toward women’s rights—showed that differences between immigrant and 
native-born students are constant across schools in all countries, which means that 
regardless of educational context, the gap (or lack thereof) in scores between immigrants 
and native students is always the same.  On all outcomes, overall scores vary between 
schools, which means that features of those contexts are associated with differences in 
students’ overall mean scores.   
For every outcome, I investigate the relationships of school features with the 
average, overall student score, focusing on the role of instructional methods.  I also study 
  
174 
those relationships in countries with a significant variance across schools in the 
immigrant/native ‘gap.’  These are essentially cross-level interactions of school with 
student characteristics.  I begin by reviewing results for those outcomes whose 
‘immigrant gaps’ are constant across schools.  Note that all tables show just the results 
for schools’ relationships with the overall score and the immigrant/native gap.  Other 
individual-level characteristics are not shown, as they were discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
6.3.1 Civic Knowledge and Interpretive Skills 
Instructional methods.  Beginning with students’ civic knowledge and skills, I 
refer to Table 6-3.  There are no consistent patterns across countries, but in western and 
southern Europe the trend seems to be that highly open classrooms are related to higher 
civic knowledge and skills scores, compared to students in schools with little traditional 
instruction and little discussion, which is anything but an average kind of school (e.g., 
students in Belgian schools with any instruction that is highly discussion-based increase 
their scores about .13 or .14 of a standard deviation: γ = .127 and .136, p < .05; see Figure 
6-1).  Students in schools with a less open climate for discussion generally score lower 
than students in schools with highly open classrooms.  Scores increase from between .07 
and .17 of a standard deviation across these countries. 
Other school characteristics.  Ethnic heterogeneity is negatively related in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, and very weakly positively related in Norway, but has no 
significant relationship with average civic knowledge in any other country.  This means 
that students in high-immigrant Czech or Hungarian schools tend to be less 
knowledgeable than peers in low-immigrant schools, while students in high-immigrant 
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Norwegian schools tend to know somewhat more than peers in low-immigrant schools.  
Taking account of all student characteristics and all other school characteristics, higher 
average book ownership among students in a school is related to a significantly higher 
score in civic knowledge and skills in 12 of 13 countries (Denmark is the exception).  
Oppositely, as expected, a greater range of students’ number of books is related to a 
slight decrease in student scores in nine countries (including Denmark).   
Figure 6-1. The relationship of instructional methods to civic knowledge and interpretive skills in 
Belgium. 
 
Recall from Chapter 5 that these between-school models are meant to help explain 
the differences in overall outcomes that exist between schools.   The change in the 
between-school variance components indicates the extent to which these models explain 
differences between schools in civic knowledge and skills scores for European 
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adolescents.55  Table 6-9 provides an overview of these variance components and the 
percent variance explained by the between-school model for each country’s overall civic 
outcome.  Across countries these models explain between 30 and 69 percent of the 
differences that exist in students’ overall civic knowledge and skills between schools.56  
 
6.3.2 Extracurricular Participation 
As Table 6-4 suggests, the features of schools that I include in my study have very 
little to do with average participation in civic-oriented extracurricular activities.  In just 
three countries—Sweden, Greece, and Hungary—students in highly open classrooms that 
have a complementary emphasis on traditional instruction have significantly higher odds 
of participation than their peers in any other kind of classroom.  Of course, in these 
countries, average participation is already exceedingly high, anyway, so these 
differences, while significant, are not large.  Additionally, students in more ethnically 
heterogeneous schools tend to participate more in Belgium, Greece, and Slovakia 
(Belgian OR = 1.514, p < .10; Greek OR = 1.411, Slovak OR = 1.399, p < .05).  
With just these few findings, it is not surprising that these models explain a very 
low proportion of the variance that exists between schools in students’ rate of 
extracurricular participation.  They explain only 1.4 percent of between-school variance 
in Denmark, but as much as 32 percent in England (see Table 6-9).57   
                                                
55 If τWITHIN = between-school variance component of the overall mean in the within-school model and 
τBETWEEN = between-school variance component of the intercept in the between-school model, then: 
Proportion of between-school variance explained = (τWITHIN - τBETWEEN) / τWITHIN 
56 Allow for some rounding error, as the variance components HLM provides go to the hundred-
thousandths place (five decimal points) and I have listed only three, through the thousandths place. 
57 You will note that in several countries, the between-school variance component from the between-school 
model is larger than that from the within-school model and in these instances I have left the variance 
explained blank.  There are several possible causes of a negative value for explained variance: 1) The 
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6.3.3 Attitudes toward Women’s Rights and Opportunities 
Recall that with this ordinal outcome (Table 6-5), results can only be interpreted 
as they relate to the probability of students falling into a lower category versus a higher 
one.  There are few significant findings: between-school results for attitudes toward 
women’s rights suggest that instructional methods are highly salient in just four 
countries.  All else being equal, in Norway, Italy, and Portugal, students in schools that 
are characterized by highly discussion-based teaching tend to have lower odds of falling 
into a less supportive category than students in schools characterized by little discussion 
and little traditional instruction (see Figure 6-2 for Norway’s example; lower bars 
indicate greater support for women’s rights).  This means they are even more likely to 
have more tolerant attitudes than students in schools with little discussion.  Interestingly, 
the opposite is true for Swiss schools with those characteristics (OR = 1.512, p < .05). 
With such limited findings, these models generally explain only a small amount 
of the difference that exists between schools in students’ attitudes.  Variance explained 
ranges from just 2 percent in Italy to an astounding 57 percent in Norway. 
                                                                                                                                            
interaction terms included in the within-school model explain variance that is unaccounted for in the 
between-school model (since that model focuses on the main effect of immigrant status).  2) These models 
are complex and anomalies are more likely in complex models.  I have not included aggregates of all 
individual characteristics at the school level to conserve degrees of freedom, though this occasionally fixes 
problems of negative variance explained (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002, p. 152). 
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Figure 6-2. The relationship of instructional methods to adolescents' attitudes toward women's rights 
in Norway.   
 
6.3.4 Attitudes toward Immigrants’ Rights and Opportunities 
Recall from Chapter 5 that—on this and the next two outcomes—there are several 
countries in which the size of the gap between immigrant and native students 
significantly varies across schools.  In some of those instances, those gaps are not 
significant overall, but because I am interested in investigating the relationship of various 
instructional methods with students’ outcomes, I believe it is worthwhile to look at those 
individual relationships with the immigrant gap.   
Instructional methods.  In Table 6-6, we see that results for instructional 
methods are mixed.  In five countries, students in schools characterized by at least some 
highly discussion-based instruction are more tolerant of immigrants’ rights, though 
English and Swiss adolescents are less tolerant if they experience highly open classrooms 
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(for example, England high openness/low traditional γ = -.347, p < .05 [see Figure 6-3]; 
Switzerland high openness/low traditional γ = -.409, p < .001).   
 
Figure 6-3. The relationship of instructional methods to adolescents' attitudes toward immigrants' 
rights in England. 
 
Interestingly, in Hungary, instruction has little to do with average attitudes, but is 
highly salient for immigrant students: as shown in Figure 6-4, these students already have 
significantly more positive attitudes toward immigrants’ rights if they attend schools with 
little discussion and little traditional instruction, but their attitudes are substantially more 
positive if they attend a school with highly open classrooms (either high openness/low 
traditional γ = .699, p < .05 or high openness/high traditional γ = .494, p < .10). 
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Figure 6-4. The relationship of instructional methods to adolescents' attitudes toward immigrants' 
rights in Hungary. 
 
Other school characteristics.  Mostly in western and Nordic Europe we see 
instances of students in high-immigrant schools being significantly more supportive of 
immigrants’ rights than students in low-immigrant schools (as much as a third of a 
standard deviation more in Sweden; γ = .315, p < .01), lending support to Contact theory 
in those regions.  This tends not to be true of schools in southern and central Europe, 
however.  In five of six countries with a significant relationship between school average 
book ownership and attitudes toward immigrants’ rights, it is clear that in schools with 
higher average book ownership, average attitudes are less positive (e.g., Belgium γ = -
.173, p < .01).  In Greece and Italy circumstances are somewhat different for immigrant 
students: in those countries, attitudes toward immigrants’ rights increase significantly for 
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immigrants in schools with higher average book ownership (Greece γ = .289, p < .01). 
In Greece and Italy these models explain practically none of the variance between 
schools on overall attitudes toward immigrants’ rights (allowing for rounding error; see 
footnote 56).  But in other countries, these features of schools are clearly important in 
describing how adolescents experience the world.  In Norway and Portugal these models 
explain more than 45 percent of the between-school variance in the overall outcome (see 
Table 6-9).  The inclusion of these school variables helps to explain all of the variance 
between schools in the size of the Greek immigrant/native gap, but very little of the 
Italian gap.  This is an interesting finding in itself, that such considerations are highly 
meaningful in one country, but leave much to be explained in another. 
 
6.3.5 Attitudes toward Ethnic Minorities’ Rights and Opportunities 
Instructional methods.  The effects of school contexts on student attitudes 
toward ethnic minorities’ rights are not exactly the same as those on attitudes toward 
immigrants’ rights, an interesting finding in itself, since ethnic minority groups tend to 
include people with immigrant backgrounds (Table 6-7).  Findings are again inconsistent 
for instructional methods.  In six countries, a highly open, discussion-based classroom 
climate is related to more supportive attitudes (as in Belgium: γ = .304, p < .05 and γ = 
.232, p < .10).  In two others, such a climate for discussion is related to less support for 
ethnic minorities (as in Switzerland, shown in Figure 6-5: γ = -.391, p < .001 and γ = -
.374, p < .001). 
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Other school characteristics.  Whereas students in high-immigrant schools in 
western and Nordic Europe tend to be significantly more tolerant of rights for ethnic 
minorities, the opposite is true of such students in the Czech Republic.  In Belgium and 
Hungary, students attending schools with higher average book ownership are less 
supportive of ethnic minorities’ rights.  This is also true of immigrants in Italy, the only 
country where the difference between immigrants’ and natives’ attitudes toward ethnic 
minorities varies across schools.  There, immigrants’ support of rights for ethnic 
minorities is significantly weaker if they attend schools with little traditional instruction 
and little discussion, but that also have higher than average book ownership.   
Figure 6-5. The relationship of instructional methods to adolescents' attitudes toward ethnic 
minorities' rights in Switzerland. 
 
These models explain as much as a third of the variance that exists between 
schools in Swedish students’ attitudes toward ethnic minorities’ rights (38.9%), but 
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practically no between-school variance is explained in Denmark, Hungary, or Slovakia.  
As in attitudes toward immigrants’ rights, there is still much between-school variation to 
be explained in the gap between Italian immigrants’ and native students’ attitudes. 
 
6.3.6 Patriotism 
Instructional methods.  Instruction has no clear pattern of relationship with 
students’ patriotism.  In Belgium (least patriotic), Greece (most patriotic), and Portugal, a 
highly open climate for discussion accompanied by much traditional instruction appears 
to be significantly related to greater average patriotism.  Generally, immigrants in schools 
with little traditional instruction and little discussion have significantly more negative 
views of their host country.  However, a highly open climate with little traditional 
instruction also has a negative relationship with immigrants’ patriotism in Denmark (γ = -
Figure 6-6.  The relationship of instructional methods to adolescents' patriotism in Portugal. 
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.480, p < .10) and Italy (γ = -.789, p < .05).  For the sake of comparison, consider the 
relationship of instruction to patriotism in two quite different countries: Portugal (Figure 
6-6) and Denmark (Figure 6-7).  Whereas in Portugal there are no significant differences 
between immigrants’ and native students’ patriotism, regardless of the type of school 
students attend, it is clear that in Denmark, instruction is quite significant.   
Other school characteristics.  Taking account of all other characteristics, in 
more than half of these countries, students in schools with higher average book 
ownership tend to be less patriotic.  In Italy this is a particularly negative situation for 
immigrant students, who are already significantly less patriotic than their native peers.  
Immigrants’ attachment to the host country is almost two times weaker if they attend 
schools with peers who have higher than average access to books (γ = -.328, p < .01).   
Figure 6-7. The relationship of instructional methods to adolescents' patriotism in Denmark. 
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In England, Germany, Denmark, Italy, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, these 
models explain only a small amount of the between-school differences that exist in 
students’ overall levels of patriotism (less than 5 percent in each case), while in Belgium, 
Greece, and Slovakia, the models explain more than 20 percent and as high as 50 percent 
(see Table 6-9).  In countries where the difference between immigrants’ and native 
students’ patriotism varies between schools, these models explain either very little 
(Germany) or about half (England and Italy) of the between-school variance in that gap, 
which means there is still much variation to be explained with features of schools that are 
not included in my models (see Table 6-10). 
 
6.4 Discussion 
In studying the moderating effect of the educational environment on students’ 
civic outcomes, there are very few uniform findings.  However, having presented results 
for individual outcomes, here I streamline discussion of those outcomes according to the 
independent variables I considered in RQ 2.   
 
6.4.1 Instructional Methods 
Of greatest interest are the relationships of various instructional methods to these 
outcomes, as instruction can be easily affected by policy changes and professional 
development.  In western and southern European countries we see that a strong focus on 
discussion has a significant, positive relationship with students’ civic knowledge, while 
in western and Nordic Europe, the same focus tends to be related to greater support for 
ethnic minorities’ rights and opportunities.  Students in those classrooms are more 
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knowledgeable and more pro-minorities’ rights than students in classrooms with little 
discussion and little traditional instruction.  (To be sure, it is unclear what the latter type 
of classroom actually looks like, as its label connotes very few opportunities for students 
to learn anything at all.)  These methods tend to have the same effects for immigrants as 
for native students, which is another positive finding.  It is interesting that these findings 
do not hold across all regions; perhaps because western and southern countries’ levels of 
knowledge are comparably lower than Nordic and central countries’, open classrooms 
have the greatest opportunity to improve outcomes in those regions. 
However, in England and Switzerland, a strong emphasis on discussion is 
negatively related to overall attitudes toward immigrants.  While I don’t wish to 
overemphasize unexpected findings in just two countries, previous research does tend to 
show that more open classrooms engender more tolerant attitudes (Avery et al., 1992; 
Hahn, 1998; Torney-Purta & Wilkenfeld, 2009).  However, negative consequences of an 
open classroom are not unheard of, as Carole Hahn has pointed out.  In her review of 
literature on open classrooms, she presented several studies that found negative 
relationships with students’ trust and tolerance, suggesting that in environments where 
“frank expressions of negative feelings” are permitted, they reinforce each other, 
essentially breeding more negative attitudes (1991, p. 473).  As educational sociologist 
Valerie Lee put it, “There are ways to promote tolerance without letting a thousand 
flowers bloom, because some of them are poison ivy” (personal communication, June 27, 
2011).  While this is an important point, I believe there is somewhat more explanation 
required here and suggest two points for consideration. 
First, remember that these students are adolescents at the very beginning of 
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secondary school.  They are at an age where they are quite likely to take on the beliefs of 
their parents or peers as if they were their own, to repeat what they hear at home as their 
own opinions, without much concern for evidence or reason (Beck & Jennings, 1991).  
Second, and compounding the potential negative effects of the first point, productive 
discussions are actually quite difficult to lead (D. Hess & Gatti, 2010).  Given these two 
points, it is interesting that there are just two countries in which open classrooms are 
related to more negative attitudes.   
We know that in the late 1990s there were strong feelings about immigration in 
both England and Switzerland, just as there were in every other western European 
country.  Commonwealth immigrants to England had been arriving since the end of 
World War II and native-born English people and politicians had great difficulty over 
those decades accepting and dealing with their arrival and attempts to integrate.  At least 
since the 1960s, with Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, immigration has been a 
hot topic in the United Kingdom.  The Swiss experienced dramatic surges in immigrant 
numbers in the late 1990s, largely refugees from Kosovo, but also Iraqi Kurds and 
Congolese, who radically changed the perceived purpose of immigration to the country, 
as well as the demographic make-up of newcomers.  In each country there were difficult 
political debates about immigration questions, and it is feasible that these debates were 
the topic of conversations in the home and at school (Afonso, 2004; Thränhardt, 1995). 
From CIVED we actually have no information about how well teachers guide the 
discussions their students claim to engage in.  We cannot actually know whether teachers 
are able to structure the class environment for productive debates of the kind that support 
democracy.  What these results suggest is that in English and Swiss schools, there tends 
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not to be much structure in these discussions: everyone has an opinion, and overly 
nationalistic, negative ones about immigrants or ethnic minorities may be given just as 
much credibility as positive ones (in the interest of ‘respect’).  Of course, too, it is 
possible that the measure of instructional methods I have created is not very strong and 
thus my findings may be unreliable.   
 
6.4.2 Other School Characteristics 
Ethnic heterogeneity.  This measure—operationalized as high versus low 
proportions of immigrants in a school—has only a couple of significant relationships with 
civic outcomes, but they are compelling.  It is related to more positive attitudes toward 
immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ rights, a generally logical finding, except that this 
relationship is concentrated in western and Nordic Europe. With ethnic heterogeneity as a 
proxy for intercultural contact, Contact theory would suggest that in more heterogeneous 
schools, students have increased interactions with students from other cultures and 
ethnicities, which leads to greater understanding and tolerance of those groups (Pettigrew 
& Tropp, 2006).  Perhaps immigrants at this point in time were not yet seen societally as 
a threat to southern and central Europeans’ ways of life, and thus greater or lesser contact 
with immigrants was a negligible aspect of those students’ lives.  Future studies would do 
well to use data on students’ countries of origin (not generally available in CIVED), as 
those data indicate the cultures from which immigrant students come, which could help 
build some understanding of how diverse ethnic groups are within schools as well as 
whether these relationships differ across those groups.  
Average number of books in students’ homes.  We see that students overall—
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native and immigrant—tend to have significantly greater civic knowledge when they 
attend schools with higher average book ownership, but in several countries those same 
students are less tolerant of immigrants’ rights, including Belgium, England, Switzerland, 
Norway, Portugal, and the Czech Republic.  The first point confirms other CIVED-based 
studies’ findings and, if one considers the school average of books in students’ homes as 
a proxy for socioeconomic composition, it is not particularly surprising because higher 
SES schools typically have more resources and better teachers (Baldi et al., 2001).  One 
possible explanation is that, since adolescents in schools with higher average book 
ownership also have greater civic knowledge, they are also more conscious of how rights 
for minorities might have social and political ramifications for them, and therefore feel 
less supportive. 
In Greece and Italy, in schools with higher ‘book averages,’ too, there tends to be 
a wider gap between immigrants and native students in attitudes toward immigrants’ 
rights, such that immigrants in those schools are more supportive.  It seems likely that in 
those schools with higher average book ownership, immigrants may feel particularly 
different from their native peers (especially if they do not themselves have great access to 
books at home), or experience native peers’ rejection, and thus cling harder to their social 
group.  This turn toward the ethnic group might enhance their support for immigrants’ 
rights.  Why this is only true in two southern European countries is unclear, however.   
This set of between-school models has given insight into how school 
characteristics are related to students’ preparedness for citizenship and social democracy, 
though certainly school characteristics appear to have much less to do with immigrants’ 
sociopolitical integration than I had expected.  Just looking at effects’ significance across 
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countries in Tables 6-3 to 6-8, one can see clear differences between nations in these 
relationships.  In Chapter 7, the final analyses address these national differences in 
response to research question 3.  The addition of national characteristics to models for 
students’ civic outcomes will begin to help us understand what underlies international 
variation in overall outcomes and how features of the national environment might be 
related to immigrants’ outcomes. 
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Table 6-2. Descriptive information for schools. 
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N 105 122 158 151 173 150 133 142 171 149 148 144 145 
% High proportion 
of immigrants 
50.2 52.9 48.7 46.7 46.6 47.1 43.7 48.7 41.6 42.1 33.6 41.3 33.9 
75.2 53.3 88.6 82.8 65.9 51.3 58.6 48.6 31.0 45.0 16.9 29.2 17.9 
Average book 
ownershipa  
-0.02 
(0.97) 
-0.00 
(0.78) 
0.07 
(0.96) 
-0.06 
(0.87) 
0.30 
(0.61) 
0.61 
(0.59) 
0.29 
(0.85) 
-0.65 
(0.67) 
-0.81 
(0.88) 
-1.30 
(0.94) 
0.70 
(0.64) 
0.53 
(0.88) 
0.27 
(0.82) 
Range of book 
ownershipa  
0.57 
(1.03) 
0.39 
(0.90) 
0.07 
(1.00) 
0.02 
(0.94) 
0.52 
(0.95) 
0.03 
(0.81) 
0.11 
(0.95) 
0.19 
(0.86) 
0.20 
(0.76) 
-0.12 
(0.97) 
-0.85 
(0.82) 
-0.29 
(1.13) 
-0.50 
(0.83) 
Instructional Methods: % 
Low openness/ 
Low traditional 
36.2 38.1 25.0 23.1 27.2 33.1 30.0 29.1 27.7 26.8 26.8 24.8 18.4 
56.3 49.9 18.5 38.2 56.7 15.4 21.2 13.9 28.9 51.6 30.9 1.9 10.1 
Low openness/ 
High traditional 
15.0 17.5 21.3 29.2 22.7 20.3 25.6 21.9 22.8 22.0 18.5 23.3 28.8 
27.7 15.6 16.9 2.9 3.6 14.7 14.7 10.0 11.7 23.6 29.3 84.1 35.9 
High openness/ 
Low traditional 
17.1 17.7 26.1 27.2 22.0 21.2 21.3 18.2 25.2 18.3 21.6 18.2 29.5 
8.3 17.2 23.9 52.5 37.2 25.4 33.7 18.3 36.1 19.1 9.0 0.0 11.4 
High openness/ 
High traditional 
31.8 26.7 27.6 20.6 28.0 25.4 23.2 30.9 24.3 32.8 33.1 33.7 23.3 
7.6 17.3 40.7 6.5 2.4 44.5 30.4 57.8 23.4 5.8 30.8 14.0 42.6 
Notes: Numbers in bold are within-country descriptive data; regular text indicates cross-national descriptive data 
a Within countries, all means are 0 and standard deviations are 1, and thus descriptive information is not listed for these two variables.  Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 6-3. Civic knowledge and interpretive skills: Between-school results by region and country. 
 Western Europe Nordic Europe Southern Europe Central Europe 
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FIXED EFFECTS              
Mean knowledge/skills -.197*** -.081*** -.130*** -.124*** -.029* .061*** -.045* .109*** .051** -.192*** .160*** -.037* .104*** 
High Imm. %a -.028 .033 .023 -.050 .009 .060† -.054 -.034 -.046 -.016 -.102* -.048† .066 
School Avg. Books  .093*** .121*** .201*** .126*** .028 .076** .092*** .136*** .169*** .127*** .184*** .127*** .156*** 
School Book Range -.040† -.029 -.009 -.052** -.042* .002 -.038† -.021† -.055*** -.044* -.084*** -.051* -.019 
Low openness/ 
High traditionalb .031 -.031 .068 .029 .012 .010 .081† .025 .071 -.019 .009 -.010 .057 
High openness/ 
Low traditionalb .127* .037 .045 .077† .034 -.006 .016 .172*** .079† -.007 -.030 -.040 .054 
High openness/ 
High traditionalb .136* .002 .116* .076† .030 .106† .069 .004 .165** .084* .113 .035 .081 
Immigrant gapc  -.015 .058 -.056* -.042 -.021 -.102 -.076 -.087 -.232† -.278*** -.027 .039 .047 
              
RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN…            
Mean knldg/skills, τ00 .030*** .009*** .026*** .025*** .007** .009*** .022*** .016*** .023*** .009*** .031*** .016*** .038*** 
Level-1 error .125 .163 .125 .118 .231 .243 .205 .230 .142 .121 .165 .146 .131 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects.   
Reference groups: a Low percent immigrants  b Low openness & little traditional instruction  c Native   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001   
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Table 6-4. Extracurricular participation: Between-school results by region and country. 
 Western Europe Nordic Europe Southern Europe Central Europe 
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FIXED EFFECTS              
Mean odds of 
participation 3.072*** 4.967*** 1.328** 1.912*** 8.466*** 21.417*** 6.134*** 8.672*** .825** 2.742*** 2.018*** 2.808*** .445*** 
High Imm. %a 1.514† 1.132 1.107 .913 1.055 1.172 1.207 1.411* .882 .986 .934 1.105 1.399* 
School Avg. Books  1.061 1.018 .892 1.039 1.034 .927 1.173 .914 1.118† 1.015 1.060 .789† 1.037 
School Book Range .937 .757** 1.099 1.003 .994 1.086 1.248† .872* 1.080 .904 1.003 .923 .947 
Low openness/ 
High traditionalb 1.045 .916 1.201 .740 .767 .624* 1.146 1.276 1.233 .582* .830 1.212 1.072 
High openness/ 
Low traditionalb 1.635 1.213 1.251 .813 1.007 1.045 .934 1.160 1.142 .889 .817 1.007 1.173 
High openness/ 
High traditionalb 1.337 .949 .697 .837 .953 .800 1.817† 1.391† 1.354 .929 .857 1.473† .589† 
Immigrant gapc  1.173 1.377 1.186* 1.409 2.548† 1.124 1.170 .833 2.182† 1.933† .690 .794 1.228 
              
RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN…            
Mean participation, τ00 .404*** .068† .339*** .293*** .069 .003 .296*** .156** .255*** .232*** .155*** .227*** .441*** 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects.  All estimates are in the form of odds ratios.  All variables have been centered 
around their grand mean. 
Reference groups: a Low percent immigrants  b Low openness & little traditional instruction  c Native   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001   
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Table 6-5. Attitude toward women's rights: Between-school results by region and country. 
 Western Europe Nordic Europe Southern Europe Central Europe 
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FIXED EFFECTS              
Mean odds of less 
positive attitude .562*** .226*** .420*** .296*** .241*** .189*** .310*** .543*** .528*** .430*** .438*** .752*** .771*** 
High Imm. %a .853 1.034 .995 1.024 .991 .839 .956 1.015 1.022 1.070 1.174 .838 .936 
School Avg. Books  1.010 1.089 .968 .910 1.021 1.203† .848* .960 .877* 1.066 .942 .860 1.084 
School Book Range 1.009 1.006 .942 1.032 .981 1.043 1.015 .991 .978 1.073 .974 .776** 1.042 
Low openness/ 
High traditionalb .895 .908 .843 1.108 1.079 .819 1.050 1.222 1.019 .990 .635* .892 1.047 
High openness/ 
Low traditionalb .882 1.021 .713 1.281 .883 .662* 1.286 .794 .829† .852 .889 .812 1.164 
High openness/ 
High traditionalb .773 .862 .761 1.512* 1.022 .682* .911 .967 .924 .791† .947 1.048 .986 
Immigrant gapc  1.262 1.263 1.007 .982 .608† .806 1.339 .814 .702 2.175* 1.546* 1.714 1.682 
              
RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN…            
Mean attitude, τ00 .250*** .116*** .154*** .218*** .025 .041 .142*** .117*** .088** .074** .150*** .137*** .118*** 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects.  All estimates are in the form of odds ratios.  All variables have been centered 
around their grand mean. 
Reference groups: a Low percent immigrants  b Low openness & little traditional instruction  c Native   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001   
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Table 6-6. Attitude toward immigrants' rights: Between-school results by region and country. 
 Western Europe Nordic Europe Southern Europe Central Europe 
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FIXED EFFECTS              
Mean attitude .097* -.035 -.340*** -.228*** -.101** .233*** .641*** .317*** -.044* .201*** .065** -.218*** -.061* 
High Imm. %a .130 .217* .119 .136† .150* .182** .315** .004 .038 .073† -.019 .072 .026 
School Avg. Books  -.173** -.107* -.008 .072* .015 -.086* .004 -.014 -.031 -.060** -.051† .051 .010 
School Book Range -.101† -.014 -.034 .004 .033 -.024 .018 .003 .000 -.023 -.033 .098* -.005 
Low openness/ 
High traditionalb .196 -.202† -.025 .023 .014 .173* .220* -.069 .118† -.103* .115* .029 .074 
High openness/ 
Low traditionalb .210 -.347* .169 -.409*** .032 .136† .224† -.086 .042 .046 -.101 .013 -.018 
High openness/ 
High traditionalb .260* -.311* .070 -.335** .013 .048 .256* .003 .117† .138* .000 .006 .031 
Immigrant gapc  -.107 .080 .089 .343** .362* .528* .188† .216 .348 .009 -.194 .395* -.045 
High Imm. %a     .140   .030      
School Avg. Books      -.030   .289** .249*   -.160  
School Book Range     .059   -.148 -.175   .025  
Low openness/ 
High traditionalb     .085   -.439† .331   .319  
High openness/ 
Low traditionalb     .020   -.247 .341   .699*  
High openness/ 
High traditionalb     -.050   -.035 -.032   .494†  
              
RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN…            
Mean attitude, τ00 .070*** .145*** .117*** .093*** .097*** .019* .117*** .018*** .029*** .004 .013*** .026*** .043*** 
Immigrant gap, τ11     .414***   .090 .407***   .466***  
Level-1 error 1.008 .966 .818 .860 .810 1.091 .984 .794 .558 .589 .558 .558 .593 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects.  All variables have been centered around their grand mean, except where the 
immigrant gap has a random effect.  In that instance, immigrant status is centered around its group mean.   
Reference groups: a Low percent immigrants  b Low openness & little traditional instruction  c Native   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001   
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Table 6-7. Attitude toward ethnic minorities' rights: Between-school results by region and country. 
 Western Europe Nordic Europe Southern Europe Central Europe 
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FIXED EFFECTS              
Mean attitude .154** .307*** -.335*** -.198*** -.145*** .170*** .194*** .151*** -.053* .312*** .093*** -.234*** -.033 
High Imm. %a .041 .155* .216** .120† .075 .090* .108† -.052 .014 -.068 -.184** .044 .021 
School Avg. Books  -.127* .004 -.009 .125** .004 -.035 .026 -.032 .018 .003 .002 -.070* .028 
School Book Range -.064 -.015 -.002 .015 -.011 -.016 -.024 -.004 .004 -.028 -.051† .012 -.015 
Low openness/ 
High traditionalb .276† .012 -.007 .085 .036 .033 .078 -.027 .089 -.016 .161* .031 .101 
High openness/ 
Low traditionalb .304* -.086 .252* -.391*** .172* .129* -.001 -.017 .006 .002 -.209** -.011 .026 
High openness/ 
High traditionalb .232† .064 .160 -.374*** .091 .007 .187** .052 .148* .095 -.119 -.011 .085 
Immigrant gapc  -.056 -.354* .086 .481*** .668*** .132 -.022 -.132 .402* -.055 -.202 .141 -.151 
High Imm. %a              
School Avg. Books          .055     
School Book Range         -.286†     
Low openness/ 
High traditionalb         .058     
High openness/ 
Low traditionalb         .378     
High openness/ 
High traditionalb         -.028     
              
RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN…            
Mean attitude, τ00 .075*** .018** .097*** .101*** .041*** .012* .011 .010** .030*** .016** .024*** .030*** .039*** 
Immigrant gap, τ11         .385**     
Level-1 error 1.034 .864 1.026 .908 .871 .768 .834 .717 .653 .737 .667 .637 .714 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects.  All variables have been centered around their grand mean, except where the 
immigrant gap has a random effect.  In that instance, immigrant status is centered around its group mean.   
Reference groups: a Low percent immigrants  b Low openness & little traditional instruction  c Native   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001   
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Table 6-8. Patriotism: Between-school results by region and country. 
 Western Europe Nordic Europe Southern Europe Central Europe 
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FIXED EFFECTS              
Mean patriotism -.682*** -.205*** -.384*** -.280*** -.032 .040 -.405*** .812*** -.086*** .495*** .150*** .109*** .226*** 
High Imm. %a -.119† -.082 -.103 -.096 -.061 -.098† -.126† -.064 -.005 -.016 .041 .050 .025 
School Avg. Books .016 .004 -.086† -.114** -.012 .005 -.099* -.073† -.051† -.075* -.057 -.041 -.214*** 
School Book Range -.006 -.003 .002 -.071* -.053† -.015 .000 -.011 -.003 -.024 -.025 .018 .034 
Low openness/ 
High traditionalb .152 .056 .004 .080 -.043 -.109 -.028 -.090 .041 .111 .138* .159† -.110† 
High openness/ 
Low traditionalb .286** -.040 -.062 .123 .011 -.038 -.009 .066 .066 .085 .032 .104 -.051 
High openness/ 
High traditionalb .283** -.019 .017 .128 .060 -.161† .005 .146* .077 .186† .049 .082 -.077 
Immigrant gapc  -.115 -.384* -.147 -.209* -.216 -.204 -.225* -.550*** -.353† -.183 -.027 .054 -.278† 
High Imm. %a -.138 .195 -.021  -.309         
School Avg. Books  .020 -.416** .088  -.068    -.328**   .014  
School Book Range .080 .057 .019  -.002    .103   .248  
Low openness/ 
High traditionalb .388 .004 .391*  -.110    -.367   -.396  
High openness/ 
Low traditionalb .088 .586 .170  -.480†    -.789*   -.233  
High openness/ 
High traditionalb -.219 -.151 .105  .027    -.548   -.059  
              
RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN…            
Mean patriotism, τ00 .040*** .032*** .096*** .064*** .031** .029*** .065*** .024*** .027*** .038*** .023*** .024*** .044*** 
Immigrant gap, τ11 .255* .186* .129***  .577***    .275*   .281**  
Level-1 error .803 .789 .805 .842 .700 .766 1.017 .795 .642 .651 .605 .638 .761 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects.  All variables have been centered around their grand mean, except where the 
immigrant gap has a random effect.  In that instance, immigrant status is centered around its group mean.   
Reference groups: a Low percent immigrants  b Low openness & little traditional instruction  c Native   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001   
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Table 6-9. Between-school variance explained: Overall civic outcomes by country. 
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Civic knowledge/skills              
Within-school τ00 .048*** .026*** .063*** .052*** .010*** .016*** .035*** .036*** .061*** .029*** .096*** .041*** .067*** 
Between-school τ00  .030*** .009*** .026*** .025*** .007** .009*** .022*** .016*** .023*** .009*** .031*** .016*** .038*** 
% Variance explained  37.5 65.4 58.7 51.9 30.0 43.8 37.1 55.6 62.3 69.0 67.7 61.0 43.3 
Extracurricular 
participation              
Within-school τ00 .450*** .100* .381*** .285*** .070 .001 .309*** .184** .266*** .261*** .150*** .238*** .488*** 
Between-school τ00 .404*** .068† .339*** .293*** .069 .003 .296*** .156** .255*** .232*** .155*** .227*** .441*** 
% Variance explained  10.2 32.0 11.0 -- 1.4 -- 4.2 15.2 4.1 11.1 -- 4.6 9.6 
Women’s rights              
Within-school τ00 .218*** .105*** .152*** .229*** .009 .095** .156*** .120*** .090*** .070** .166*** .150*** .115*** 
Between-school τ00 .250*** .116*** .154*** .218*** .025 .041 .142*** .117*** .088** .074** .150*** .137*** .118*** 
% Variance explained  -- -- -- 4.8 -- 56.8 9.0 2.5 2.2 -- 9.6 8.7 -- 
Immigrants’ rights              
Within-school τ00 .093*** .171*** .121*** .133*** .095*** .036*** .145*** .018*** .030*** .008* .018*** .028** .042*** 
Between-school τ00 .070*** .145*** .117*** .093*** .097*** .019* .117*** .018*** .029*** .004 .013*** .026*** .043*** 
% Variance explained  24.7 15.2 3.3 30.1 -- 47.2 19.3 0.0 3.3 50.0 27.8 7.1 -- 
Ethnic minorities’ 
rights              
Within-school τ00 .087*** .023*** .108*** .153*** .042*** .015** .018* .011** .032*** .015** .040*** .030*** .040*** 
Between-school τ00 .075*** .018** .097*** .101*** .041*** .012* .011 .010** .030*** .016** .024*** .030*** .039*** 
% Variance explained  13.8 21.7 10.2 34.0 2.4 20.0 38.9 9.1 6.3 -- 40.0 0.0 2.5 
Patriotism              
Within-school τ00 .050*** .032*** .098*** .072*** .032** .034*** .064*** .033*** .027*** .044*** .025*** .024*** .089*** 
Between-school τ00  .040*** .032*** .096*** .064*** .031** .029*** .065*** .024*** .027*** .038*** .023*** .024*** .044*** 
% Variance explained  20.0 0.0 2.0 11.1 3.1 14.7 -- 27.3 0.0 13.6 8.0 0.0 50.6 
Note: Where % variance explained is marked --, this indicates that a negative value would otherwise be given.  In those cases, the predictors included in the model tend not to be significant 
and are adding very little valuable information to HLM’s analysis. 
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Table 6-10. Between-school variance explained: Differences between immigrants’ and native 
students’ civic outcomes by country. 
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Immigrants’ rights        
Within-school τ11    .375***  .129* .465*** .403*** 
Between-school τ11     .414*** .090 .407*** .466*** 
% Variance explained    -- 100.0 12.5 -- 
Ethnic minorities’ rights        
Within-school τ11      .419**  
Between-school τ11       .385**  
% Variance explained      8.1  
Patriotism        
Within-school τ11 .218* .376*** .129*** .549***  .540*** .263* 
Between-school τ11  .255* .186* .129*** .577***  .275* .281** 
% Variance explained -- 50.5 0.0 --  49.1 -- 
Note: Where % variance explained is marked --, this indicates that a negative value would otherwise 
be given.  In those cases, the predictors included in the model tend not to be significant and are 
adding very little valuable information to HLM’s analysis. 
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Chapter 7 
Results: Moderating Effects of National Contexts 
 
By this point, we know several things about adolescents’ civic outcomes in 
Europe.  We know from Chapters 5 and 6 that European adolescents’ overall levels of 
civic knowledge, participation, and pro-democratic attitudes tend to differ between 
schools within countries, but also across countries.  Also, immigrant students’ cultural 
values and knowledge of civics differ from native students’ in some ways, though rarely 
in every country.  This chapter represents a step further, a higher-level approach to 
understanding adolescents’ civic attitudes in Europe that takes account of national 
characteristics.  In response to research question 3, I ask to what extent system of 
controlling school curriculum, national affluence, and economic inequality moderate 
overall civic outcomes and immigrant/native disparities.  Findings on the system of 
curricular control are likely to be the most compelling for educational policymakers, as a 
nation’s relative wealth and its distribution across social classes are far more challenging 
political and cultural issues.  In this chapter I describe my hypotheses related to each of 
these national characteristics, discuss the national data, present results for each outcome’s 
between-country model, and summarize these findings’ patterns. 
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7.1 Hypotheses 
7.1.1 National Affluence 
It is likely that the relationships of national affluence and economic inequality 
with overall outcomes and the immigrant gap are not uniform across outcomes.  In 
Bryony Hoskins and colleagues’ recent study using CIVED, they find that adolescents in 
poorer European countries—which also happen to be the youngest democracies—have 
stronger inclinations toward civic participation than adolescents in wealthier, more 
established democracies (2011).  However, Nicole Schneeweis (2009) found that national 
affluence was negatively related to academic achievement, which for immigrants might 
also lead to disengagement from school, a turn toward co-ethnics, and then possibly less 
inclusive attitudes toward other groups, including women.   
 
7.1.2 Income Inequality 
Regarding income inequality, there are two possible hypotheses.  The first is 
based on Schneeweis’s finding that higher degrees of income inequality in a country are 
associated with lower levels of immigrants’ academic achievement and Lane 
Kenworthy’s (2004) hypothesis that people in more equitable countries feel greater social 
solidarity.  It is possible that income inequality—in which immigrants are typically at the 
losing end and because of which schools are typically not the same across communities—
exacerbates an already negative relationship between immigrant status and civic 
knowledge and patriotism.  It may also widen the gap between immigrants and native 
students’ attitudes toward ethnic minorities and immigrants, essentially associated with 
less inclusive attitudes on native students’ part.   
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However, I find an alternative hypothesis more compelling, based on Ruud 
Koopmans’ (2010) findings related to welfare states and immigrants’ social integration.  
He notes that in countries with greater income inequality and a less generous welfare 
state, immigrants rely heavily on income from employment, and thus have many 
incentives to improve their language proficiency and job skills, which in turn help to 
integrate them into the rest of society.  I would argue that parents’ experiences with 
integration in this case ‘trickle down’ to their adolescent children.  Essentially I predict a 
positive relationship (philosophically, not statistically) of income inequality with 
immigrant/native disparities in civic outcomes even for adolescents still in school.  
 
7.1.3 National Curriculum 
Finally, from the work of Janmaat and Mons (2011) using CIVED data, we know 
that ethnic minorities’ level of patriotism is closer to that of ethnic majority students in 
countries with more centralized curricular control (recall that they define ethnic minority 
students as those who speak a non-school language at home sometimes or always).  
Conversely, their study shows that in these same countries, majority students’ beliefs in 
immigrants’ rights are more similar to those of ethnic minority students (which are quite 
supportive).  I hypothesize that these findings will be borne out similarly in my study, 
and extended to other self-expression values.   
 
7.2 Descriptive Information on Countries 
Table 7-1 gives information on national affluence (Gross National Income—
GNI—per capita), income inequality (Gini coefficient), and the model of curriculum 
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control for each country in the study.  Here we see that affluence does not perfectly 
correlate with equality.  Western and Nordic Europe are wealthier than southern Europe, 
but southern European countries are far more unequal than nearly all their northern 
neighbors, topped only by England, the only English-speaking country in the sample 
(English-speaking countries tend to have very high levels of income inequality; Förster & 
Mira d'Ercole, 2005, p. 10).58  Furthermore, note that central Europe, which contains the 
most recent democracies, is poorer than southern European countries, but more equal 
economically.   
Table 7-1. National affluence (GNI per capita), income inequality (Gini coefficient), and system for 
controlling curriculum in selected European countries, by region and country. 
 
Region Country 
GNI per 
capita, 1999a 
Gini coefficient, 
“around” year 2000b 
Curricular 
Controlc 
Western 
Belgium 25,820 .29 Federal 
England 24,140 .37 School Autonomy 
Germany 24,870 .27 Federal 
Switzerland 32,080 .28 Federal 
Nordic 
Denmark 26,710 .23 Collaboration 
Norway 29,560 .26 Centralized 
Sweden 25,740 .24 School Autonomy 
Southern 
Greece 17,160 .34 Centralized 
Italy 24,090 .34 Centralized 
Portugal 16,530 .36 Centralized 
Central 
Czech Republic 13,970 .26 Decentralized 
Hungary 10,370 .29 School Autonomy 
Slovakia 10,250  .27d Decentralized 
a In current international dollars.  GNI data from the World Bank’s International Comparison Program 
database: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD?page=2 
b Gini coefficient data from the OECD: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=26067 
c Curricular control information from Janmaat & Mons (2011). 
d Slovakia became a member of OECD in late 2000, and thus did not provide data to OECD prior; this data 
point comes from the mid-2000s. 
 
Recall that categories describing curricular control derive from Nathalie Mons’ 
study and are described in greater detail in section 2.3.  By virtue of political structure, 
                                                
58 I am able to differentiate countries within the UK on the curricular control variable, so this measure does 
represent England alone. 
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three of the four western European countries have a federal model in place for controlling 
curriculum, meaning regional entities, rather than the central government, have control.  
The southern countries are characterized by strong central control of curriculum, while 
the post-Soviet societies tend to be more decentralized (recall that in a school autonomy 
model schools have some freedom in content and methods, but the national government 
creates the guidelines and high-stakes assessments that measure student learning).   
 
7.3 Research Question 3: Between-Country Model Results 
Between-school models in Chapter 6 suggest that there are differences between 
countries in students’ overall civic outcomes and in the size of the immigrant/native gap 
in several outcomes.  Including national characteristics in my models may help to explain 
that between-country variation.  I began between-country models by assuming that there 
were significant differences between countries in both overall outcomes and the 
immigrant/native gap.  When HLM showed that those differences were non-significant, I 
adjusted the models accordingly.   
Additionally, in combining these countries’ data, I chose to model each outcome’s 
overall level and immigrant/native gap with cross-level interactions with school 
characteristics.  By combining countries’ data, I increased the variance in each outcome, 
which made interactions of school-level variables with the immigrant gap more likely to 
be statistically significant.  Recall, too, from chapter 4 that before running these three-
level analyses, I ran ‘unconditional’ models that included just immigrant status at each 
level and no other modifying variables to determine whether there was significant 
between-school and between-country variance in the immigrant/native gap at each of 
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those levels.  If there was not, I did not include modifying variables on the immigrant gap 
at those levels.  Otherwise, modifying variables were included and, in some cases (as I 
will show), explained all the variance in that gap away! 
I model economic factors separately from curriculum factors to conserve power in 
the analyses.  With only thirteen countries providing information, degrees of freedom are 
very low to begin with (df =12) and each individual measure included in the model takes 
up another degree.  Note, too, that school and individual characteristics are included in all 
of these models to show what the aggregate, Europe-wide findings look like for the 
‘average European adolescent.’  Estimates at the individual and school levels likely have 
little meaning, but it is useful to control for those characteristics since we have already 
looked at their unique relationships with civic outcomes by individual countries.  
 
7.3.1 Civic Knowledge and Interpretive Skills 
National economic indicators.  Column 2 of Table 7-2 gives results for the 
effects of national affluence (GNI) and income inequality (Gini coefficient).  National 
affluence has no relationship with adolescents’ overall civic knowledge and skills, or 
with the difference between immigrants’ and natives’ scores.  Income inequality appears 
to be related to a very slightly higher score in civic knowledge overall (γ = .015, p < .10).  
With just one significant predictor, this national-level model does not explain much 
between-country variance in students’ overall outcomes (in fact, as you see in Table 7-6, 
which gives information on how much between-country variance is explained by these 
models, the variance explained would be negative because these predictors add nothing 
but ‘noise’ to HLM’s ability to estimate effects).  However, despite these predictors being 
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unrelated to the immigrant/native gap in civic knowledge, they help to explain nearly half 
of the between-country differences in that gap.59 
System for curricular control.  Here is our first look at the second main topic of 
this study, and the results are intriguing.  The national system for controlling curriculum 
has a large and significant relationship with students’ overall civic knowledge (see Table 
7-4).  Recall that federal, school autonomy, and decentralized systems are quite different 
from collaboration and centralized systems, in that the latter give either zero or very little 
control to schools, communities, or geographic regions.  Curriculum in collaboration and 
centralized systems is highly driven by a central authority.  Since all the estimates for less 
centralized systems are negative and significant, these results suggest that all students—
native and immigrant—in those more centralized systems are more knowledgeable and 
skilled in civics than their peers in any system that is less centrally controlled.  Students 
in less centrally controlled systems know anywhere from 13 to 25 percent of a standard 
deviation less than peers in countries with collaboration or centralized systems (federal γ 
= -.250, p < .001; school autonomy γ = -.252, p < .01; decentralized γ = -.133, p < .10).   
System of curriculum control has a significant, but opposite relationship with the 
gap between immigrants’ and native students’ civic knowledge and skills.  These effects 
must be considered in light of the effects on overall outcomes, of course, which means 
immigrants in less centralized systems are already at a disadvantage, but the model shows 
that this disadvantage is not compounded for immigrants in less centralized systems.  
Surprisingly, immigrant students in decentralized systems score the highest compared to 
                                                
59 τB-S = between-country variance component of the overall mean in the between-school model, and τB-C = 
between-country variance component of the overall mean in the between-country model: 
Proportion of between-school variance explained = (τB-S - τB-C) / τB-S 
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immigrants in collaboration or centralized systems (γ = .182, p < .001).  See Figure 7-1 
for an illustration of how immigrants and native students compare to one another and 
across systems of curricular control. 
As shown in Table 7-6, this model explains just over half of the variance between 
countries in students’ average civic knowledge and skills, and in fact removes all the 
variation between countries in the gap between immigrants and native students.   
 
7.3.2 Extracurricular Participation 
National economic indicators.  Note first in Table 7-2 that immigrants appear to 
be—internationally—over 50 percent more likely to participate in civic-oriented 
extracurricular activities than native students (OR = 1.513, p < .01).  National affluence 
has no relationship with either overall levels of participation or with the difference in 
immigrants’ and natives’ participation, but income inequality does appear to be weakly 
related to a greater likelihood of immigrant participation (OR = 1.043, p < .10).  With so 
few relationships between these indicators and extracurricular participation, this model 
explains practically none of the between-country variance in overall participation, but 
quite a lot of the country differences in the immigrant/native gap (78.5%). 
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Figure 7-1. Differences in immigrants' and native students' civic knowledge and skills by system of 
curricular control. 
 
System for curricular control.  Table 7-4 shows that whether curriculum is 
centrally, regionally, or locally controlled has no relationship with students’ overall levels 
of participation, but immigrants overall are significantly more likely to participate.  
Interestingly, the effect of immigrant status is less strong in federal and decentralized 
systems, compared to centralized systems.  Participation rates of immigrants in countries 
with federal or decentralized systems are more similar to their native peers’ rates than in 
centralized systems (federal OR = .662, p < .05; decentralized OR = .380, p < .01).  
However, in federal countries, immigrants are still more likely to participate, while in 
decentralized countries, immigrants are less likely to participate (see Figure 7-2).  These 
variables explain just a third of the between-country variance in overall participation (so 
they are more useful to the model than economic indicators), but explain all of the 
country differences in the immigrant/native gap in participation. 
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Figure 7-2. The relationship of system of curricular control with differences in immigrants' and 
native students' extracurricular participation. 
 
7.3.3 Attitudes toward Women’s Rights and Opportunities 
Preliminary models showed that there are no significant between-school or 
between-country differences in the immigrant/native gap on this outcome, so I did not 
model school or country characteristics on that gap.  Essentially, this means that I look at 
how school and country characteristics are related to all students’ overall attitudes toward 
women’s rights. 
National economic indicators.  In Table 7-2, we see that for every thousand-
dollar increase in Gross National Income per capita, the odds of students falling into a 
lower (less tolerant) category decrease on the measure of attitudes toward women’s rights 
(odds ratio = 0.946, p < .01).  That is, in wealthier countries, students are somewhat more 
likely to be supportive of women’s rights.  Income inequality has no relationship with 
students’ attitudes on this measure.  These economic indicators explain just 26 percent of 
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the between-country variance in students’ overall attitudes toward women’s rights and 
opportunities.   
System for curricular control.  As seen in Table 7-4, a country’s system for 
controlling curriculum is unrelated to students’ overall attitudes toward women’s rights. 
(This model results in a negative value for explained variance.) 
 
7.3.4 Attitudes toward Immigrants’ Rights and Opportunities 
National economic indicators.  Table 7-3 shows that there are no relationships of 
national economic indicators with students’ attitudes toward immigrants’ rights.  
System for curricular control.  We see in Table 7-5 that the national system for 
controlling curriculum is not uniformly related to students’ average tolerance of rights for 
immigrants.  In federal systems, though, students’ overall attitudes toward immigrants’ 
rights are lower by more than a third of a standard deviation (γ = -.367, p < .01), 
compared to students in collaboration or centralized systems.  Immigrants are generally 
more supportive than natives of immigrants’ rights, but in countries with decentralized 
systems, they are nearly half a standard deviation less supportive than their immigrant 
peers in other countries (γ = -.461, p < .05).  Altogether, this model’s national-level 
indicators help to explain 56.8 percent of the between-country variance in students’ 
overall attitudes toward immigrants’ rights and 56.3 percent of that variance in the gap 
between immigrants’ and natives’ attitudes.   
 
7.3.5 Attitudes toward Ethnic Minorities’ Rights and Opportunities 
National economic indicators.  According to Table 7-3, greater income 
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inequality in a country relates to a somewhat higher level of tolerance of ethnic 
minorities’ rights among students overall (γ = .039, p < .01).  Both economic indicators 
have a significant relationship with the gap between immigrants’ and natives’ support for 
ethnic minorities’ rights.  While every thousand dollar increase in GNI per capita 
increases the effect of immigrant status by .016 standard deviations (p < .10), every one 
hundredth of a point increase in the Gini coefficient (remember that it is a proportion 
with values falling between 0 and 1) changes the effect of immigrant status by -0.026 (p 
< .10).  These are weak but significant effects.   
You can see in Figure 7-3 what the effect of income inequality actually looks like: 
in countries with about average inequality (for this sample, .29; in this graph, .77), 
immigrants and native students have equivalent attitudes toward ethnic minorities’ rights 
(γ = .015, n.s.), but the change in attitudes is much different for immigrants and natives 
along the inequality spectrum.  In countries with greater equality (to the left of center), 
immigrants are significantly more supportive than native students, but in countries with 
greater inequality (to the right of center), their support is greater than their international 
immigrant peers’, but below that of their in-country native peers.   
With economic indicators in the model, about 41 percent of the between-country 
variance is explained in students’ average attitudes toward ethnic minorities’ rights, while 
about 57 percent of the between-country variance is explained in the gap between 
immigrants and native students. 
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Figure 7-3. The relationship of national income inequality to differences in immigrants' and native 
students' attitudes toward ethnic minorities' rights. 
 
System for curricular control.  In Table 7-5, similar to findings on attitudes 
toward immigrants’ rights, we learn that adolescents in countries with federal systems are 
significantly less positive about rights for ethnic minorities than adolescents in countries 
with centralized systems.  This effect is similarly large, as well (γ = -.318, p < .05).  
Students in Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland are overall nearly a third of a standard 
deviation less supportive of rights for ethnic minorities than their peers in countries with 
collaboration or centralized systems (Denmark, Norway, southern Europe).  The 
inclusion of these indicators explains about half of the between-country variance in 
students’ overall attitudes toward ethnic minorities’ rights (50.4%).   
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Figure 7-4. The relationship of system of curricular control to differences in immigrants' and native 
students' attitudes toward ethnic minorities' rights. 
 
Furthermore, we see illustrated in Figure 7-4 that there is a significant change in 
the effect of being an immigrant in countries with school autonomy (England, Sweden, 
Hungary) and decentralized systems (Czech Republic and Slovakia).  In those nations, 
immigrants are significantly different from their native peers and, oddly, less supportive 
of ethnic minorities’ rights (school autonomy γ = -.253, decentralized γ = -.342; , p < 
.10).  The inclusion of these indicators explains about 71 percent of the variance that 
exists between countries in the ‘immigrant gap’ on attitudes toward ethnic minorities’ 
rights and opportunities.  
 
7.3.6 Patriotism 
National economic indicators.  We see in Table 7-3 that national affluence has a 
significant negative relationship with students’ overall patriotism, meaning that 
  
214 
adolescents in wealthier countries are less patriotic.  Income inequality, though, is only 
related to the gap between immigrants’ and native students’ patriotism.  A one-hundredth 
of a point increase in the Gini coefficient is related to a gap that is wider by one 
hundredth of a standard deviation (γ = -.016, p < .10): immigrant students are already 
significantly less patriotic than native students in countries with average inequality (in 
this sample, Gini = .29), but in less equal countries are even less patriotic.  These 
variables together explain just over half (56.1%) of the variance between countries in 
students’ overall patriotism, and just over a third (34.3%) of that variance in the 
immigrant/native patriotism gap. 
System for curricular control.  In Table 7-5 we see that students in countries 
with federal systems of curriculum control are much less patriotic than students in more 
centralized systems (γ = -.524, p < .01).  However, while immigrants in centralized 
systems are significantly less patriotic than their native peers (γ = -.273, p < .001), the 
patriotism ‘gap’ between immigrants and native students is much smaller in federal and 
decentralized systems.  See Figure 7-5 for an illustration of this: the distance between the 
highest point on native students’ bar and the lowest point on immigrant students’ bar in 
this graph of the collaboration/centralized systems represents the patriotism ‘gap’ in those 
countries (Denmark, Norway, southern Europe).  But the distance between the lowest 
points on natives’ and immigrants’ bars in the federal systems is smaller, representing a 
smaller gap in patriotism between native and immigrant students.  Essentially this means 
that, all else being equal, in Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Czech Republic, and 
Slovakia, immigrants’ patriotism is much more similar to their native peers’ patriotism 
than in other countries (federal γ = .251, p < .001; decentralized γ = .237, p <.10).  These 
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systems ‘close the gap’ in patriotism somewhat.   
With this model I have explained about two thirds (65.9%) of the variation 
between countries in students’ overall patriotism, and all of that variation in the 
difference between immigrants and native students.  
 
Figure 7-5. The relationship of system of curricular control to differences between immigrants' and 
native students' patriotism. 
 
7.4  Discussion 
As I did in Chapter 6, here I synthesize results by focusing on independent 
variables and their patterns of effects.   
 
7.4.1 National Affluence & Income Inequality 
These models statistically confirmed comparative results from Chapter 6, that in 
wealthier countries (western and Nordic Europe) students tend to be less patriotic.  In 
addition, those same students tend to be more supportive of women’s rights overall, and 
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indeed immigrants in those regions are more similar to their native peers in those views.    
Economic inequality is another story, though.  It is related—weakly, but 
significantly—to higher scores on civic knowledge for all students, regardless of 
immigrant status, which contradicts Schneeweis’s findings that immigrants in highly 
unequal societies underachieve academically (2009).  It is interesting that there is such a 
dramatic change in native adolescents’ support for ethnic minorities’ rights as one looks 
from northern European welfare states (most equal) to southern Europe and England 
(least equal), but the change for immigrants is less dramatic.  Moreover, it is notable that 
attitudes toward ethnic minorities are not very positive in welfare states.  Keeping in 
mind which nations these are (Denmark, Norway, Sweden) is helpful, since in the 1990s 
they were strongly concerned with the recent influx of refugees from Africa and the 
Middle East, whose presence increased the range of cultural diversity of the host 
societies.  Interestingly, these are also the countries in my sample where multiculturalism 
(tolerance of and support for all cultures) as a model of integration was most favored by 
political officials, yet this ethos seems not to have ‘trickled down’ to adolescents. 
Finally, in more unequal countries, immigrant students are significantly less 
patriotic than their peers elsewhere.  This could be precisely because of the inequality 
they see in those countries, which they may not see as matching the democratic ideal.  
Indeed they may already have seen inequality at work in their parents’ lives, 
disenfranchising those already in the weakest social position.  
There do not appear to be other major ‘perks’ of income inequality, but the 
finding on ethnic minorities’ rights partially supports Koopmans’ belief that immigrants 
are better integrated into unequal societies (fewer social benefits) because they are forced 
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to participate in the labor market and interact with nationals to develop their employment 
skills: perhaps in these countries there is some sort of ‘trickle-down’ effect for children—
native or immigrant—whose parents interact with one another.  Particularly for native 
students, it seems that ethnic minorities were not viewed as much of a threat in more 
unequal countries, a positive finding.  In the contemporary political climate in Europe, it 
might be feasible to consider restricting social benefits in traditional ‘welfare states’ to 
encourage immigrants to participate more in the labor market and thus enhance inter-
ethnic feelings of acceptance. 
 
7.4.2 System of Curricular Control 
When it comes to control of curriculum, there are common relationships with 
students’ civic knowledge and values.  Overall, students in less centralized systems are 
less knowledgeable about civics and less patriotic, which supports Janmaat and Mons’ 
(2011) findings, but those students also tend to be less supportive of immigrants’ and 
ethnic minorities’ rights, which is different from their findings (they found no 
relationship between curricular control and overall attitudes toward immigrants’ rights).   
There are mixed results for relationships with disparities between immigrants and 
native students.  In some less centralized systems (i.e., those that are labeled ‘federal,’ 
‘school autonomy,’ or ‘decentralized’ in Table 7-1), where educational policy is less 
dependent on national-level decisions, there are smaller disparities in civic knowledge 
and patriotism, but greater disparities in attitudes toward ethnic minorities’ rights 
(immigrants are less supportive).  They are not uniform relationships, but the findings 
extend and at least partially support Janmaat and Mons’ work.  Those researchers posit 
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the following as a reason for such findings: 
Federal systems are likely to produce greater disparities, particularly across 
regions, than unitary systems, because sub-state authorities have much more 
autonomy regarding curriculum matters in the former.  This sub-state autonomy is 
likely to yield a great variety of curriculum guidelines, subject matter, learning 
materials, and teaching practices across schools within the country, which may 
produce large values disparities in general.  To the extent that the residential 
patterns of social, ethnic, and religious groups coincide with territorial 
administrative units, a federal structure may well yield larger disparities across 
social, ethnic, and religious groups. (2011, p. 59) 
However, the smaller patriotism gap between immigrants and natives in federal 
and decentralized systems contradicts Janmaat and Mons’ findings.  Though they suggest 
that the “kind of patriotism promoted in nonfederal countries is not ethnocentric and 
exclusionary,” my findings suggest that this is not universally true (2011, p. 77).  There 
are several reasons for the contradictions between my work and that of Janmaat and 
Mons.  First, they focused on differences between ‘ethnic minorities’—defined as those 
who never or only sometimes speak the language of the school at home—and the ethnic 
‘majority’ that speaks the school language at home always.  Since my study is of 
immigrants, I have defined my two groups as either having been born in the country or 
outside of it.  A quick review of the descriptive data shows that their definition of ethnic 
minority is not synonymous with my definition of immigrant in the CIVED data—there 
are percentages of the immigrant population that always speak the school language at 
home and there are percentages of the native population that don’t always speak the 
school language at home.  Second, they use all students in each of 20 countries that 
extend beyond Europe (including Australia, the US, and Chile), rather than just students 
in 13 European countries.  Thus they have somewhat greater power at the national level 
and greater diversity of information in their study. 
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7.4.3 School- and Individual-Level Effects 
Just a cursory glance at Tables 7-2 through 7-5 shows that many school features 
and individual characteristics are highly significant in combined international models.  
These between-country models are useful for taking a high-level view of national 
characteristics’ relationships with civic outcomes, but the analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 
provided nuanced information about how different features of schools and individuals are 
associated with knowledge, values, and behavior that this chapter’s analyses could not 
possibly provide.   
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 With this chapter I have extended the analyses from Chapters 5 and 6 to 
statistically confirm and explain differences between countries on all civic outcomes.  I 
have shown that the wealth and income inequality of a country are significantly related to 
adolescents’ civic knowledge, patriotism, and attitudes toward ethnic minorities.  More 
interesting for policymakers are the findings on systems of curricular control.  There is, to 
some extent, a ‘winner’ among these models: a more centralized system is consistently 
associated with higher civic knowledge, extracurricular participation, patriotism, and 
stronger self-expression values.  There are clearly trade-offs in each of these systems for 
officials concerned with immigrants’ sociopolitical integration, though, since even 
federal systems appear to have smaller disparities between immigrants and native 
students on patriotism.  Of course, all of these models have limited scope: there are still 
unexplained differences between countries in overall levels and in immigrant/native 
disparities on attitudes toward immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ rights.  Nevertheless, 
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these findings are intriguing and important. 
In the final chapter, I link these findings closer to the within- and between-school 
results to tell a more complete story of how young Europeans’ cultural values and 
preparedness for citizenship shake out across countries and how first-generation 
immigrants compare.  
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Table 7-2. Civic knowledge and interpretive skills, extracurricular participation, and attitude toward 
women’s rights: Between-country results for economic indicators. 
 Civic Knowledge  & Skills 
Extracurricular 
Participation Women’s Rights
 
FIXED EFFECTS    
Mean outcome -.050 2.167** .410*** 
COUNTRY MEASURES    
NAT’L AFFLUENCE (GNI) -.002 1.006 .946** 
INCOME INEQUALITY (GINI) .015† 1.043 .975 
School characteristics    
High Immigrant %a -.020† 1.118* 1.036 
School Avg. Books  .173*** .994 .959* 
School Book Range -.039*** 1.018 .935*** 
Low openness/High traditionalb .067*** 1.007 .853** 
High openness/Low traditionalb .054*** 1.139* .841*** 
High openness/High traditionalb .102*** .883* .811*** 
Immigrant gapc -.052* 1.451* 1.033 
COUNTRY MEASURES    
NAT’L AFFLUENCE (GNI) -.004 1.014  
INCOME INEQUALITY (GINI) -.006 1.043†  
School characteristics    
High Immigrant %a .014 .638†  
School Avg. Books  -.011 .943  
School Book Range -.017† .948  
Low openness/High traditionalb -.038 1.095  
High openness/Low traditionalb -.056** .838  
High openness/High traditionalb -.053* .712*  
Femaled   -.069*** 1.460*** .217*** 
Under-agee -.038 2.815*** .963 
Over-agee -.062*** .881* 1.032 
Books: Fewf -.093*** .764*** 1.117*** 
Books: Manyf .098*** 1.470*** .965 
Time in country -.008*** 1.053*** .992 
Language: Neverg -.156*** .923 1.423** 
Language: Sometimesg -.112*** 1.074 1.071 
Open climate .064*** 1.084*** .792*** 
Civic knowledge & skills  1.356*** .319*** 
Extracurricular participationh .041***  .885*** 
    
RANDOM EFFECTS    
Country mean outcome, τ000 .012*** .596*** .077*** 
Country immigrant gap, τ111 .002** .023*  
School mean outcome, τ00 .023*** .322*** .138*** 
School immigrant gap, τ11 -- 1.016**  
Level-1 error .152   
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects.  
Immigrant status is group-centered in the extracurricular participation model.  All other variables are centered 
around their grand mean.  Estimates for extracurricular participation and attitude toward women’s rights are in 
the form of odds ratios.  -- indicates that all variance has been explained by the included variables at that level. 
Reference groups: a Low immigrant proportion  b Low openness & little traditional instruction   
c Native  d Male  e Target age (13-15 years)  f Average # of books  g School language at home always   
h No extracurricular participation   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001 
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Table 7-3. Attitudes toward immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ rights, and patriotism: Between-
country results for economic indicators. 
 Immigrants’ rights Minorities’ rights Patriotism 
FIXED EFFECTS    
Mean outcome -.080 -.065 -.086 
COUNTRY MEASURES    
NAT’L AFFLUENCE (GNI) -.012 -.006 -.032** 
INCOME INEQUALITY (GINI) .015 .039** .013 
School characteristics    
High Immigrant %a .090*** .073*** -.060** 
School Avg. Books  -.016 .009 -.093 
School Book Range -.004 -.001 -.012 
Low openness/High traditionalb -.051† -.011 .041 
High openness/Low traditionalb -.059* -.039 .032 
High openness/High traditionalb -.072** .002 .064** 
Immigrant gapc .128† .015 -.232** 
COUNTRY MEASURES    
NAT’L AFFLUENCE (GNI) .013 .016† .007 
INCOME INEQUALITY (GINI) -.012 -.026† -.016† 
School characteristics    
High Immigrant %a -.058 -.093 .020 
School Avg. Books  -.004 -.016 -.047† 
School Book Range .027 .038 .013 
Low openness/High traditionalb .030 -.060 .117 
High openness/Low traditionalb .121† .052 -.130* 
High openness/High traditionalb .077 -.023 .094 
Femaled  .259*** .301*** -.223*** 
Under-agee -.175† -.176† -.071 
Over-agee .041 .014 -.016 
Books: Fewf -.005 -.008 .007 
Books: Manyf .005 .035** -.055*** 
Time in country -.028*** -.032*** -.002 
Language: Neverg .258*** .192*** -.385*** 
Language: Sometimesg .388*** .247*** -.242*** 
Open climate .139*** .162*** .096*** 
Civic knowledge & skills .286*** .364*** -.116*** 
Extracurricular participationh -.008 .028* .049*** 
    
RANDOM EFFECTS    
Country mean outcome, τ000 .042*** .030*** .046*** 
Country immigrant gap, τ111 .016*** .023*** .006* 
School mean outcome, τ00 .095*** .075*** .061*** 
School immigrant gap, τ10 .159*** .136*** .237*** 
Level-1 error .765 .832 .761 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random 
effects.  Immigrant status is centered around its group mean.  All other variables are centered around 
their grand mean.   
Reference groups: a Low immigrant proportion  b Low openness & little traditional instruction   
c Native  d Male  e Target age (13-15 years)  f Average # of books  g School language at home always   
h No extracurricular participation   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001 
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Table 7-4. Civic knowledge and interpretive skills, extracurricular participation, and attitude toward 
women’s rights: Between-country results for systems of curricular control. 
 Civic Knowledge  & Skills 
Extracurricular 
Participation Women’s Rights
 
FIXED EFFECTS    
Mean outcome -.004 2.432** .415*** 
COUNTRY MEASURES^    
FEDERAL -.250*** .468 .741 
SCHOOL AUTONOMY -.252** 1.310 .727 
DECENTRALIZED -.133† .378 1.702 
School characteristics    
High Immigrant %a -.019† 1.122* 1.035 
School Avg. Books  .173*** .995 .961* 
School Book Range -.039*** 1.017 .935*** 
Low openness/High traditionalb .067*** 1.005 .861** 
High openness/Low traditionalb .054*** 1.137* .840*** 
High openness/High traditionalb .101*** .881* .812*** 
Immigrant gapc -.073*** 1.655*** 1.031 
COUNTRY MEASURES^    
FEDERAL .111*** .662*  
SCHOOL AUTONOMY .080** .763  
DECENTRALIZED .182*** .380**  
School characteristics    
High Immigrant %a .008 .610†  
School Avg. Books  -.015† .948  
School Book Range -.017† .926  
Low openness/High traditionalb -.017 1.017  
High openness/Low traditionalb -.057* .832  
High openness/High traditionalb -.043* .671*  
Femaled   -.069*** 1.459*** .217*** 
Under-agee -.039 2.848*** .961 
Over-agee -.062*** .880* 1.035 
Books: Fewf -.093*** .764*** 1.117*** 
Books: Manyf .098*** 1.470*** .966 
Time in country -.008*** 1.055*** .992 
Language: Neverg -.159*** .921 1.423** 
Language: Sometimesg -.113*** 1.076 1.068 
Open climate .063*** 1.085*** .792*** 
Civic knowledge & skills  1.358*** .318*** 
Extracurricular participationh .042***  .887*** 
    
RANDOM EFFECTS    
Country mean outcome, τ000 .005*** .392*** .134*** 
Country immigrant gap, τ111 -- --  
School mean outcome, τ00 .023*** .323*** .137*** 
School immigrant gap, τ10 -- 1.210**  
Level-1 error .152   
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects.  
Immigrant status is group-centered in the extracurricular participation model.  All other variables are centered 
around their grand mean.  Estimates for extracurricular participation and attitude toward women’s rights are in 
the form of odds ratios.  -- indicates that all variance has been explained by the included variables at that level. 
Reference groups: ^ Collaboration & centralized systems  a Low immigrant proportion  b Low openness & little 
traditional instruction  c Native  d Male  e Target age (13-15 years)  f Average # of books  g School language at 
home always  h No extracurricular participation   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001 
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Table 7-5. Attitudes toward immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ rights, and patriotism: Between-
country results for systems of curricular control. 
 Immigrants’ rights Minorities’ rights Patriotism 
FIXED EFFECTS    
Mean outcome -.023 -.001 -.015 
COUNTRY MEASURES^    
FEDERAL -.367** -.318* -.524** 
SCHOOL AUTONOMY -.001 .119 -.274 
DECENTRALIZED -.034 -.032 .054 
School characteristics    
High Immigrant %a .093*** .076*** -.058** 
School Avg. Books  -.016 .009 -.093*** 
School Book Range -.004 -.001 -.012 
Low openness/High traditionalb -.052† -.015 .044† 
High openness/Low traditionalb -.058* -.039 .031 
High openness/High traditionalb -.071** .001 .066** 
Immigrant gapc .117† -.019 -.273*** 
COUNTRY MEASURES^    
FEDERAL -.002 .149 .251*** 
SCHOOL AUTONOMY -.102 -.253† .115 
DECENTRALIZED -.461* -.342† .237† 
School characteristics    
High Immigrant %a -.070 -.098 .042 
School Avg. Books  .007 -.005 -.041 
School Book Range .024 .038 .021 
Low openness/High traditionalb .021 -.065 .123 
High openness/Low traditionalb .116† .050 -.124† 
High openness/High traditionalb .072 -.031 .094 
Femaled  .259*** .301*** -.223 
Under-agee -.172† -.173 -.069 
Over-agee .041 .014 -.017 
Books: Fewf -.005 -.008 .006 
Books: Manyf .005 .035** -.055*** 
Time in country -.028*** -.032*** -.001 
Language: Neverg .261*** .193*** -.385*** 
Language: Sometimesg .388*** .248*** -.244*** 
Open climate .139*** .162*** .096*** 
Civic knowledge & skills .286*** .364*** -.117*** 
Extracurricular participationh -.009 .027* .050*** 
    
RANDOM EFFECTS    
Country mean outcome, τ000 .021*** .025*** .036*** 
Country immigrant gap, τ111 .015*** .015*** -- 
School mean outcome, τ00 .095*** .075*** .061*** 
School immigrant gap, τ11 .158*** .134*** .238*** 
Level-1 error .765 .832 .761 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random 
effects.  Immigrant status is centered around its group mean.  All other variables are centered around 
their grand mean.  -- indicates that all variance has been explained by the included variables at that 
level. 
Reference groups: ^ Collaboration & centralized systems  a Low immigrant proportion  b Low 
openness & little traditional instruction  c Native  d Male  e Target age (13-15 years)  f Average # of 
books  g School language at home always  h No extracurricular participation   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001 
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Table 7-6. Between-country variance explained, by civic outcome. 
 Original τ  National economic indicators τ  
% Variance 
explained 
Curricular 
control τ  
% Variance 
explained 
Civic knowledge and 
skills 
Overall .00973*** .01171*** -- .00460*** 52.7 
Imm. gap .00278*** .00158** 43.2  100.0 
Extracurricular 
participation 
Overall .59621*** .59611*** 0.02 .39189*** 34.3 
Imm. gap .10906*** .02342* 78.5  100.0 
Attitudes toward 
women’s rights 
Overall .10383*** .07696*** 25.9 .13361*** -- 
Imm. gap      
Attitudes toward 
immigrants’ rights 
Overall .04988*** .04248*** 14.8 .02155*** 56.8 
Imm. gap .03333*** .01636*** 50.9 .01457*** 56.3 
Attitudes toward ethnic 
minorities’ rights 
Overall .04996*** .02965*** 40.7 .02479*** 50.4 
Imm. gap .05278*** .02252*** 57.3 .01547*** 70.7 
Patriotism 
Overall .10500*** .04612*** 56.1 .03579*** 65.9 
Imm. gap .00913** .00600* 34.3  100.0 
Note: Where % variance explained is marked --, this indicates that a negative value would otherwise be given.  In those cases, the 
predictors included in the model tend not to be significant and are adding very little valuable information to HLM’s analysis. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
This study began with a series of questions about European adolescents’ 
preparedness for democratic citizenship and their tendency for pro-democratic, self-
expression values.  While I have derived a variety of findings from these questions (see 
results and discussion sections in chapters 5, 6, and 7), the three most relevant to policy 
in the educational enterprise are: 1) what are adolescents’ degrees of preparedness for 
citizenship and their views on rights for traditionally marginalized groups (self-
expression values), and how do immigrants differ from native students on these 
outcomes; 2) how are discussion-based instructional methods related to different degrees 
of preparedness and more or less tolerant views of out-groups; and 3) how does the 
national system for regulating curriculum explain between-country differences in 
adolescents’ preparedness and self-expression values?  This concluding chapter focuses 
on these three questions.   
In this dissertation I have shown that there are actually relatively few 
commonalities across European democracies in how instruction and adolescents’ 
personal characteristics relate to their civic outcomes.  I found that, though it has quite 
different relationships with each civic outcome across countries, immigrant status is 
nearly always an important factor.  Instructional methods—teacher- vs. student-
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centered—have both anticipated and unanticipated relationships with these outcomes.  
Finally, I found national educational systems’ means of designing and disseminating 
curriculum to be significantly related to several outcomes, though often in unexpected 
ways.  All of these are complex relationships, none of which are universally beneficial or 
detrimental.  This could be both a comfort and a frustration for educators or policymakers 
interested in developing a more democratic culture amongst immigrants as well as native 
adolescents.  It is disappointing that more, or stronger, patterns of relationships do not 
exist between educational characteristics and immigrant/native gaps, since the study 
focused so strongly on immigrants, but such is the nature of educational research. 
The findings did not entirely confirm previous research on these topics or studies 
using these data.  Indeed, I recognize that the restriction of this study to just 13 European 
countries, just students in the middle grades, and students who had complete data on all 
the variables of interest, somewhat limits the generalizability of the study’s results.  
Though the data are not perfect, they are powerfully suggestive and represent a useful 
contribution to a burgeoning literature on how young immigrants are—and might better 
be—integrated into society and the political/civic realm.  What’s more, through this work 
I have extended civic education scholarship to meet political science scholarship in two 
ways: a) by bringing qualities of intermediary institutions—schools—to bear on society-
level attitudes, and b) by recognizing that the environments of lower secondary schools 
and their political education practices operate in a national political and cultural context.  
In this concluding chapter I revisit the work that was foundational to mine, how I have 
begun to fill a gap in that work, strengths and limitations of the data and my results, 
potential implications for policy, and some suggestions for future research.   
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8.1 Conventional Wisdom: Immigrants, Integration, and Schools 
Political science and education together have determined the elements of 
democracy that are most valuable and how schools can be involved in citizens’ 
development.  In political science, Inglehart and Welzel gave a frame to one half of this 
study, laying the groundwork for understanding how adult orientations to self-expression 
values relate to democracy, finding that strong commitments to rights and freedoms for 
all people can cause societies to become [more] democratic (2005).  Before that, Almond 
and Verba (1963) and Diamond (1999) recognized the importance of civic participation 
for the health of a democracy, and Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry (1996) identified 
education as an essential element in the intergenerational development of knowledgeable, 
thoughtful democratic citizens.60  Accordingly, I designed this study around these factors, 
many of which previous research has explored.   
Perhaps because the educational enterprise is seen as best equipped for these 
particular elements of civic preparation, civic education research has focused primarily 
on conventional ideas of civic preparedness: what students know, how they participate 
(or intend to) in civic-related activities, and their sense of national identity, or patriotism.  
But while these are important, they are not the primary drivers of democracy.  Each of 
those elements can just as easily support undemocratic modes of governance and 
interaction.  For this reason and two others—because education literature has looked so 
extensively at these outcomes for all students, including ethnic minorities and 
immigrants, and because my findings largely confirm this literature—in this concluding 
chapter I am most concerned with the study’s findings on adolescents’ self-expression 
                                                
60 Of course this education has to have a purposefully democratic orientation.  One must consider that the 
rise of the Nazis in the early 1930s occurred in one of the most highly educated environments in history. 
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values, as these are the cultural orientations that other research has found to be most 
significantly predictive of sustained democracy.  I do give a synopsis of findings on 
schools’ three more conventional civic-related goals.   
 
8.1.1 Immigrants’ Civic Outcomes 
Civic knowledge and participation.  As a set of facts about democracy’s ideals 
and processes, civic knowledge is comparable to other academic subjects in the literature 
on differences between immigrants and native students: immigrants tend to be less 
knowledgeable, and for reasons including less exposure to school and content, language 
barriers, and socioeconomic status (DeFeyter & Winsler, 2010; Reimers, 2005; Schnepf, 
2007; Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, & Todorova, 2008).  Yet most studies find that 
immigrants are no less likely to participate in civic-oriented extracurricular or political 
activities (Prokic & Dronkers, 2010).  In some cases, their even greater participation may 
be a response to perceived discrimination which fuels strong feelings of ethnic identity, 
or perhaps more often, because of strong family religious commitments that entail 
community service of some kind (Stepick & Stepick, 2002).  
Patriotism.  All nations seek to cultivate patriotism, so it is not unique to 
democracies, but I presented in the introductory chapter an argument that patriotism—
loyalty to or affinity for one’s nation of residence—can be either a positive or negative 
trait in citizens.  To the extent that a sentimental attachment to a personified ‘nation’ is 
exclusive, nationalistic, or derogatory toward other nations or cultures, patriotism can be 
a negative, even destructive force in a society, encouraging discrimination at the least and 
violence at the worst.  But patriotism could also be defined as a solid understanding of 
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and high regard for the nation’s democratic ideals (e.g., liberty, equal opportunities, well-
being) and most admirable experiences that live up to those ideals (‘best traditions’).  
Under that definition, as Lawrence Blum writes, “The best traditions patriot feels a sense 
of shared fate with her fellow nationals … and hopes that this national community will be 
able to live up to its best traditions” (2007, p. 64).  According to this notion, people can 
still be patriotic even when they find national policies to be contradictory to these best 
traditions and are disappointed in their country on some matters.   
As important as it is to be able to think critically about national policy, instilling 
in young people a fondness for the country in which they live is a goal in many, if not all, 
countries.  As education scholar William Damon writes, this is appropriate: “The capacity 
for constructive criticism is an essential requirement for civic engagement in a 
democratic society; but in the course of intellectual development, this capacity must build 
upon a prior sympathetic understanding of that which is being criticized” (2001).  
However, what research exists on minorities’ patriotism for adolescents is quite limited: 
Janmaat and Mons (2011) found that large differences exist between ethnic minority and 
ethnic majority students beyond their socioeconomic background.  Prokic and Dronkers 
(2010) found that similarly large differences exist between immigrant and native students 
typically regardless of how long immigrants have lived in the country, though speaking 
the language of the host country is related to a somewhat stronger attachment to that 
country for some immigrants.    
Self-expression values.  In studying immigrants’ cultural views, scholars have 
found much greater support amongst the foreign-born for immigrants’ rights, a somewhat 
predictable finding (Hjerm, 2005; Prokic & Dronkers, 2010).  Much research has shown, 
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though, that immigrant students in Europe are far less tolerant of rights for women 
(Lalwani, 2008; Prokic & Dronkers, 2010). 
 
8.1.2 National Educational Policy and Instruction   
This study has primarily focused on the education-related factors associated with 
students’ civic outcomes.  Many researchers before me have noted that even in Europe 
schools are often expected to be—but realistically cannot be—the solution to societal 
dysfunction and social conflict (Eurydice, 2005).  Because adolescents spend so much 
time there, schools are certainly not without influence, but educational environments 
exist within and because of family, community, regional, and national environments.  
National policies may enable or restrict adult immigrants’ integration, which affects their 
children’s opportunities for integration, but schooling is a salient—if not the most 
salient—factor in young immigrants’ integration into their peer group (Holdaway, Crul, 
& Roberts, 2009; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001).  Therefore, in considering adolescents’ 
preparedness for conventional citizenship and furthering democracy, it is essential to look 
at both immediate educational environments and qualities of the national political and 
policy environment that are related to students’ lives and outcomes.   
Centralized vs. decentralized control of curriculum.  Nathalie Mons’ 
international study found greater equality in academic achievement among students in 
countries with more centralized educational systems than with regionally controlled 
(federal) systems (Mons, 2007).  In a study that followed on this finding, Janmaat and 
Mons used CIVED data to study disparities in ethnic minorities’ and ethnic majorities’ 
patriotism and attitudes toward immigrants’ rights based on whether their countries had 
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more or less centrally controlled systems for curriculum design and dissemination (2011).  
They found that across countries there are large gaps between minority students’ and 
their majority peers’ affection for the nation, though the gaps are somewhat smaller in 
non-federal educational systems (2011).  These scholars argue that a stronger central 
regulation of curriculum results in students’ development of a closer tie to their nation 
than to any sub-national entity like a province or community, which fosters a stronger 
national identity and “cultural homogeneity” by not allowing regions to indulge too 
disparate cultural traditions or inter-group hostilities.  They believe that the “patriotism 
promoted in nonfederal countries is not ethnocentric and exclusionary,” which makes it 
easier for ethnic minorities to identify with their nation (p. 77).  They found also that in 
nonfederal systems, majority students’ tolerance of immigrants and their rights is stronger 
(thus, more equivalent to minority students’).   
Instructional methods.  Much civic education research has focused on the 
classroom climate and teaching methods that best engender inclinations for civic 
participation, develop skills for debate and critical reasoning, and open students’ minds to 
other opinions.  Generally what researchers find is that in classrooms where respectful 
discussion and debate are valued and where relevant, controversial contemporary issues 
provide at least some of the content, students are more engaged in politics and more 
likely to participate in civic-oriented extracurricular activities (Flanagan et al., 2007; 
Torney-Purta & Wilkenfeld, 2009).  More importantly, though, and with only a few 
documented exceptions, students in these classrooms generally are more tolerant of the 
political rights of socially marginal groups (Avery et al., 1992; Hahn, 1991, 1998).  One 
US study suggests that, unfortunately, immigrant students have lesser access to 
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classrooms characterized by such pro-democratic climates, though they are even more 
positively influenced by them (Reimers, 2005). 
 
8.1.3 The Unknowns   
The gaps in comparative research on students’ civic outcomes in Europe have, 
until now, been in what is known about young immigrants’ sociopolitical attitudes.  We 
know far more about young immigrants’ conventional preparation for citizenship.  Most 
research on instructional methods’ relationship to the immigrant/native gap is limited to 
the US: scholars should come to know better what European adolescents’ opportunities to 
learn are, and the national and educational structures within which they might learn.  Are 
there particular attitudes that we should be particularly concerned about, or any that are 
clearly unproblematic?  Where immigrant status has a negative relationship with 
desirable values and attitudes, what are educators’ options, and how might nations help 
immigrants integrate? 
 
8.2 Confirmations of and Challenges to the Conventional Wisdom 
8.2.1 Preparedness for Citizenship 
At the individual level, predictably, the most common salient ‘predictors’ of 
students’ preparedness for citizenship (entailing civic knowledge, extracurricular 
participation, and patriotism) are immigrant status, gender, and home language (as a 
proxy for ethnic identity).  Generally this study’s findings on student-level relationships 
with these outcomes confirm those of previous studies.  Where my study adds to the 
discussion is in differences between immigrants’ and natives’ civic preparedness.   
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Overall levels of civic knowledge and interpretive skills clearly range widely, and 
it is only in four countries—two in the northwest and two in southern Europe—where 
immigrants face significant challenges in mastering political ideas and reasoning skills. 
Results on extracurricular participation suggest that European countries have little to 
worry about on this point: there are practically no differences between immigrants and 
native students and, outside of central Europe, where civil society was still gaining a 
foothold at this point in time, generally students are likely to participate.   
My strong belief about immigrants’ levels of patriotism, which are generally 
weaker than native students’, is that several elements of in- and out-of-school experiences 
shape their attitudes.  Within schools, it is likely that they, like their native peers, are 
generally subject to the ‘national narrative’ that emphasizes reasons to be proud and 
respectful of the country, without much attention to mismatches between national ideals 
and policies that seem to contradict those ideals (Koh, 2010).  Yet immigrants’ 
experiences in society outside of school are different from those of native students, and 
not always positive (Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, & Todorova, 2008).  They are more 
likely than their native peers to see the consequences of national immigration policies and 
hear their parents talk about the difficulties of the adult immigrant experience.  In 
addition, those who arrived at an older age are more likely to have memories of their 
childhood in the country of origin, while all immigrants are likely to have parents who 
still have contacts in and strong cultural attachments to the sending country.   
I therefore believe that immigrants’ lesser patriotism can be well explained by 
both a stronger familial attachment to the country of origin and the recognition of 
mismatches between what the host country says its sociopolitical values are and the de 
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facto situation of first-generation immigrants.  As other studies of immigrant patriotism 
have shown, immigrants have logical, politically based reasons for appreciating their host 
country, but are less sentimental in their attachment to it than native-born people, 
suggesting a ‘best traditions’ patriotism in immigrants (Lee & Hébert, 2006).    
Discussion-based instructional methods.  Whether teachers emphasize more or 
less discussion versus lecture-style instruction appears to have no consistent relationship 
with patriotism, but students’ civic knowledge is higher when teachers emphasize more 
discussion (true in seven of thirteen countries).  
National context.  This study found weak evidence of higher overall civic 
knowledge among adolescents in more economically unequal countries, which 
contradicts findings from studies of other academic subjects, but somewhat predictably, it 
showed that immigrants in more unequal countries are even less patriotic than their peers 
in equal countries.  Reduced levels of patriotism tend to be concentrated in the older 
(wealthier) democracies.  Those countries have a more solid foundation as sovereign, 
united countries and students may take the nation for granted in ways that students in 
younger democracies, recently under authoritarian rule, do not.  This may not actually be 
such a problem for most countries if students are more thoughtful about their nation and 
its ideals and politics, rather than just emotionally attached.  Of course, in the federal 
states of Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland, there are extremely strong distinctions 
between regions based either on culture or language (in Belgium: French/Dutch, in 
Germany: east/west, in Switzerland: German/French/Italian/Romansh), that make a 
strong national affection somewhat more difficult to fathom.61   
                                                
61 Romansh is a Romance (Latin-derived) language and should not be confused with Romani, the Indic 
(India-derived) language of the historically itinerant Roma people of central and eastern Europe. 
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Curriculum regulation.  There is strong evidence in this study supporting Mons’ 
finding that achievement is higher in more centrally controlled educational systems: 
overall, adolescents in less centralized systems are less knowledgeable about and skilled 
in civics, though in those same systems, immigrants’ knowledge is more comparable to 
their native peers than in centralized systems.  The study supports Janmaat and Mons’ 
theory that overall patriotism (affection for the nation) is lower in federally organized 
systems, likely because students have a stronger affection for their region or state than for 
the national identity (consider the language-based communities of Belgium).  It 
contradicts their finding on minority/majority disparities, however: my study suggests 
that immigrants’ affection for their adopted nation in federal and decentralized 
(exclusively local control) systems is more comparable to their native peers’ than in 
centralized systems.  Perhaps regional- and local-level authorities are actually more in 
tune with the ethnic communities under their purview and design curricula to be inclusive 
of those communities, essentially doing a great service to the nation by being responsive 
to constituents at a sub-national level. 
 
8.2.2 Self-Expression Values 
This study also showed that at the individual level, the most common salient 
predictors of students’ tendency for self-expression values are immigrant status, gender, 
home language, and civic knowledge.  Interestingly, though, in a number of countries 
immigrants did not have the anticipated negative views on women’s rights, nor 
universally more positive views on immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ rights that I had 
predicted and which Europeans tend to use as stereotypes.  Overall, women’s rights are 
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fairly well supported among native students and immigrants, though at this moment in 
history, Slovak and Hungarian adolescents were significantly less tolerant on this issue 
than their peers in any other country (a curious finding, given the strong national 
similarities between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, though their levels of affluence 
may be at play here; Czech people were more well off than their Slovak—and 
Hungarian—counterparts). 
Instructional methods.  A more open classroom climate is clearly related to 
more support for immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ rights in several countries, though in 
only a few is it related to more positive overall tolerance of rights for women.  
Additionally, in Switzerland, an open classroom is related to decreased tolerance on all 
three self-expression values, a surprising finding that contradicts much research on the 
value of discussion in civics classes.  As I discussed in Chapter 6, these findings may 
make some sense, if one considers the possibility that those discussions are run by Swiss 
teachers who are willing to respect and thereby give credibility to all opinions, without 
regard for evidence that supports them.  It may be that controversial discussions in which 
students voice negative opinions about certain groups may encourage other negative 
opinions that are unproductive contributions to democratic debate. 
To more succinctly answer RQ 2, instructional methods do not have a uniform 
relationship with self-expression values, but in certain areas of the European continent, 
they appear to be especially valuable. 
National context.  A country’s relative wealth is undeniably related to students’ 
embrace of rights for women: in general, adolescents are more supportive of women’s 
rights in wealthier countries, but immigrants too tend to be more supportive in those 
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countries.  Economic inequality is more strongly related to views of ethnic minorities’ 
rights, such that adolescents in more unequal countries are significantly more supportive.  
In a sense, these findings also support Koopmans’ findings on immigrants’ greater 
integration in more unequal countries (like the southern European ones), as immigrants in 
nations with higher income inequality prove, in my study, to be more comparable to 
natives in their attitudes toward ethnic minorities. 
Curriculum regulation.  With my study I confirmed Janmaat and Mons’ results 
on tolerance of immigrants’ rights: in countries with non-centrally organized educational 
systems, immigrants’ views on women’s, immigrants’, and ethnic minorities’ rights tend 
to be less supportive than native students’.  More concisely, greater central control of 
curriculum is related to more pro-democratic views on rights for marginalized groups.   
At the greatest extreme are Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland (federal 
systems), where adolescents are generally less supportive of immigrants and ethnic 
minorities.  Each of these democracies has a particularly difficult problem of social and 
political integration, both from the perspective of bringing native students around to 
having tolerant attitudes, but also of encouraging comparable attitudes in newcomers.  
Belgians are already wary of those who don’t share their language, Germans still appear 
to be committed to homogeneity and sameness (Luchtenberg, 2004, p. 258), while the 
Swiss assign naturalization powers to cantons rather than the federal government and 
have among the strictest admission and naturalization laws on the continent, seemingly in 
defiance of the reality of great immigration to that country (Fibbi, Lerch, & Wanner, 
2007). 
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8.3 Limitations 
Primary among the issues that limit the generalizability of my results is the age of 
the CIVED data.  It is now more than a decade since the data were collected, during 
which time international relations, global travel, immigration flows, and borders of the 
European Union have changed significantly.  It is unlikely that this study’s findings 
exactly match those we would find on immigrants’ sociopolitical integration today.  
However, they certainly provide valuable insight into how immigrants to Europe 
experienced their lives in democracies before 9/11, the Iraq war, and the Arab Spring.  In 
the cases of southern and central Europe, the data describe young people’s preparedness 
for democratic citizenship in countries that were still adjusting to democracy and the 
arrival of immigrants, rather than a constant flow of emigrants.  As I shall suggest as a 
direction for future research, the illustration of the world that CIVED provides is 
invaluable for those who wonder how these events of the adult world may have affected 
the lives of the next generation of young immigrants and native students in the 
intervening twelve years.  
Of course the ideal data set for studying immigrants’ experiences, cultural 
attitudes, and civic activities would result from sampling specifically for immigrant 
representation, i.e., to oversample where necessary so sample sizes are comparable to 
native students and estimates of relationships are more precise.  Ideally survey 
administrators would also sample from more than one classroom per school so 
researchers could investigate how the methods of different teachers in the same school 
might have differential relationships with their students’ outcomes, independent of 
school-level factors (the practice of sampling just one classroom per school is a common 
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flaw in international comparative surveys). 
Another drawback in interpreting this study is that, in most countries I examined, 
there are no data on students’ ethnicity.  In a few countries, ethnicity information was 
collected, but none was shared publicly, so to get it requires personal communication 
with national research coordinators (many of whom are difficult to track down twelve 
years later).62  In most countries, though, this question was not asked of students.  Having 
no knowledge of students’ ethnicity, we also have no knowledge of immigrant students’ 
countries of origin, an unquestionably important piece of information that would give 
researchers considerable understanding of immigrants’ cultural background.  Where one 
comes from has an important relationship with one’s worldview as well as one’s 
experience as an immigrant in other cultures.  Information on ethnicity would also be 
helpful for authenticating other researchers’ definition of ‘ethnic minorities’ as those 
students who speak a non-school language at home.  
These are serious limitations, but none undercut the significance of this study’s 
results for better understanding immigrants’ sociopolitical integration.  These findings are 
enormously useful for scholars interested in adolescents’ civic development throughout 
Europe in this particular time period (1999, pre-millennium, pre-9/11), as well as for 
looking at change over time, when the CIVED data are used in combination with more 
recent data. 
 
                                                
62 I managed to make contact with eleven of the twenty-two European national research coordinators for 
CIVED.  Six of them (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Norway, Portugal) told me the question 
about ethnicity was not asked; one (Finland) shared information about how many students were in each 
ethnic group, but did not share what the coding in the data set represented; one (Poland) said information 
on ethnicity was for statistical purposes only and was “without meaning;” one (Slovenia) shared what 
ethnicities were represented, but did not share coding information; and England and Greece shared their 
ethnicity data codes.  The rest did not respond to my queries. 
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8.4 Education Policy Implications 
In this study I have been concerned with the preparedness of adolescents in 
Europe for citizenship in a political and social democracy.  As I have shown, there are 
numerous elements of individuals, their schools, and countries that surround and, likely, 
feed into that preparatory process.  There do not appear to be any silver bullets, though, 
that are clearly related to universally ‘better’ civic outcomes.  On self-expression values, 
I find mainly in western and Nordic Europe that students in schools with a relatively 
strong focus on discussion and a respectful climate tend to have more positive, inclusive 
views of rights for immigrants and ethnic minorities.  In these countries, teacher 
education institutions and professional development organizations would do well to 
instruct more teachers in these discussion-based practices to increase the number of 
children benefiting from them.   
Discussion-oriented methods are negatively associated with minority-related 
outcomes for students in England, Switzerland, and the Czech Republic.  It is unclear 
why this would be, so I turn to the case studies conducted on each of these countries’ 
civic and citizenship education situations, conducted as Phase I of CIVED.  It is clear that 
around this time in England, there was much discussion politically and educationally 
about national identity and the rapidly changing demographics of the country because of 
immigrants.  Britain did not have national civic or citizenship education requirements at 
this time, though teachers identified the “promotion of greater harmony between different 
social groups” as a primary aim of citizenship education.  Yet most (90 percent) new 
teachers did not feel confident about “teaching about social class and ethnic groups” 
(Kerr, 1999c, p. 215).  Additionally, as Carole Hahn found in her early-‘90s study of five 
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countries’ classrooms, English classrooms—even when their content included 
controversial topics or subjects of debate—involved note-taking, regurgitating facts, and 
listening to a teacher’s interpretation of an event (1998).  The takeaway message seemed 
to be, “Form an opinion, don’t express it.”    
Concurrently in Switzerland, researchers identified “problems of linguistic 
minorities…[as] a constant feature in the media,” and though much pedagogical theory in 
the country suggested tying civic and citizenship education to more participatory, action-
oriented methods, this rarely happened (Reichenbach, 1999, p. 572).  In the Czech 
Republic, teachers were expected to inform students about various ethnic groups, but 
there were no guidelines for developing critical thinking skills related to the potential 
social and political problems that result from ethnic heterogeneity (Moree, Klaassen, & 
Veugelers, 2008).  Each of the western European case studies strongly suggests that 
public sentiment about (and possibly against) immigrants and ethnic minorities was quite 
strong at this point in time and all case studies point to teachers being ill-equipped to 
handle productive discussions about these or related topics, so students were likely given 
license—through teacher neutrality—to express negative views of different groups.  
While England’s National Curriculum has come to include elements of civic and 
citizenship education in the intervening decade, and Czech curriculum guidelines have 
since become more explicit about what multicultural education is (one that provokes 
critical thought), one must hope that teacher education institutions there and in 
Switzerland are attending to the skills of their teachers in guiding discussions that a) do 
not let negative opinions slide without evidence that supports them, and b) encourage 
playing devil’s advocate, if students believe in only one side of an argument (D. E. Hess, 
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2009; Roby, 1998).   
Curriculum-related and economic findings should be viewed cautiously, as merely 
speculative, because of low power and relatively small variation in national 
characteristics.  However, a more centrally controlled system for curriculum does seem to 
be the most advantageous system for strong self-expression values and high civic 
knowledge, participation, and patriotism.  Remember that the countries in this study that 
exemplify collaboration or centralized models are Denmark, Norway, Greece, Italy, and 
Portugal.  While these countries do not have as long a history with immigration as other 
countries in Europe, it seems that many other nations could do well to consider instituting 
national regulations over curriculum.  The federal system appears to be the least positive 
for most of these outcomes, such that students overall in Belgium, Germany, and 
Switzerland are least knowledgeable, least pro-immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ rights, 
and least patriotic, though in some ways their young immigrant populations are better 
integrated than those in other countries (see the discussion of civic knowledge and 
patriotism in section 7.4.2).  However, it is debatable whether greater similarity between 
groups is desirable, if the average attitude is so negative to begin with.  
 
8.5 Future Research 
All the limitations I have pointed out suggest avenues for future research and, 
indeed, data collection in the first place.  Beginning with the data set itself, remember the 
IEA ran a follow-up study to CIVED in 2009 called the International Civics and 
Citizenship Education Study (ICCS).  When those data become publicly available (later 
this year), researchers interested in the immigrant experience should use them to conduct 
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a comparative study with pre-2000 CIVED data as a baseline.  Together, findings from 
these data sets shed light on democracy’s altered profile for contemporary youth; analysts 
will be able to see how countries and schools have or have not changed since then in 
serving the civic needs of immigrant students and national needs to integrate immigrants 
into democratic societies.  For the purposes of such a study, ICCS’s data collection is in 
many ways an improvement over that collected in CIVED.  For example, ICCS 
ascertained students’ immigrant status by having them report on whether they and their 
parents were born in the country of the test (Kerr, Sturman, Schulz, & Burge, 2010).  In 
doing so they made it easier to comment on the first- and second-generation immigrant 
populations’ sociopolitical integration.   
Second, future large-scale survey research in Europe ought to include more 
serious consideration of ethnicity or country of origin.  A few CIVED participant 
countries asked about ethnicity, but these countries’ coding systems were difficult to 
come by (not included in general codebooks), and a majority of the European countries I 
studied did not ask about ethnicity anyway.  As I discussed previously, immigrant 
students’ country of origin is a non-negligible fact in studying their integration into 
society, as it may have much to do with how the host country’s population receives them.  
Some smaller-scale studies have begun a process of comparing the experiences of 
Turkish immigrant youth in Germany to those of their peers in the Netherlands (Crul & 
Schneider, 2009), but with globalization, sending countries’ immigrant diasporas have 
broadened their geographical scope.  Across countries, immigrants of the same origin 
may have different experiences based on national political decisions and economic 
situations.  
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Additionally, given wide-ranging associations of instructional methods in civics 
and other social studies classes with adolescent students’ self-expression values (views 
on women’s, immigrants’, and ethnic minorities’ rights), it is important to understand 
better what these sorts of methods actually look like in action.  It is urgent, it seems to 
me, that researchers design more on-the-ground, qualitative studies similar to Carole 
Hahn’s 1998 effort to explain how school and classroom environments engender different 
political attitudes.  Research on instruction must more intensively involve observation of 
and commentary from teachers in civic education.  These efforts might include recording 
teachers’ political views or civic inclinations and their willingness (or permission) to 
share them.  They could shed light on what the difference really is between a) classrooms 
with great openness to discussion as well as a strong emphasis on traditional, fact-based 
instruction, and b) classrooms with great openness to discussion but little emphasis on 
traditional instruction.  Perhaps even more importantly, such studies could determine to 
what extent the topics of classroom discussions are controversial or mundane, and 
whether students are expected to provide evidence for their arguments. 
All told, this dissertation has contributed to a greater understanding of the 
situation of young immigrants’ sociopolitical integration in Europe, and has suggested 
that educators and teacher educators look more closely at how discussions of civic-related 
topics are conducted in schools.  Additionally, it has identified more centralized 
educational systems as having the strongest relationship to desirable democratic values 
and civic outcomes.  Each of these findings presents policy options for European 
officials, though I imagine instructional methods reform being more palatable than the 
curriculum regulation reform to citizens in more decentralized countries.  I have clearly 
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left much room for further investigation. It is my hope that such studies are conducted in 
the future by educationists and political scientists alike, as both fields are concerned with 
the longevity and progression of democracy as a way of life. 
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Appendix A 
On Democracy 
 
A.1 Aggregative vs. Integrative Democracy 
The emphases scholars and policymakers place on and the orientations they take 
to these fundamental democratic values vary.  In a discussion of popular empowerment in 
contemporary democracies, Danish researcher Eva Sørenson categorizes these 
orientations to democracy’s purposes as aggregative or integrative.  In the aggregative 
category, she places those systems that distribute political power in certain, equal 
allotments and resolves conflicts.  Scholars of this orientation believe democracy’s 
purpose is to make political institutions better so they can address the needs of pluralist 
society on the whole.  They think of individual freedom and collective governance as 
being potentially at odds with one another: 
They assume that ‘man’ steps into society with exogenously given preferences 
which change little in the policy process, with the result that society is regarded as 
nothing more than a gathering of atomized individuals.  Hence, democracy 
becomes competition between conflicting views and interests organized in a 
relatively static one-way process of preference aggregation.  (1997, p. 555) 
 
The integrative category, on the other hand, is more concerned with the ability of 
democratic institutions to create citizens.  There are two ways of conceptualizing 
‘citizens’ here.  The first, as John Stuart Mill argued, is as those people who can put the 
good of society before their own personal interests in democratic decision-making.  The 
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second is that of participatory democracy: citizens are those who have “social resources 
and intellectual capacities” for democratic participation (Sørenson, 1997, p. 555).  What 
these concepts of citizenship have in common is a belief that individuals benefit from the 
same things that are good for society’s governance precisely because individuals make up 
society; whatever happens in the society at large happens to or affects them.  This 
interpretation is foundational to the philosophy of grassroots and participatory 
democracy, for whose supporters democracy is more than just a means of conflict 
regulation.   
 
A.2 Countries’ Adherence to Democratic Values 
There are numerous countries that claim their system of governance is democratic 
because it is based on elections, but which lack certain fundamental elements of a 
democratic electoral or legislative system.  Because there are a number of fundamental 
elements to a democratic system, it is possible to identify how ‘free’ a democracy is, as a 
matter of degrees.  For example, Freedom House, a democratic advocacy and monitoring 
organization, surveys the international landscape annually, identifying countries along a 
‘free’ to ‘unfree’ continuum.  Freedom House uses a number of criteria to determine 
whether a country is an electoral democracy, and rates countries’ promotion of political 
rights and protection of civil liberties on scales of 1-7 (1 being completely free).  It then 
assigns a holistic label of free, partly free, and not free.  In 1998 and 1999, as now, all 
western European countries were labeled free, with the most favorable marks for 
ensuring political rights and civil liberties.  Eastern European countries, however, just 
before the millennium ran the gamut from free (Lithuania) to partly free (Macedonia) to 
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not free (Belarus).  While their marks for political rights and civil liberties tend not to 
have changed much since 2000, most eastern European countries (except for Belarus) had 
come a considerable way from authoritarianism in the decade after the fall of 
Communism (Freedom House, 2010).   
 
A.3 Assessing Civic Knowledge and Skills 
Interestingly, there is a mismatch in what various interest groups (e.g., the US’s 
National Assessment Governing Board and political scientists) generally accept as valid 
civic knowledge for adults and for students.  Large-scale surveys of US adult civic 
behaviors and knowledge rarely involve questions about the intricate details of the 
Constitution or historical figures in American democracy, the very topics that are the 
hallmarks of civics-related assessments for students (Niemi & Junn, 1998).  Instead these 
surveys tend to inquire about elements of civic engagement that have provided 
researchers with comprehensive, nationally representative information about adults’ 
political practices and beliefs.  Topics and actual questions include: 
• voting habits, e.g., Do you expect to vote in the national elections this coming 
November?; 
• contemporary political knowledge, e.g., What is [your preferred Presidential 
candidate]’s religion?;  
• political activities, e.g., Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, 
dinners, or things like that in support of a particular candidate?; 
• media consumption, e.g., How much attention do you pay to news on national 
news shows about the campaign for President?;   
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• political opinions, e.g., Should the government in Washington see to it that black 
people get fair treatment in jobs or is this not the federal government's business?; 
and 
• community service, e.g., During the past 12 months, have you worked with other 
people to deal with some issue facing your community? (American National 
Election Studies, n.d.) 
Understanding of students’ civic behaviors and knowledge, however, tends to be 
limited (again, in the US) to results from large-scale assessments that prioritize historical 
or procedural knowledge about government. 
These conventional assessments require students to answer questions about 
historical documents or events that influenced the nation’s government, governmental 
procedures, and democratic values.  Examples of such questions, taken from the 2008 
Social Studies Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP) assessment, include: 
• Describe ways the Constitution delegates congressional powers. 
• How can the legislative branch of the United States government check the power 
of the President? 
• A senator is caught driving 30 miles per hour over the speed limit and given a 
speeding ticket.  Which core democratic value does this represent? (Michigan 
Department of Education, 2008) 
 
While knowing the answer to these and similar questions is certainly useful in 
debates and for understanding why legislation moves as it does through governmental 
bodies, I contend that that knowledge does not in itself indicate that a student is more 
democratically oriented than another, which is often the take-away message in media 
coverage of these assessments (see, for example, Cooper, 1999; Hedges, 1999).   
Some large-scale assessments have made an effort to collect more comprehensive 
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information about students’ civic awareness and preparedness by requiring a persuasive 
essay in which students must make a case for or against an issue.  This example also 
comes from the MEAP: 
Should the United States Congress pass a law that requires political candidates to 
release a list of all organizations that contribute over $100? You may either 
support or oppose a law requiring political candidates to release a list of these 
contributors. Write a letter to your congressional representative. (Michigan 
Department of Education, 2003) 
Such a question allows a student to demonstrate his or her skill at constructing a 
logical argument with facts and reason, but still does not get at his or her actual proclivity 
for involvement or opinions about pressing, contemporary political matters.  Some 
schools or individual teachers evaluate students’ civic preparation and knowledge via 
participatory activities, such as a live debate with classmates or a public hearing on a 
topic of community concern.  But there are very few large-scale indicators of what 
school-age students know how to do and actually do in the way of citizenship.  Good 
examples of the rare efforts to understand these elements are the CIVED study—which I 
discuss in much greater detail in Chapter 4—and its follow-up, the International Civic 
and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS).   
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Appendix B 
Structural Determinants of Immigrants’ School Success 
 
There are a number of structural characteristics that contribute to immigrant 
students’ lower achievement and poor ‘incorporation’ in receiving countries.  Primary 
among them are residential segregation, language policies that fail to account for theories 
of second language acquisition, differential funding schemes for schools that serve 
immigrants, and educational tracking systems that disproportionately assign immigrant 
students to lower academic tracks (Alba & Silberman, 2009; Crul & Schneider, 2009; 
Crul & Vermeulen, 2003; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2010; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001).   
Residential segregation is the result of factors from the host country and 
immigrants’ sides.  Immigrants may desire to live near co-ethnics who look like them, 
sound like them, and have similar cultural beliefs and practices.  Simultaneously, the host 
country may have relegated immigrants to certain geographic regions through the kinds 
of jobs it made available to first-generation immigrants—which also affect immigrants’ 
socioeconomic status and potential for upward social mobility—and any resultant 
discriminatory policies that kept the ‘other’ from encroaching on territory where natives 
live (Angenendt et al., 2007; Holdaway, Crul, & Roberts, 2009; Oliver & Wong, 2003).  
Such practices are disturbing, but they are so systemic as to be overwhelming to a 
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government interested in promoting social harmony.  More concrete policy levers might 
include differential spending for schools that serve immigrants, ethnic minorities, and the 
poor, or instructional language policies that make allowances for students who arrive at 
various ages and thus need different supports in the second language acquisition process.   
Funding for schools serving ethnic minorities is meant to provide teachers with 
greater access to resources, to hire staff to assist students with second-language-related 
learning needs, or pay for outreach programs to immigrant and minority parents, and it 
tends to be significantly higher than funding for schools with predominantly native 
students (Joppke, 2007).  Differential funding schemes are not common to all European 
countries, however, with southern European countries having much weaker ‘welfare 
states’ than their northern neighbors, and thus offering very little financial compensation 
to schools that serve needy populations (Holdaway, Crul, & Roberts, 2009; Marques, 
Valente Rosa, & Lopes Martins, 2007).  Numerous studies suggest, too, that additional 
money does not, in fact, solve the problem of unequal resource allocation by raising 
immigrants’ achievement enough to close the gap between them and their native-born 
peers (Schneeweis, 2009; Willms, 2006). 
A main problem with the residential segregation that often defines school 
populations is that it is symptomatic of a more all-encompassing national approach to 
integration that smacks of intolerance and, in the case of language policies, denies 
science.  Results from the 2000 and 2002 PISA showed that countries’ language support 
programs were related to the size of performance differences between immigrants and 
native-born students (Holdaway, Crul, & Roberts, 2009).  A monolingual, immersion 
approach to teaching immigrant students a second language is at odds with best practices 
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for language learning, though “this consensus among psycholinguists and language 
educators has certainly not convinced all decision makers” in immigrant-receiving 
countries (McAndrew, 2009, p. 1530).  Second language acquisition and fluency are not 
solely matters of will.  Depending on their age, students are more successful learning a 
second language in school if they have an advanced understanding of their native 
language and are familiar with its written system.  Without appropriate educational 
supports and linguistic experience, a student cannot reasonably be expected to learn a 
second language.  Yet this is where ethnic prejudice tends to take over in educational 
policy.  A review of Scandinavian countries’ language instruction policies shows that an 
immigrant secondary student’s mother tongue gets practically no school-based support, 
even if the student cannot read or write in that language (Biseth, 2009).  Schools or 
countries often place greater emphasis on immigrants learning the country’s native 
language for national identity purposes, without regard for best practice in second 
language instruction.  As Alba and Nee write: 
Perhaps most telling for acculturation in general and the prospects for resistance 
to it is linguistic assimilation.  Language is crucial here in at least two respects.  
Many aspects of ethnic culture are embedded in the mother tongue and thus are 
diminished, if not lost, as fluency wanes.  In addition, communication in a mother 
tongue marks a largely impenetrable social boundary which includes all who 
share the same ethnic origin and can speak its language and excludes everyone 
else. (2003, p. 72)   
Another problematic element of the educational system that can have negative 
impacts on immigrant students’ language acquisition is the age at which schooling 
begins.  In countries like France and Belgium where universal schooling begins quite 
early—when students are still learning their parents’ language—they are also exposed to 
the new country’s language.  But in countries where schooling starts at age 5 or 6, as in 
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Germany and the Netherlands, immigrant students have already lost out on that crucial 
developmental time for the host country’s language (Crul & Vermeulen, 2003).  Further, 
there are large cross-national differences in how many ‘contact hours’ students get with 
teachers and peers throughout their schooling trajectory (Holdaway, Crul, & Roberts, 
2009).  In Germany, for example, students only attend school for half the day and thus 
have that much less time to learn from teachers or be exposed to the host country 
language (they also tend to do more homework than students in other countries).  Nicole 
Schneeweis’s (2009) study of educational institutions’ influences on immigrants’ math 
and science achievement shows unequivocally that the number of hours spent in school is 
statistically significantly related to immigrants’ achievement. 
Cross-national differences between immigrants’ and native students’ academic 
achievement are also related to the timing and rigidity of academic tracking.  While 
tracking is meant to be a socially efficient means of educating a workforce, some 
countries’ placement exams in vocational, general academic, or university preparatory 
tracks occur as early as age 10 (Germany, Austria), meaning that newcomer students 
have less time to “pull themselves out of their disadvantaged starting position” than in 
countries where placements occur later, as in Belgium at age 14 (Crul & Vermeulen, 
2003, p. 979).  Thus, research across Europe has shown that immigrants are consistently 
placed in lower academic tracks, though in countries with later placement exams, there 
are lower percentages of immigrants in lower tracks.  In Germany and Austria, the 
proportions are incredibly high: two thirds and three quarters of students with an 
immigrant background are placed in the lower vocational school once they reach 
secondary school age (Crul & Vermeulen, 2003).  In Europe it tends to be very difficult 
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to move from a lower track to a higher one (while not easy in the US, it is easier), which 
means that the system practically destines people for dramatically different life 
opportunities.  Recognizing this in the late 1990s, France reformed its tracking policy so 
that professional or technical curricula as rigorous as academic curricula are available to 
secondary students who are not interested in or qualified for a traditional university 
degree, though immigrant students are still less likely to obtain one of these professional 
or technical degrees, making employment and movement to the middle class that much 
more challenging (Alba & Silberman, 2009).  
The consequences of placing large numbers of immigrants in a lower academic 
track only begin with social segregation.  After that, Jan Janmaat and Nathalie Mons 
write, ethnic groups in those lower tracks may see segregation as involuntary and 
insurmountable, which would lead them to express alienation from the dominant group.  
Additionally, intragroup solidarity that is produced by alienation from mainstream 
society “engenders different life worlds” that entail different values and attitudes (2011, 
p. 59).  Finally, reinforcing each of these is the very likely lower quality of civics 
curriculum and instruction available to students in lower tracks.  Janmaat and Mons’ 
research supports these hypotheses, with less rigid tracking associated with increased 
tolerance of immigrants’ rights.   
Many other studies find that immigrants—in most cases, certain types, especially 
those that are non-white or non-Christian—tend to be underrepresented in higher 
education and in knowledge-economy jobs.  For example, in Germany Turkish immigrant 
students are far less likely than native-born peers to get scores high enough in their fifth-
grade testing year to be placed on the academic, university-preparatory gymnasium track, 
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and among those who are placed in a vocational track, in the first year after graduation 
they are more likely to be working in apprenticeships than participating in extra 
vocational schooling (Faist, 1995).  However, as previously noted, not all immigrants fit 
the same mold: Moroccan students in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands are better 
represented in higher education than Turkish students (Crul & Schneider, 2009).   
Immigrant students’ generally lower attainment and achievement—in many cases 
a result of placement in lower academic tracks and separation from high-achieving 
students who could otherwise exert positive peer pressure—perpetuates their negative 
reputation in schools.  This reputation has both led to and been the result of negative 
stereotyping by teachers (Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, & Todorova, 2008, p. 137).  As 
sociologist Ana Bravo-Moreno writes, educational institutions “can play an active role in 
perpetuating prevailing hegemonic societal attitudes through their socialization 
processes” (2009, p. 421).  Where negative associations with immigrants prevail, it 
affects both the quality of education and native and/or affluent families’ decisions about 
where to educate their children.  Dutch and Spanish parents specifically aim to put their 
children in schools with fewer poor, minority, or immigrant students because the quality 
of education is better in more homogeneous (white) schools (Calero, 2005; Ladd, Fiske, 
& Ruijs, 2010).  More pointedly, Italian researchers have found that some Italian families 
are willing to go out of their way to enroll their children in schools with small 
populations of foreign pupils, because they believe that these pupils’ inadequate Italian 
language proficiency would hold up their children’s development (Gobbo, Ricucci, & 
Galloni, 2009, p. 9).   
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Appendix C 
Original CIVED Data 
 
C.1 Descriptive Information 
Table C-1 gives descriptive information on all independent and dependent 
variables in each country’s original sample so I can discuss the representativeness of my 
analytic samples.  Countries are broken into geographic groups, and include an indication 
of how many data are missing from each variable.  Altogether there are 41,725 students, 
2,997 of whom are immigrants (about 7.2 percent).  Note that the immigrant group is 
dramatically smaller than the native group in every country, though it ranges from just 
under 2 percent in Czech Republic and Slovakia to 19 percent in Germany.  Immigrants 
are significantly older than their native peers in most countries (not in central Europe or 
England).63  Additionally, in western and northern Europe, native students tend to have 
more books in their home than immigrant students, though in southern and central 
Europe, there are no differences between those groups.  
In most countries—Slovakia and Hungary are the only exceptions—higher 
proportions of immigrants never or only sometimes speak the school language at home, 
while far more native students always speak the school language at home.  There is no 
                                                
63 In Germany—which asked students only for their birth year, not their birth date—I randomly assigned 
students the numbers 1-12 for birth month, then subtracted their birth month and year from the test month 
and year to derive age.  The age range in a number of countries is as wide as 10-19 years old; because 
immigrants tend to be somewhat older than their native peers and their sample sizes are already small, I do 
not want to reduce their sample size further to just 14-year-olds.  13- to 15-year-olds are all conceivably 
still in middle school or early high school, and are just bumping up against the age at which students leave 
school in large numbers (Lehmann, 2004, p. 10). 
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international trend in students’ perceptions of an open classroom climate except for 
similar amounts of missing data between native and immigrant groups within countries.  
Where there are significant differences between immigrants and native students, native 
students do tend to perceive greater openness.     
Interestingly, only in Sweden and each central European country do immigrants 
have as much civic knowledge as native students; in all other countries, natives score 
higher on civic knowledge than their immigrant peers.  There are no international patterns 
of extracurricular participation across all countries or even by region, though there are 
several instances of native students being significantly more active in civic-oriented 
activities than immigrant students.   
Finally, on civic attitudes, we see native students in nearly every country having 
significantly more patriotic views of the country in which they live, whereas immigrants 
in a majority of countries favor significantly more inclusive attitudes toward ethnic 
minorities and immigrants, a somewhat intuitive finding.  However, in England, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, and Slovakia, native students’ attitudes toward ethnic minorities and 
immigrants are not significantly different from immigrants’ attitudes, suggesting either 
greater levels of immigrant integration or more progressive values on native students’ 
part.  Though there are no uniform international patterns of attitudes toward women’s 
rights, where there are significant differences—as in Germany, Sweden, and Italy—a 
higher proportion of native students hold highly positive attitudes toward women’s rights 
while higher proportions of immigrant students rank low.  
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C.2 Missing Data 
Nearly every country is missing data on a number of valuable independent 
variables, though there is no uniform pattern.  For example, for political reasons, 
Germany did not include stratification codes that would allow analysts to explicitly 
account for different representation of certain school types.  For various undisclosed 
reasons, most countries did not ask students to identify their ethnicity or nationality 
(which makes it impossible to address hypotheses about differential attitudes of students 
from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds).  Generally, student data are not missing 
country-wide; more often, they are missing because students did not answer items or did 
not answer completely, or because some school administrators chose not to administer 
certain items.  Students tend to be missing far more data on the number of books in their 
home (the proxy for socioeconomic status) than any other variable.  Missing data patterns 
in civic attitudes tend only to be slight, with immigrants in western and northern 
countries missing slightly more data than native students, while the opposite is true in 
central Europe. 
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Table C-1. Means and standard deviations for original data: Western Europe. 
  Belgium, n=2076 England, n=3043 Germany, n=3700 Switzerland, n=3104 
  Native Imm Miss Native Imm Miss Native Imm Miss Native Imm Miss 
Unweighted sample 
size 1869 198 9 2812 172 59 2931 692 77 2566 512 26 
Weighted percentage 
of total n 89.5 9.9 0.5 92.4 5.6 1.9 78.6 19.0 2.4 82.8 16.3 0.8 
% Female 49.5*  40.7      50.0    45.7     50.4     50.3       50.4     51.2         
(% Missing) 0.1     0.0       8.9      1.7       0.2      1.5        0.3        0.2        
Age 13.52 (0.02) 
13.98*** 
(0.08)   
14.21 
(0.01) 
14.23 
(0.04)   
14.30    
(.02) 
14.50*** 
(.05)   
14.40      
(0.02 
14.80***    
(0.04)   
(% Missing) 1.4 3.5  3.3 7.6  2.8 2.2  1.0 1.8  
B
oo
ks
 
Few 26.1 38.9**  27.1 29.7  24.9 39.6***  24.4 50.0***   
Average 21.9 16.7  23.3 20.9  24.7 22.7  25.8 21.3  
Many 33.3** 28.8  27.2 29.7  30.6*** 23.6  26.8*** 15.4  
(% Missing) 18.7 15.7  22.3 19.8  19.8 14.2  23.1*** 13.3  
%
 S
pe
ak
in
g 
sc
ho
ol
 
la
ng
ua
ge
 a
t h
om
e Never 0.9     8.4***    2.6     2.2       0.3      3.5***      1.2  9.0***   
Sometimes 6.8     23.1***   2.5     23.4***   2.5     24.2***   7.8     44.8***   
Always 84.4***  66.7     95.2***  73.6    81.6***  69.7  87.0*** 45.3   
(% Missing) 7.9     1.8       2.1      0.7       15.6    2.5  4.3      0.9   
Time in country -- 8.40 (0.38)   -- 
8.40  
(0.39)   -- 
10.84      
(0.18)   -- 
8.73       
(0.18)   
(% Missing) -- 3.5  -- 7.6  -- 2.2  -- 1.8  
Perception of an open 
classroom climate 
-0.40 
(0.03) 
-0.37 
(0.13)   
-0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.08 
(0.08)   
.14*     
(.02) 
.03     
(.04)   
0.16†     
(0.02) 
0.07      
(0.05)   
(% Missing) 10.7 17.2  10.3 12.2  2.0 3.9  2.1 1.2  
NOTES: ‘Miss’ represents numbers of students missing data on immigrant status.  Weighted percentages use the TOTWGT weight variable in original data.  
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Table C-1, cont. Means and standard deviations for original data: Western Europe. 
  Belgium England Germany Switzerland 
  Native Imm Miss Native Imm Miss Native Imm Miss Native Imm Miss 
Civic Outcomes                         
Civic knowledge -0.22† (0.01) 
-0.31 
(0.05)  
-0.11† 
(0.01) 
-0.18 
(0.04)  
-.08*** 
(1.0) 
-0.20    
(0.02)  
-0.11*** 
(0.01) 
-0.30    
(0.02)  
(% Missing) 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  
% Participating in 
extracurriculars 67.5    62.9      77.3     73.0       53.9      53.4        63.7***  51.8      
(% Missing) 8.5      15.3         0.0 0.0  8.5       9.4       5.9      10.1     
A
tt
itu
de
s t
ow
ar
ds
…
 
Country 
(Patriotism) 
-0.64*** 
(0.03) 
-1.07 
(0.08)   
-0.19*** 
(0.02) 
-0.62 
(0.06)   
-0.37*** 
(0.02) 
-0.60    
(0.04)   
-0.26***    
(0.02) 
-0.59    
(0.04)   
(% Missing) 2.8 6.1  6.0 8.7  1.0 2.6  0.7 1.0  
Ethnic 
minorities' 
rights 
0.08 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.10)   
0.27 
(0.02) 
0.23 
(0.09)   
-0.37    
(0.02) 
-0.04*** 
(0.05)   
-0.34    
(0.02) 
0.34***    
(0.05)   
(% Missing) 2.8 8.6  7.9 10.5  1.2 1.7  1.2 1.6  
Immigrants' 
rights 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.15 
(0.10)   
-0.11 
(0.02) 
0.07† 
(0.10)   
-0.41   
(0.02) 
-0.05***   
(0.05)   
-0.38    
(0.02) 
0.35***  
(0.05)   
(% Missing) 4.6 9.6  8.7 12.8  1.0 1.9  1.0 1.8  
W
om
en
's 
rig
ht
s 
 
Low 42.0    44.8      23.5    29.7†    32.3      37.1*    34.4       39.0         
Middle 19.9    16.7     21.8     19.6     22.1     22.2      19.9      19.6         
High 38.1    38.6     54.6    50.6     45.6* 40.7      44.7      41.5         
(% Missing) 2.8 7.6  7.0 10.5  0.8 1.6  0.5 1.2  
NOTES: ‘Miss’ represents numbers of students missing data on immigrant status.  Weighted percentages use the TOTWGT weight variable in original data.  
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Table C-1, cont. Means and standard deviations for original data: Nordic countries. 
  Denmark, n=3094 Norway, n=3264 Sweden, n=2964 
    Native Imm Miss Native Imm Miss Native Imm Miss 
Unweighted sample 
size 2876 218 0 3061 203 0 2599 365 0 
Weighted percentage 
of total n 93.0 7.0 0.0 94.1 5.9 0.0 91.7 8.3 0.0 
% Female 50.0     50.6            50.7     49.0       51.2     54.2       
(% Missing) 0.0        0.9        0.1        1.2        0.1     0.4       
Age 14.33     (0.01) 
14.44*     
(0.04)   
14.28    
(0.9) 
14.40**    
(4.0)   
13.83     
(0.01) 
13.93*   
(0.05)   
(% Missing) 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  
B
oo
ks
 Few 21.9 36.2***  16.5 37.0***  17.7 47.4***   
Average 22.6 23.4  20.3 19.2  21.9 19.5  
Many 34.0*** 21.6  37.4*** 30.1  37.8*** 17.3  
(% Missing) 21.5 18.8  25.8 20.2  22.7 15.9  
%
 S
pe
ak
in
g 
sc
ho
ol
 
la
ng
ua
ge
 a
t h
om
e Never 1.0        5.0**    0.7      39.9***   0.9      11.8***    
Sometimes 1.2       33.4***   1.8       39.9***   3.3      39.3***  
Always 76.1***  58.0       81.5*** 46.3  64.6*** 47.2  
(% Missing) 21.2     3.6        16.0     4.6        31.2       1.6         
Time in country -- 9.10       (0.28)   -- 
9.15     
(0.30)   -- 
9.28    
(0.23)   
(% Missing) -- 0.0  -- 0.0  -- 0.0  
Perception of an open 
classroom climate 
-0.05       
(0.02) 
-0.15      
(0.08)   
0.26*     
(0.02) 
0.11     
(0.06)   
0.06    
(0.03) 
0.02     
(0.06)   
(% Missing) 5.9 8.7  3.7 0.4  4.8 7.7  
Civic Outcomes                   
Civic knowledge -0.07***     (0.01) 
-0.27         
(-0.33)  
-0.02***    
(0.9) 
-0.25    
(0.03)  
-0.10*** 
(0.01) 
-0.32     
(0.03)  
(% Missing) 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  
% Participating in 
extracurriculars 86.0**  75.2           89.8**     82.7          78.5       73.9          
(% Missing) 2.0       7.3         3.3        5.6         6.2       10.1       
A
tt
itu
de
s t
ow
ar
ds
…
 
Country 
(Patriotism) 
0.02***     
(0.02) 
-0.38       
(-.07)   
0.08***   
(0.02) 
-0.38   
(0.07)   
-0.21***    
(0.03) 
-0.79     
(0.08)   
(% Missing) 1.9 2.8  1.5 2.5  2.6 4.7  
Ethnic minorities' 
rights 
-0.20     
(0.02) 
(0.22)***     
(0.07)   
0.15    
(0.02) 
0.22    
(0.07)   
0.04      
(0.03) 
0.21*     
(0.07)   
(% Missing) 2.9 4.6  2.9 3.4  6.8 5.5  
Immigrants' 
rights 
-0.22     
(0.02) 
0.45***    
(0.08)   
0.14    
(0.02) 
0.67***  
(0.09)   
0.33     
(0.03) 
1.04***    
(0.08)   
(% Missing) 2.0 4.1  2.3 3.9  2.5 2.5  
W
om
en
's 
rig
ht
s Low 24.2     28.1       23.7     27.5       29.2     43.0**   
Middle 21.5      19.4        21.1     24.9      25.9     26.1      
High 54.4      52.6         55.2*  47.6      44.9***  30.8    
(% Missing) 1.7 3.2   2.2 3.0   2.1 2.5   
NOTES: ‘Miss’ represents numbers of students missing data on immigrant status.  Weighted percentages 
use the TOTWGT weight variable in original data.  
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Table C-1, cont. Means and standard deviations for original data: Southern European countries. 
  Greece, n=3390 Italy, n=3808 Portugal, n=3045 
    Native Imm Miss Native Imm Miss Native Imm Miss 
Unweighted sample size 3194 196 0 3728 80 0 2889 156 0 
Weighted percentage of 
total n 94.2 5.8 0.0 97.8 2.2 0.0 95.0 5.0 0.0 
% Female 51.5     56.3        51.7      46.3       52.5     53.9       
(% Missing) 1.0      0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  
Age 14.13     (0.01) 
14.63*** 
(0.05)  
14.46    
(0.01) 
15.25***    
(0.16)  
13.88     
(0.02) 
14.08*     
(0.08)  
(% Missing) 0.0 0.0  0.1 1.2  0.0 0.0  
B
oo
ks
 
Few 41.5 54.1*  45.2* 40.0  57.5 57.7  
Average 26.9 23.0  24.3 25.0  20.0 22.4  
Many 16.0 14.3  14.4 23.8*  11.2 8.3  
(% Missing) 15.6 8.7  16.1 11.3  11.3 11.5  
%
 S
pe
ak
in
g 
sc
ho
ol
 
la
ng
ua
ge
 a
t h
om
e Never 0.1      3.6**   2.9       13.8**   0.25     3.0*  
Sometimes 0.10      22.6***   18.1        26.7†  1.5       19.6***  
Always 99.5***  73.2       71.9*  59.4      81.5      77.3        
(% Missing) 0.3      6.2       7.1          --  16.8        --  
Time in country -- 7.91     (0.28)  -- 
9.03     
(0.47)  -- 
7.62       
(0.33)  
(% Missing) -- 0.0  -- 0.01  -- 0.0  
Perception of an open 
classroom climate 
0.20      
(0.02) 
0.12      
(0.07)  
0.12**      
(0.02) 
-0.16     
(0.14)  
-0.22       
(0.01) 
-0.24         
(0.07)  
(% Missing) 1.6 3.1  0.9 1.2  2.8 1.3  
Civic Outcomes                   
Civic knowledge 0.09**   (0.01) 
-0.02    
(0.03)  
0.03***    
(0.01) 
-0.18     
(0.06)  
-0.19      
(0.01) 
-0.18      
(0.03)  
(% Missing) 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  
% Participating in 
extracurriculars 88.2* 81.9        44.1      58.7*  67.0       69.3       
(% Missing) 0.4     --  2.4      --  6.2       7.2        
A
tt
itu
de
s t
ow
ar
ds
…
 
Country 
(Patriotism) 
0.83***    
(0.02) 
0.17     
(0.07)  
-0.13†      
(0.01) 
-0.31     
(0.10)  
0.47***     
(0.02) 
0.11    
(0.07)  
(% Missing) 0.4 2.5  0.6 3.8  1.4 1.3  
Ethnic 
minorities' rights 
0.14     
(0.02) 
0.27**   
(0.06)  
-0.05     
(0.02) 
-0.04     
(0.12)  
0.28     
(0.02) 
0.36     
(0.07)  
(% Missing) 1.3 2.0  1.4 3.8  2.0 1.9  
Immigrants' 
rights 
0.29    
(0.02) 
0.60***   
(0.07)  
-0.07     
(0.01) 
0.12     
(0.12)  
0.18      
(0.02) 
0.47***    
(0.07)  
(% Missing) 1.3 2.0  0.8 2.5  1.8 1.3  
W
om
en
's 
rig
ht
s Low 38.7       40.8        37.6      47.8†  33.4       30.8        
Medium 25.3      21.7        28.7       30.6       31.9        33.4       
High 36.0       37.6       33.7** 21.7       34.7         35.7          
(% 
Missing) 0.6 1.5  0.4 2.5  1.2 1.3  
NOTES: ‘Miss’ represents numbers of students missing data on immigrant status.  Weighted percentages 
use the TOTWGT weight variable in original data.  
  
265 
Table C-1, cont. Means and standard deviations for original data: Central Europe. 
  Czech Republic, n= 3607 Hungary, n=3167 Slovakia, n=3463 
    Native Imm Miss Native Imm Miss Native Imm Miss 
Unweighted sample size 3535 61 11 3064 80 23 3387 64 12 
Weighted percentage of 
total n 97.8 1.6 0.5 96.6 2.6 0.8 97.9 1.8 0.3 
% Female 51.1        53.2          50.0       40.6         52.2      32.2         
(% Missing) 0.1          --  0.2       1.4         -- --  
Age 13.90       (1.2) 
13.94       
(0.11)   
13.92       
(0.01) 
14.06      
(0.07)   
13.75      
(0.01) 
13.8     
(0.08)   
(% Missing) 0.50 1.6  0.8 0.0  0.0 0.0  
B
oo
ks
 
Few 9.5 13.1  15.4 25.0  20.2 21.9   
Average 23.7 31.2  20.3 12.5  27.8 23.4  
Many 35.1 31.2  40.0 36.3  26.5 26.6  
(% Missing) 31.7 24.6  24.3 26.3  25.4 28.1  
%
 S
pe
ak
in
g 
sc
ho
ol
 
la
ng
ua
ge
 a
t h
om
e Never 0.20       14.1*    0.0      5.0*    1.9      7.6        
Sometimes 1.0        18.7*   0.5       3.2        7.4        7.2         
Always 88.1**  64.9         75.4       89.7***   88.2       85.2        
(% Missing) 10.8  2.2   24.1 2.1    2.4 --  
Time in country -- 9.93        (0.76)   -- 
9.47      
(0.43)   -- 
10.54       
(0.58)   
(% Missing) -- 1.6  -- 0.0  -- 0.0  
Perception of an open 
classroom climate 
-0.33        
(0.02) 
0.05**       
(0.15)   
-0.36*     
(0.02) 
-0.46    
(0.12)   
0.02    
(0.02) 
-0.18      
(0.13)   
(% Missing) 0.7 0.0  1.2 2.5  1.1 0.0  
Civic Outcomes                   
Civic knowledge -0.04       (0.9) 
-0.04       
(7.4)  
-0.06      
(0.8) 
-0.1     
(0.06)  
0.03      
(0.01) 
-0.02      
(0.06)  
(% Missing) 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  
% Participating in 
extracurriculars 63.0*  45.5       70.8       73.8        23.4       41.6†      
(% Missing) 0.8      2.8       0.6       --  2.5      5.3        
A
tt
itu
de
s t
ow
ar
ds
…
 
Country 
(Patriotism) 
0.20***     
(0.02) 
-0.23     
(0.12)   
0.12      
(0.15) 
0.06      
(0.1)   
0.33***   
(0.02) 
-0.07      
(0.11)   
(% Missing) 0.3 0.0  0.1 0.0  0.1 0.0  
Ethnic 
minorities' rights 
0.01      
(0.02) 
0.18       
(0.17)   
-0.26      
(0.02) 
0.07*      
(0.09)   
-0.07      
(0.02) 
0.1     
(0.12)   
(% Missing) 0.4 0.0  0.3 0.0  0.4 0.0  
Immigrants' 
rights 
0.01     
(0.02) 
0.20     
(0.20)   
-0.24     
(0.02) 
0.19***     
(0.1)   
-0.09     
(0.02) 
-0.1    
(0.09)   
(% Missing) 0.6 0.0  0.3 0.0  0.3 0.0  
W
om
en
's
 r
ig
ht
s Low 38.8      46.9          45.3       49.2       47.1     47.1        
Middle 30.7       33.3        26.8        24.7        32.2    31.6         
High 30.5† 19.8        27.9       26.2        20.7      21.3       
(% Missing) 0.2 0.0  0.1 0.0  0.2 0.0  
NOTES: ‘Miss’ represents numbers of students missing data on immigrant status.  Weighted percentages 
use the TOTWGT weight variable in original data.  
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Appendix D 
Technical Notes on Variables and Analytic Methods 
 
D.1 Civic Knowledge & Skills: Example Items from the 38-Item Test 
The variable measuring students’ civic knowledge and interpretative skills is 
based on students’ scores on 38 multiple-choice items on the test portion of the CIVED 
survey.  Five of the released items from the test that make up this score are presented here 
as examples of the types of questions students were asked (Torney-Purta et al., 2001).  
Examples A, B, and C test knowledge; D and E test interpretative skill.  Correct answers 
are followed by an asterisk.   
Example A. Which of the following is most likely to cause a government to be 
called non-democratic? 
A. People are prevented from criticizing the government.* 
B. The political parties criticize each other often. 
C. People must pay very high taxes. 
D. Every citizen has the right to a job. 
 
Example B. In a democratic country [society] having many organizations for 
people to join is important because this provides ... 
A. a group to defend members who are arrested. 
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B. many sources of taxes for the government. 
C. opportunities to express different points of view.* 
D. a way for the government to tell people about new laws. 
 
Example C. In democratic countries what is the function of having more than one 
political party? 
A. To represent different opinions [interests] in the national legislature [e.g. 
Parliament, Congress].* 
B. To limit political corruption. 
C. To prevent political demonstrations. 
D. To encourage economic competition. 
 
 Example D.  
 
 
 
 
This is an election leaflet which has probably been issued by ... 
A. the Silver Party. 
B. a party or group in opposition to the Silver Party.* 
C. a group which tries to be sure elections are fair. 
D. the Silver Party and the Gold Party together. 
 
We citizens have had enough! 
A vote for the Silver Party means a vote for higher taxes. 
It means an end to economic growth and a waste of our nation’s resources. 
Vote instead for economic growth and free enterprise. 
Vote for more money left in everyone’s wallet! 
Let’s not waste another 4 years! 
VOTE FOR THE GOLD PARTY. 
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Example E.  What is the message or main point of this cartoon?  History 
textbooks … 
A. are sometimes changed to avoid mentioning problematic events from the past.* 
B. for children must be shorter than books written for adults. 
C. are full of information that is not interesting. 
D. should be written using a computer and not a pencil. 
 
 
 
D.2 Gini Coefficient 
This measure of income inequality within a country is defined as the area between 
what is called the ‘Lorenz curve’ and a 45-degree line, as a ratio of the whole triangle.  
The Lorenz curve “plots cumulative shares of the population, from the poorest to the 
richest, against the cumulative share of income that they receive” (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, n.d.).  The coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, with 
0 representing perfect equality—each ‘share’ of the population gets the same share of 
income—and 1 representing perfect inequality—all income goes to the share of the 
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population with the highest income.  Therefore, lower values represent greater equality.  
See Figure 8-1 for a graphic representation, where A is the 45-degree line and B is the 
Lorenz curve.  If the curve matched the line, the Gini coefficient would be 0.  As a point 
of reference, the average for all 20 European, OECD-member countries that have data for 
“around 2000” is 0.29, ranging from 0.23 in Denmark to 0.37 in the United Kingdom.64  
This range is much smaller than the range for the world in general.  I multiplied all Gini 
coefficients by 100 to make results more easily interpretable.  Again, because there are 9 
unique values across only 13 observations at this level, it would be misleading to call 
these data normally distributed, but there are tails on either side, so they approximate a 
normal distribution. 
 
Figure 8-1. The Gini coefficient: the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line.  (Source: 
The World Bank, http://go.worldbank.org/3SLYUTVY00) 
 
                                                
64 The Gini coefficient is not measured separately for member countries of the United Kingdom, so I am 
forced to use the whole UK’s value for England. 
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D.3 Analyses 
D.3.1 Descriptive Analyses 
I tested the differences between immigrants’ and native students’ means on civic 
outcomes for statistical significance using the -lincom- command in StataSE v.11 
software.  This command takes any covariance between immigrants’ and native students’ 
means into account in testing the difference between those means, allows weighting with 
sampling weights, and produces a t statistic, so is similar to a t-test.  I tested differences 
on categorical outcomes (e.g., number of books in the home) for statistical significance 
using chi-square tests.  
 
D.3.2 Multilevel Models and Analyses 
Fully Unconditional Models and the calculation of intraclass correlation 
coefficients (ICCs).  The universal characteristic of Fully Unconditional Models is that 
there are no independent variables included at any level.  However, since the model 
structure, assumptions, and estimates vary for continuous (e.g., patriotism), dichotomous 
(e.g., extracurricular participation), and ordinal (e.g., attitudes toward women’s rights) 
outcomes, here I provide detail about each, including how to calculate the ICC for these 
three different types of dependent variables. 
Continuous outcomes.  Below is an example FUM for a continuous outcome 
such as patriotism: 
LEVEL 1 (Students):  Yijk = π0jk + eijk 
LEVEL 2 (Schools):  π0jk = β00k + r0jk 
LEVEL 3 (Countries): β00k = γ000 + u00k 
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MIXED:   Yijk = γ000 + u00k + r0jk + eijk 
In this model, Yijk is the dependent variable of interest (patriotism), π0jk is the mean level 
of patriotism in school j in country k, eijk is the unique effect for student i on the mean in 
school j in country k, β00k is the mean level of patriotism across all schools in country k, 
r0jk is the unique effect of school j on the overall mean of country k, γ000 is the overall 
mean level of civic knowledge across all countries, and u00k is the unique effect of 
country k on the overall mean.   
Let σ2 represent the variance in the outcome that exists within schools (eijk), τ00 
represent variance between schools (r0jk), and τ000 represent variance between countries 
(u00k).  Then the intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) for continuous outcomes are: 
ICCschool = τ00 + τ000 
 σ2 + τ00 + τ000 
ICCcountry    = τ000 
 σ2 + τ00 + τ000 
 
Dichotomous outcomes.  Because extracurricular participation is dichotomous 
(students do or do not participate), I use HLM’s Bernoulli (logistic regression) function, 
which calculates the log-odds of participation.  While Levels 2 and 3 are built the same 
way as for a continuous outcome, Level 1 for a dichotomous outcome is different: 
LEVEL 1: Prob(Yijk=1 | πjk) = φijk 
  Log[φijk /(1-φijk)] = ηijk  
  ηijk = π0jk 
In this model, Yijk is extracurricular participation, πjk represents the mean log-odds of 
students’ participation in extracurricular activities across schools, φijk is the odds of a 
student participating in extracurricular activities, and ηijk is the predicted log-odds of a 
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student participating in extracurricular activities.   
Intraclass correlation coefficients for dichotomous outcomes must be calculated 
differently, as well.  The variance of a logistic (binary: 0 or 1) distribution at Level 1 
(within schools, or between students) is constant, equivalent to π2/3, so the ICCs are 
calculated as follows (Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 2004, p. 60): 
ICCschool = τ00 + τ000 
 π2/3 + τ00 + τ000 
ICCcountry    = τ000 
 π2/3 + τ00 + τ000 
  
Ordinal outcomes.  Because attitude toward women’s rights is a three-category, 
ordinal variable, I use HLM’s proportional odds function, which calculates the 
probability of scoring in a lower category versus a higher one.  Output for this sort of 
model is in the form of cumulative log-odds of having a lower score than a higher one.  
Again, Levels 2 and 3 are the same as those for a continuous outcome, but Level 1 for an 
ordinal outcome is different, as it is based on the number of categories being modeled 
(three in my case: low, middle, high): 
LEVEL 1: Prob[Rijk = 1 | πjk]  = φʹ′ijk(1) = φijk(1)  
  Prob[Rijk <= 2 | πjk] = φʹ′ijk(2) = φijk(1) + φijk(2)  
  Prob[Rijk <= 3 | πjk] = 1.0 
This model is similar to the Bernoulli model for the binary outcome, but requires 
calculating cumulative log-odds of a student falling into a lower category than a higher 
one (i.e., having a less positive attitude toward women’s rights).  Thus, Rijk represents a 
student’s category (1, 2, or 3) and πjk is the mean log-odds of falling into a lower category 
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than a higher one across schools.  Therefore, the probability that a student falls into 
category 1, 2, or 3—given the mean log-odds of falling into a lower category—is 1.0 (see 
the third line; this is a given because students must fall into one of these categories).  
φʹ′ijk(1) and φʹ′ijk(2) represent, respectively, functions of the odds of scoring a 1, and a 1 or 2 
(i.e., lower than 3).  φijk(1) and φijk(2) are the odds of scoring a 1 or a 2, respectively.  ICCs 
for ordinal variables are calculated as for dichotomous outcomes, with π2/3 as the Level 1 
variance. 
Main effect of immigrant status: A within-school model.  Here is an example 
of such a model, an equation that represents the relationships between immigrant status 
and patriotism (I wait until RQs 1a and 1b to include covariates or controls): 
Patriotismijk = π0jk + π1jkImmigrant + eijk  
These parameters can be interpreted this way for student i in school j in country k: 
π0jk = Mean level of patriotism for students in school j and country k 
π1jk = Mean difference in levels of patriotism between immigrant and native-born  
        students in school j and country k 
eijk = Student i’s unique error term in school j and country k 
Note that I am, at the outset, interested in whether students’ overall means or the 
difference in means between immigrant and native students are significantly different 
between schools and countries.  While significant differences exist between boys and 
girls, and between students who are monolingual and multilingual, I limit myself to 
investigating just the differences between immigrants and native-born students because of 
my research questions. 
Moderating effects of school features on overall outcome levels and the 
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relationship between immigrant status and outcomes: A between-school model.  This 
between-classroom model involves a set of level 2 equations like this: 
π0jk = β00k + r0jk 
π1jk = β10k + β11kSchool Average Books in Students’ Homes + r1jk 
where β00k is the mean level of patriotism across all schools in country k, r0jk is the unique 
effect of school j in country k on the mean level of patriotism, β10k is the overall mean 
difference in levels of patriotism between immigrant and native-born students, β11k is the 
mean change in the difference between immigrant and native students’ levels of 
patriotism for every one unit of change in school average number of books (in this case, 
that would be one standard deviation), and r1jk is the unique effect of school j in country k 
on the mean difference in immigrant and native levels of patriotism.   
Moderating effects of national characteristics on the relationship between 
immigrant status and outcomes: A between-country model.  This is a three-level, 
between-country model that involves a set of level 3 equations like this: 
β00k = γ000 + u00k 
β10k = γ100 + γ11kGini + u10k 
where γ000 is the mean level of patriotism across all thirteen countries (the grand mean), 
u00k is the unique effect of country k on the grand mean, γ100 is the overall mean 
difference in levels of patriotism between immigrant and native-born students, γ110 is the 
mean change in the difference between immigrant and native students’ levels of 
patriotism for every one unit of change in a country’s Gini coefficient in a country (in this 
case, that would be one hundredth of a point), and u10k is the unique effect of country k on 
the mean difference in immigrant and native levels of patriotism.   
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Appendix E 
Within-School Interaction Effects 
 
You will recall from Chapter 5 that numerous demographic characteristics tend to 
be more significantly related to civic outcomes than immigrant status.  A compelling 
question is to what extent those characteristics are related to somewhat different 
outcomes for immigrant and native students.  Models that answer this question include 
interactions of immigrant status with several demographic variables to show how 
characteristics have different effects for immigrants and native students.65  This 
discussion builds on that already presented in Chapter 5. 
 
E.1 Civic Knowledge and Interpretive Skills 
Beginning with civic knowledge and skills, in Table E-1 we see that girls score 
somewhat lower than boys, though not by much more than a tenth of a standard deviation 
(immigrant girls score much lower than immigrant boys in Hungary, the only country for 
which this is the case, γ = -0.301, p < .05).  In several countries, students who are older 
than the target age range—i.e., older than 16 years—score lower than their younger 
peers, and generally this is true for students overall, not just immigrants or just natives.  
                                                
65 Sometimes, even when they are not significant, interactions improve a model’s ‘fit,’ or how well it is 
able to use data to estimate effects.  This is why some non-significant interactions are included in within-
school models.  I used HLM’s general linear hypothesis testing feature to determine whether interactions 
improved models’ fit.  
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This is another indication that those students may have been held back at some point for 
low achievement.   
Students with few books in their home or who don’t speak the school language at 
home consistently score significantly lower than students with an average number of 
books or who always speak the school language at home.  These effects are somewhat 
different for immigrant students in certain countries.  For example, consider Sweden.  
Monolingual immigrants score nearly three-tenths of a standard deviation below 
monolingual native students (γ = -.288, p < .001).  Even native-born students, if they 
never speak the school language at home, score nearly four tenths of a standard deviation 
lower than monolingual native students (γ = -.388, p < .001).  However, this model shows 
that immigrants who never speak the school language at home know more about civics 
than natives who never speak the school language at home (γ = .454, p < .05).  See Figure 
E-1 for an illustration of this phenomenon.   
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Figure E-1. The relationship of home language to differences in immigrants' and native students' 
civic knowledge and interpretive skills in Sweden. 
 
E.2 Extracurricular Participation 
We see in Table E-2 that girls are generally more participatory than boys, but 
home language is generally not associated with extracurricular participation (exceptions: 
England and Hungary, where occasional non-school language speakers are more likely to 
participate).  The longer a student has lived in the country, generally the more likely he or 
she is to be involved in extracurricular activities, except in southern and central Europe.    
 
E.3 Attitudes toward Women’s Rights and Opportunities 
Analyses of students’ attitudes toward women’s rights (Table E-3) show that in all 
countries, regardless of immigrant status, girls are much more likely to be highly 
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supportive (54 to 83 percent less likely to fall into a lower category), an expected finding 
(for an example of this in Hungary, see Figure E-2; note that the difference between 
immigrant boys and immigrant girls is the same as the difference between native boys 
and native girls).  Norwegian immigrant girls, however, are actually much less likely to 
be supportive than native Norwegian girls (OR = 2.742, p < .05).   
 
Figure E-2. The relationship of gender with Hungarian adolescents' attitudes toward women's rights: 
The same, regardless of immigrant status. 
 
Findings vary regarding language of the home, though.  In Switzerland, Denmark, 
and Sweden, being multilingual increases the likelihood of strong support for women’s 
rights (odds ratios less than 1), but in Greece, Italy, and Czech Republic, multilingualism 
decreases that likelihood (odds ratios greater than 1).  These effects are different for 
natives and immigrants in some countries, though.  In Sweden, for example, a native 
student who sometimes speaks a non-school language at home is more likely to be 
supportive of women’s rights (OR = .630, p < .05), but an immigrant student is less likely 
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to be so (interaction OR = 2.007, p < .05). 
 
E.4 Attitudes toward Immigrants’ Rights and Opportunities 
Table E-4 shows that girls do tend, overall, to be more supportive of immigrants’ 
rights, but in Norway, for example, the ‘effect’ of being a girl is not as strong for 
immigrant girls as native girls (interaction γ = -.542, p < .01), while in Czech Republic, 
the effect of being a girl is positively compounded for immigrant girls (interaction γ = 
.431, p < .05).  Effectively, controlling for other characteristics: in Norway, immigrant 
girls are about as supportive of immigrants’ rights as immigrant boys, but in Czech 
Republic, immigrant girls are much more supportive of immigrants’ rights than their 
male peers. 
In western and Nordic Europe, occasionally speaking a non-school language at 
home is significantly positively associated with support for immigrants’ rights, though 
this relationship is frequently different for immigrants than for natives.  In several 
countries, native students who are occasional speakers of a non-school language are 
actually more pro-immigrants’ rights than immigrant students who are occasional 
speakers of a non-school language (note the effects for language sometimes and the 
interaction of immigrant status and language sometimes in western and Nordic Europe).  
Figure E-3 helps clarify this situation, as it shows the relationship of home language to 
differences in immigrants’ and native students’ attitudes toward immigrants’ rights in 
Switzerland.  ‘Sometimes’ multilinguals are more supportive of immigrants’ rights in 
both groups, but the ‘sometimes’ immigrant multilinguals are less supportive than their 
‘sometimes’ native peers.   
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Figure E-3. The relationship of home language with differences in immigrants' and native students' 
attitudes toward immigrants' rights in Switzerland. 
 
E.5 Attitudes toward Ethnic Minorities’ Rights and Opportunities 
For this outcome (Table E-5), we see similar patterns to those for attitudes toward 
immigrants’ rights.  Again girls are universally significantly more supportive of ethnic 
minorities’ right to respect and opportunities for education, employment, and political 
office.  In countries where the effect of being female is different for natives and 
immigrants (Germany, Denmark, Norway), immigrant girls are still more supportive than 
immigrant boys, but the gap between those groups is not as large as the gap between 
native girls and native boys.   
Language of the home is not consistently related to this attitude.  More often in 
western and Nordic Europe, multilingualism is associated with greater support for ethnic 
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minorities’ rights, though these effects are frequently different for immigrants than for 
native students (the effect of being multilingual is not as strong for immigrants as for 
natives).   
 
E.6 Patriotism 
Table E-6 shows that in Switzerland, Norway, and Sweden, though girls tend to 
be significantly less patriotic than boys, in several countries there is not quite so large a 
difference between immigrant girls’ and immigrant boys’ patriotism (England and 
Sweden, for example).  Though multilingual native students are much less patriotic than 
monolingual natives, multilingual immigrants are more patriotic than their native peers 
(see Figure E-4 for the Norwegian example).  In other cases, multilingual immigrants are 
even less patriotic than their native peers, possibly reflecting a stronger attachment to the 
familial homeland. 
 
E.7 Discussion 
Since I have just described results by outcome, in this discussion I summarize the 
findings according to independent variables.  It is rare that immigrant status has one 
constant, main effect for all immigrants; more often, these students’ outcomes vary by 
gender, home language, and number of books in the home (proxying, as you’ll recall, for 
socioeconomic status).   
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Figure E-4. The relationship of home language with differences in Norwegian adolescents' 
patriotism. 
 
Gender and books in the home.  While these variables were included as 
statistical controls, there are several interesting relationships with each that I believe are 
worth commenting on. 
Gender.  Across countries, gender has a fairly consistent relationship with 
outcomes.  Girls tend to have less civic knowledge and skills, are less patriotic, but 
participate in civic-oriented extracurricular activities more.  Other research has shown 
that each of these outcomes tend to be somewhat different for boys and girls generally 
(girls know either as much or somewhat less and participate more), and this is true of 
immigrant and minority youth, as well (Flanagan & Faison, 2001).   
Girls are also significantly more supportive of rights for all three traditionally 
marginalized groups.  This confirms previous studies’ findings.  Work on young people’s 
sociopolitical attitudes has found strong gender differences: girls tend to be much more 
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tolerant (understandably) of rights and economic opportunities for women, and they are 
also more supportive of rights for and tolerance of ethnic minorities and immigrants 
(Husfeldt, 2004; Torney-Purta, Wilkenfeld, & Barber, 2008).  This seems to be because 
females in general are more likely to be concerned with social justice and human rights 
than males.  For example, other researchers have found adolescent girls to be more 
tolerant than boys of rights for feminists, homosexuals, and even racists.   
There is no sense that immigrant girls are consistently different from immigrant 
boys across outcomes or countries, though.  Rather, in a few instances, the ‘effect’ of 
being a girl is compounded for immigrants, as in Germany on women’s rights, or is 
weakened for immigrants, as in Norway on women’s rights (e.g., girls tend to be much 
more supportive of women’s rights, but immigrant girls in Germany are even more so, 
while immigrant girls in Norway are less so).  A weakening of the overall effect is more 
prevalent, and especially on patriotism.  In western and Nordic Europe, controlling for all 
else, while native girls are significantly different from native boys in their affection for 
their country, immigrant girls tend to be more like immigrant boys, i.e. have more similar 
degrees of patriotism.  It seems that in those regions, with longer histories of immigration 
and more prominent problems with immigrant integration, immigrant students’ 
experiences may really be most defined by being immigrants. 
Number of books in the home.  In some studies, students of lower SES appear to 
be significantly less supportive of rights for marginalized groups, perhaps because they 
feel their and their families’ security is threatened by outsiders (Hjerm, 2005).  Other 
studies have not shown socioeconomic status to be significantly related to xenophobia 
(Torney-Purta, Wilkenfeld, & Barber, 2008).  In my study, number of books (considered 
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as a weak proxy for socioeconomic status) has the most consistent relationship with civic 
knowledge and skills, and extracurricular participation.  In both instances, across 
countries there are strong patterns: having more books is related to greater civic 
knowledge and to a higher likelihood of civic participation.  Generally these effects are 
not different for natives and immigrants, but where they are, there are inconsistent 
findings: the effect of number of books may be compounded or weakened for 
immigrants.  On other outcomes there tend not to be obvious patterns of relationships, 
either.  One exception is women’s rights, where, in a few countries, students with more 
books are more likely to be highly supportive of women’s rights.  Supporting this finding 
is that in another few countries, students with fewer books than average are significantly 
less supportive.  This may speak to the idea that those who have greater material security 
are more open to rights for those at society’s margins, while those with fewer resources 
feel more threatened by people at the margins. 
Home language.  The measure of how frequently students speak the school 
language at home has been used by several other researchers as an indicator of native-
born students’ ethnic minority status, or having an immigration background (parents or 
grandparents who were immigrants).  Additionally, if immigrants are monolingual in the 
school language, they and their families are likely to be particularly well integrated into 
the host society.  These interpretations, if true, are very helpful in making sense of these 
findings.  Where students’ home language is different from the school language, i.e., are 
multilingual, generally patriotism and civic knowledge and skills are lower, but support 
of immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ rights is greater.  Regarding immigrants’ and 
native-born multilingual students’ lower levels of patriotism, it may be that they see 
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themselves as treated differently by the ethnic majority in their countries both socially 
and politically.  Furthermore it is likely that they and their parents have strong emotional 
and social ties to the country of origin still. 
In some cases, as I showed, multilingualism is more beneficial for immigrants’ 
civic knowledge than for natives’ civic knowledge.  This may be related to the very likely 
reason that immigrants’ families immigrated in the first place: greater economic 
opportunities and a ‘better future’ for their children.  In immigrant families, there tend to 
be great pressures on students to achieve highly in school because parents see academic 
achievement as the ticket to that better future.  Immigrant adolescents who speak a non-
school language at home with some frequency are likely to be well attached to and 
respectful of their parents’ wishes, and thus strive harder for academic achievement (Coll 
& Magnuson, 1997; Fuligni, 1997). 
Astoundingly, though, in western and Nordic Europe, multilingualism has an 
unexpectedly less positive relationship with immigrants’ attitudes toward immigrants’ 
and ethnic minorities’ rights.  This means that in countries in those regions, with better 
established minority communities, multilingual natives are more pro-rights for minorities 
than multilingual immigrants.  Perhaps this is an indication that these multilingual 
immigrant students, with the ability to operate in two cultures’ languages, are wrestling to 
some extent with assimilation.  Their ability to code-switch linguistically may extend to 
cultural code-switching, so when they see that native students tend to be less supportive 
of rights for minorities, they claim to be less supportive, as well, to fit in better.  Perhaps, 
too, multilingual native students feel confident in and comfortable with both cultures, and 
have developed pride in their parents’ background, without feeling that they have to 
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reject it.   
Length of residence in the country.  Students who have lived in the country 
longer tend to be less knowledgeable about civics and have less positive views of 
immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ rights, but these same students tend to have greater 
odds of civic participation.  Generally these findings apply to all students regardless of 
immigrant status, but in a few countries, immigrants who have been in residence longer 
are more knowledgeable.  The findings do suggest greater integration with the native 
population, though. 
In summary, these relationships are quite changeable across countries and 
outcomes, such that gender generally makes no difference for immigrants’ and natives’ 
civic knowledge or participation, but in several northern and western European countries 
creates different relationships with patriotism.  Several other patterns are identifiable by 
geographic region.  In Nordic and western Europe and Greece, immigrants who 
frequently speak both the school and home language are significantly less supportive of 
immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ rights.  This striking finding suggests that immigrants 
in these countries may perceive that integration requires a certain denigration of and 
intolerance toward minorities (though this is not borne out necessarily by findings on 
native students’ attitudes).  It would appear that these students have overcompensated, 
strongly rejecting that which most defines them.  Perceiving that who they are is not 
acceptable to mainstream society, their attitudes may be in some ways akin to those of 
aggressively anti-gay rights American politicians who eventually come out of the closet.  
In those same regions, immigrants’ access to books at home is also strongly 
negatively related to their attitudes toward immigrants’ rights (fewer books = stronger 
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support of immigrants’ rights; a statistically negative relationship, not philosophically), 
opposite of native students, whose attitudes are unrelated to their access to books.  
Despite having fewer educational resources, perhaps these immigrants cling to the idea of 
social mobility in their host country and are thus strongly in favor of pro-immigrant 
policies.  
These findings on the interaction between immigrant status and demographic 
variables show clearly that immigrants cannot be perceived as a universal demographic 
‘block’ that experiences schools and views democracy in one common way (which 
supports previous studies’ comments on the lack of solidarity among immigrant 
populations (Klopp, 2002, p. 8).  Rather, immigrants differ from one another in numerous 
ways, dependent on their country of residence.  Future research should certainly include a 
better measure of immigrants’ countries of origin, which would add a valuable dimension 
to understandings of immigrants’ diverse experiences.  
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Table E-1. Civic knowledge and interpretive skills: Within-school results by region and country, with interaction effects. 
 Western Europe Nordic Europe Southern Europe Central Europe 
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FIXED EFFECTS              
Mean civic knldg/skills -.197*** -.083** -.111*** -.114*** -.023† .074** -.047* .113*** .041† -.175*** .169*** -.040† .127*** 
Immigrant gapa  -.663* .088 -.056** -.521* -.030 -.091 -.288*** -2.176*** -.244* -1.307*** -1.224*** -.593* .160* 
Femaleb   -.008 -.047 -.107*** -.079*** -.120*** -.166* -.078** .024 -.024 -.055** -.108*** -.043* -.049* 
Under-agec .137  -.084 -.031          
Over-agec .001  -.069*** -.035 -.097 -.182† -.304 -.046 .014 .147** .352*** -.291*** -.244 
Books: Fewd -.054* -.174*** -.068*** -.088*** -.171*** -.133** -.119** -.144*** -.097*** -.108*** -.138*** -.158*** -.111*** 
Books: Manyd .108*** .172*** .090** .074*** .080** .165*** .155*** .122** .045† .111** .127*** .145*** .067** 
Time in country -.050** .015* -.009† -.034* .029** .012 .005 -.144*** -.026† -.107*** -.075*** -.039* -.007 
Language: Nevere -.150* -.679*** -.109 -.060 -.370** -.098 -.388*** -.187 -.232*** -.030 -.320** .003 -.152** 
Language: Sometimese -.188*** -.079 -.068 -.106*** -.223** -.213*** -.291*** .225*** -.169*** -.044 .084 -.203* -.098* 
Open climate .074*** .073*** .055*** .034*** .127*** .107*** .099*** .076*** .072*** .054*** .078*** .056*** .058*** 
Extracurricularsf .046* .098*** .060** .031* -.011 .176† .068* .172*** .008 .013 -.021 .025 .013 
Interactions              
Imm x Female            -.301*  
Imm x Over-age          -.388***    
Imm x Few books       .178*    -.089 .067** -.339** 
Imm x Many books       .053    .491**  -.088 
Imm x Time in ctry .050*   .034*    .158***  .087*** .086***   
Imm x Lang. never  .759*   .359†  .454** -.440†     -.012 
Imm x Lang. some  -.120   .194  .396*** -.337**     -.246* 
              
RANDOM EFFECTS              
Mean knldg/skills .046*** .026*** .063*** .051*** .009*** .016*** .033*** .036*** .061*** .026*** .094*** .040*** .067*** 
Level-1 error .125 .163 .125 .118 .231 .243 .201 .228 .142 .119 .163 .145 .131 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects. All variables have been centered around their grand mean.   
Reference groups: a Native  b Male  c Target age (13-15 years)  d Average # of books  e School language at home always  f No extracurricular participation   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001   
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Table E-2. Extracurricular participation: Within-school results by region and country, with interaction effects. 
 Western Europe Nordic Europe Southern Europe Central Europe 
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FIXED EFFECTS              
Mean participation 3.098*** 4.943*** 1.294** 1.915*** 8.466*** 21.107*** 5.936*** 8.432*** .827** 2.740*** 2.015*** 2.879*** .458*** 
Immigrant gapa  142.758** 2.150 1.218 1.383 2.559† 1.096 1.329 .002* 1.812 1.936† .558 .874 1.322 
Femaleb   1.139 2.079*** 1.404** 1.499*** 1.138 2.745*** 1.137 1.455* 1.233† 1.107 1.561*** 1.225† 1.752*** 
Under-agec 4.736†  2.740*           
Over-agec .514  .752 1.058  2.594  1.923 .981 .929 1.699 1.037  
Books: Fewd .784 .886 .756* .642*** .653* .276** .962 .920 .861 .591*** .737* .802 .858 
Books: Manyd 2.027*** 1.674** 1.705*** .950 1.473* .893 1.938** .966 1.784** 1.052 1.583*** 1.096 1.264* 
Time in country 1.475** 1.095* 1.066† 1.072* 1.152* 1.082 1.034 .721 1.002 1.067 1.033 .912 1.068 
Language: Nevere 1.418 2.339 1.158 .872 .920 2.178 1.254 .324 .703 .627 .403  .740 
Language: Sometimese 1.390 2.296* 1.030 .854 .563 .934 1.062  1.145 .942 1.427 5.570* 1.050 
Open climate 1.102 1.217** 1.046 1.043 1.123 1.160 1.098 1.014 1.035 1.144 1.182** 1.167* 1.080 
Civic knowledge 1.438* 1.994*** 1.555** 1.355** .957 2.085 1.353 2.186*** 1.127 1.124 .896 1.071 1.073 
Interactions              
Imm x Female  .410†            
Imm x Over-age        .187* 3.761†     
Imm x Few books        3.698*   .077*   
Imm x Many books        10.486*   2.997   
Imm x Time in ctry .690**       1.496†      
Imm x Lang. never              
Imm x Lang. some            .011**  
              
RANDOM EFFECTS              
Mean participation .464*** .103* .381*** .285*** .070 .001 .309*** .189** .266*** .261*** .151*** .242*** .488*** 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects.  All estimates are in the form of odds ratios.  All variables have been centered 
around their grand mean.   
Reference groups: a Native  b Male  c Target age (13-15 years)  d Average # of books  e School language at home always  
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001   
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Table E-3. Attitude toward women’s rights and opportunities: Within-school results by region and country, with interaction effects. 
 Western Europe Nordic Europe Southern Europe Central Europe 
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FIXED EFFECTS              
Mean odds of less 
positive attitude .563*** .227*** .416*** .290*** .243*** .202*** .310*** .541*** .523*** .429*** .449*** .760*** .782*** 
Immigrant gapa  .914 1.537 1.226 1.164 .605† .435* 1.326 .848 1.412 2.226* .866 1.566 1.668 
Femaleb   .243*** .169*** .231*** .176*** .197*** .128*** .253*** .134*** .215*** .463*** .281*** .212*** .401*** 
Under-agec .607  1.611           
Over-agec .583  1.124 1.219 .479 .452 .970 1.381 1.224 .784 .557 1.077 1.108 
Books: Fewd 1.409† 1.203 .925 1.102 1.148 1.188 .918 1.142 1.206† 1.163† .893 1.348 1.344** 
Books: Manyd .966 1.252 1.010 .955 .799† .813* .961 .936 .822 1.052 .987 .702*** .910 
Time in country 1.049 .982 .950† .998 .911* .977 1.109* .991 1.029 1.145** .956 1.036 1.038 
Language: Nevere .861 5.700* 1.038 1.570 .167** 1.504 1.629 2.335 1.794* .652 11.943† 1.304 1.220 
Language: Sometimese .780 1.182 1.071 .767† .892 .848 .630* 25.404* 1.320* 1.005 .575 .450 1.288 
Open climate .775** .733*** .736*** .796*** .755*** .712*** .785*** .796*** .833** .699*** .792*** .859** .810*** 
Civic knowledge .228*** .401*** .389*** .292*** .317*** .315*** .186*** .170*** .202*** .195*** .414*** .295*** .336*** 
Extracurricularsf  .714** .897 .826† .901 .795 .672† .992 .945 .966 .987 .853 .841 .947 
Interactions              
Imm x Female   .711†   2.742* .322***       
Imm x Under-age   .054**           
Imm x Over-age   .747           
Imm x Few books  2.437  .921   4.771***    4.254   
Imm x Many books  .311†  .435*   .924    5.581*   
Imm x Time in ctry              
Imm x Lang. never 1.728      .735 1.224 1.136  .020*   
Imm x Lang. some 4.297**      2.007* .031* .136*  3.736   
              
RANDOM EFFECTS              
Mean attitude .220*** .115*** .153*** .235*** .018 .099** .178*** .120*** .082*** .070** .162*** .150*** .115*** 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects.  All estimates are in the form of odds ratios.  All variables have been centered 
around their grand mean.   
Reference groups: a Native  b Male  c Target age (13-15 years)  d Average # of books  e School language at home always  f No extracurricular participation   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001   
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Table E-4. Attitude toward immigrants’ rights and opportunities: Within-school results by region and country, with interaction effects. 
 Western Europe Nordic Europe Southern Europe Central Europe 
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FIXED EFFECTS              
Mean attitude .087† -.003 -.332*** -.218*** -.113*** .202*** .620*** .315*** -.045* .195*** .061** -.219*** -.058* 
Immigrant gapa  .243 .029 .134* .415*** -.949** 2.990*** -1.132 .269 .347† .208 -.408* .338* -.038 
Femaleb   .216** .295*** .220*** .381*** .456*** .522*** .316*** .221*** .239*** .045 .246*** .156** .149*** 
Under-agec .172  -.184 -.701          
Over-agec .280  .054 -.116 .129 1.976 -.491 .140 .052 -.009 .030 .058 .635 
Books: Fewd .056 -.037 -.040 -.013 -.019 .017 .097 .008 -.056 .084† -.033 .153* .019 
Books: Manyd -.074 -.022 -.024 .007 .045 .195*** .108* -.015 -.006 .022 .013 .034 .007 
Time in country -.045* -.008 -.029* -.024† -.051* .145** -.152* -.033† -.013 -.035* -.005 -.034† .002 
Language: Nevere -.007 1.444* .942 -.002 .233 -.395 .052 .360 .050 .293 .242 .340 .309** 
Language: Sometimese .585*** .673*** 1.026*** .865*** .703** .831*** .592*** -.815† .034 .060 .382 .068 .051 
Open climate .107** .091* .184*** .041* .139*** .207*** .250*** .186*** .155*** .178*** .087*** .094*** .162*** 
Civic knowledge .314*** .182** .307*** .381*** .415*** .314*** .314*** .340*** .328*** .263*** .182*** .138** .146** 
Extracurricularsf  -.025 -.0002 -.096* -.024 .071 .265** .090 -.006 .065* .023 .092* .032 -.029 
Interactions              
Imm x Female      -.542**  -.338*   .431*   
Imm x Few books -.418† -.244  .260* .496** .718**    -.238†    
Imm x Many books -.223 .583*  .112 -.059 .240    -.711**    
Imm x Time in ctry     .097*** -.162** .111†       
Imm x Lang. never .789† -1.827 -.750 .185 .659† -.159 .346 -.748  .892*    
Imm x Lang. some -.645* -.525† -.519* -.610*** .144 -.655** -.442** .952*  .141    
              
RANDOM EFFECTS              
Mean attitude .094*** .168*** .118*** .136*** .068*** .039*** .138*** .018*** .030*** .009* .018*** .028** .042*** 
Immigrant gap     .319**    .465***   .403***  
Level-1 error 1.000 .960 .816 .851 .812 1.078 .982 .799 .559 .588 .558 .559 .592 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects.  All variables have been centered around their grand mean, except where the 
immigrant gap has a random effect.  In that instance, immigrant status is centered around its group mean.   
Reference groups: a Native  b Male  c Target age (13-15 years)  d Average # of books  e School language at home always  f No extracurricular participation   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001   
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Table E-5. Attitude toward ethnic minorities’ rights and opportunities: Within-school results by region and country, with interaction effects. 
 Western Europe Nordic Europe Southern Europe Central Europe 
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FIXED EFFECTS              
Mean attitude .149** .312*** -.324*** -.179*** -.145*** .157*** .188*** .149*** -.054* .320*** .080* -.236*** -.024 
Immigrant gapa  .068 -.454** .302** .526*** .895*** .293 .106 .131 .310† -.166 -.117 .162 -.139 
Femaleb   .394*** .377*** .324*** .449*** .455*** .486*** .181*** .205*** .230*** .167*** .315*** .197*** .178*** 
Under-agec .069  -.203 -1.792†          
Over-agec .483†  .052 -.119 .057 -.095 .148 .090 -.108 .115 -.236 -.070 .162 
Books: Fewd .008 -.121† .011 -.0002 -.046 -.040 .119* .087* -.137** -.029 .023 .209*** -.110** 
Books: Manyd -.118 -.052 .057 .090† -.026 .147* .120* -.029 -.006 -.130† .022 .127** .045 
Time in country -.035† -.034* -.044** .001 .064** -.040 -.022 -.019 .004 -.030* .020 -.001 -.032 
Language: Nevere -.221 .052 .995 .155 .461* -.413** .255 -.546*** .052 .415 .271 .131 .222† 
Language: Sometimese .314† .277* .754** .638*** .585*** .382 .273** -.563*** -.010 -.332** .273 -.250 .059 
Open climate .150*** .184*** .199*** .076*** .124*** .209*** .222*** .169*** .142*** .175*** .137*** .155*** .165*** 
Civic knowledge .482*** .559*** .358*** .400*** .417*** .397*** .558*** .276*** .394*** .503*** .257*** .091* .230*** 
Extracurricularsf  .052 .107† -.047 -.049 .068 .358** .146* .048 .096** .033 .048 .071 .060 
Interactions              
Imm x Female   -.278*  -.391† -.377*        
Imm x Over-age        -.417†      
Imm x Few books  .003  .278*  .591*     .218   
Imm x Many books  .506*  .054  .261     -.413*   
Imm x Lang. never .299  -1.078 .109  .027 -.571* -.594†  .693    
Imm x Lang. some -.670*  -.501* -.495***  -.760* -.220 .597**  .751**    
              
RANDOM EFFECTS: VARIANCE IN…            
Mean attitude .088*** .024*** .103*** .156*** .041*** .015** .018* .011** .032*** .015** .039*** .030*** .040*** 
Immigrant gap         .419**     
Level-1 error 1.030 .861 1.023 .903 .869 .760 .831 .716 .653 .736 .667 .638 .714 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects.  All variables have been centered around their grand mean, except where the 
immigrant gap has a random effect.  In that instance, immigrant status is centered around its group mean.   
Reference groups: a Native  b Male  c Target age (13-15 years)  d Average # of books  e School language at home always  f No extracurricular participation   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001   
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Table E-5. Patriotism: Within-school results by region and country, with interaction effects. 
 Western Europe Nordic Europe Southern Europe Central Europe 
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FIXED EFFECTS              
Mean patriotism -.673*** -.205*** -.400*** -.290*** -.026 .050 -.397*** .802*** -.087*** .495*** .147*** .112*** .186*** 
Immigrant gapa  -.188 .621 -.233* -.445*** .070 -.156 -.550** -.571*** -.102 -.179 -.019 -.072 -.305* 
Femaleb   -.015 -.303*** -.471*** -.250*** -.112* -.249*** -.367*** .133** -.216*** -.171*** -.113** -.082* -.178** 
Under-agec -.291  -.157 .785          
Over-agec -.017  -.007 .097 .127 .091 1.352 -.035 -.132 -.074 -.138 .024 -.735** 
Books: Fewd -.081 .022 .066 -.049 -.078 -.0001 .190** .025 .031 -.034 .016 -.023 .025 
Books: Manyd -.093 -.170* -.101† -.079† -.023 .034 -.034 -.118 -.038 -.087 .075* -.004 -.127** 
Time in country .024 .062† -.006 -.015 .026 .008 .006 -.014 .006 .022 .013 .008 -.005 
Language: Nevere -.330† -.871* -.873** -.181 .263 -.167 -.378† -.669† .018 -.108 -.613** .200 -.156 
Language: Sometimese -.376*** -.886*** -.352** -.520*** -.875*** -.710*** -.483*** -.632** .102* -.341** -.302† .097 -.119 
Open climate .098*** .122*** .030 .114*** .079** .161*** .120*** .225*** .119*** .169*** .105*** .127*** .084** 
Civic knowledge .057 -.064 -.332*** -.180*** -.158** -.201*** -.167** .038 -.031 -.045 -.201*** .095* -.260*** 
Extracurricularsf  .114* .154* .069 -.035 .089 .177 -.153* .077 -.006 .090* .053 .089* .092* 
Interactions              
Imm x Female  .343* .192† .271**   .395**       
Imm x Under-age -.589             
Imm x Over-age 1.157*        .790*     
Imm x Few books      -.335†   -.135   .728**  
Imm x Many books      -.246   -.522*   -.165  
Imm x Time in ctry  .062†   -.031*         
Imm x Lang. never    -.362 -.611† .208 -.308  -.769*   -.453  
Imm x Lang. some    .366** .475 .468† .343*  -.161   -1.768**  
              
RANDOM EFFECTS              
Mean patriotism .049*** .024*** .099*** .073*** .031** .033*** .063*** .033*** .028*** .044*** .025*** .024*** .089*** 
Immigrant gap .228* .230* .116**  .493***    .271*   .204*  
Level-1 error .804 .788 .806 .837 .700 .765 1.013 .796 .642 .650 .605 .636 .762 
Note: Table contains HLM coefficients under fixed effects and variance components under random effects.  All variables have been centered around their grand mean, except where the 
immigrant gap has a random effect.  In that instance, immigrant status is centered around its group mean.   
Reference groups: a Native  b Male  c Target age (13-15 years)  d Average # of books  e School language at home always  f No extracurricular participation   
† p < 0.1  * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001   
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